

A CRITIQUE OF MORAL VEGETARIANISM

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VEGETARIANISM is an old and respectable doctrine, and its popularity seems to be growing.¹ This would be of little interest to moral philosophers except for one fact, namely that some people advocate vegetarianism on moral grounds. Indeed, two well-known moral and social philosophers, Robert Nozick and Peter Singer, have recently advocated not eating meat on moral grounds.²

One job of a moral philosophy should be to evaluate vegetarianism as a moral position, a position I will call moral vegetarianism. Unfortunately, there has been little critical evaluation of moral vegetarianism in the philosophical literature. Most moral philosophers have not been concerned with the problem, and those who have, e.g., Nozick, have made little attempt to analyze and evaluate the position. As a result, important problems implicit in the moral vegetarian's position have gone unnoticed, and unsound arguments are still widely accepted.

In this paper, I will critically examine moral vegetarianism. My examination will not be complete, of course. Some of the arguments I will present are not worked out in detail, and no detailed criticisms of any one provegetarian argument will be given. All the major provegetarian arguments I know will be critically considered, however. My examination will be divided into two parts. First, I will raise some questions that usually are not asked, let alone answered, by moral vegetarians. These questions will have the effect of forcing the moral vegetarian to come to grips with some ambiguities and unclaritys in his position. Second, I will consider critically some of the major arguments given for moral vegetarianism.

VARIETIES OF MORAL VEGETARIANISM

Moral vegetarianism will be understood as the view that because of some moral principles one ought not to eat certain edible animals and perhaps animal products. Two varieties of moral vegetarianism can be distinguished: lactovo moral vegetarianism and vegan moral vegetarianism. On the lactovo variety, eating animal products, e.g., milk and eggs, would not be considered morally wrong, although eating certain animals would be; on the vegan variety, eating animal products would be morally forbidden as well.

Lactovo and vegan moral vegetarianism can be subdivided into what might be called new and old or traditional moral vegetarianism. On the traditional position, justification of vegetarianism was in terms of animal welfare, happiness, rights, and so on. In recent years another type of justification has been given: vegetarianism has been justified in terms of human suffering, rights, etc. There is, of course, nothing incompatible with using both kinds of considerations in justifying vegetarianism. What seems to be absent in some recent vegetarian arguments, however, is any consideration of animals. (Arguments for the new moral vegetarianism will be considered later.)

It is clear that in order to have any plausibility moral vegetarianism must be construed as the view that there is a *prima facie* duty, rather than an absolute duty, not to eat meat or animal products. Suppose a mad scientist will blow up the world unless you consume a beef steak. If the duty not to eat meat were an absolute one, you should not eat the steak. But surely this is absurd. So the duty not to eat meat cannot be an absolute one. The important question, then, is when this alleged *prima facie* duty can be overruled.

In old moral vegetarianism one can distinguish at least two positions (a hard-line and a moderate position) on this question, and these can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose you are marooned on a desert island inhabited by edible birds. Suppose there is no edible plant life on the island and you have a gun. For nonvegetarians the choice is easy. You should survive as best you can, and

killing the birds and eating them is the only way, given the situation as described. But what does the nonvegetarian assume in arguing in this way? Presumably that a bird's life is less valuable than one's own. This is exactly what strict moral vegetarians would question.

Consider a different situation. Suppose that instead of birds the island contains people. Would it be morally permissible for you to kill some people and eat them? It is certainly not clear that it would be, unless perhaps all the people on the island agree to some form of cannibalism and draw lots to decide who is to be sacrificed for food. The question that would be asked by the hard-line moral vegetarian is why there is a difference if there are birds on the island instead of people. It would be argued that to suppose that a bird's life is less valuable than a human life is a form of speciesism, a doctrine of prejudice analogous to racism and sexism. On this hard-line view one ought never to kill any nonhuman animal unless it were right to kill a human being in the same circumstance. Clearly in our second hypothetical situation, it would be said, it would not be right to kill a human being for food. Consequently it would be wrong to kill and eat a bird.

A vegetarian holding a moderate position might argue that it is *prima facie* wrong to kill an animal for food but that certain human rights, e.g., the right to life, can override this *prima facie* wrong. On this view there are cases in which it would not be right to kill a human being but it would be right to kill an animal. One such case would be where human life depended on the nourishment that animals give when killed and eaten. Note that this would not justify the killing and consuming of animals in contemporary society where various meat substitutes are available. An important question for the moderate is: On what plausible moral principle can the distinction between animals and human beings be made?

SOME PROBLEMS OF MORAL VEGETARIANISM

With respect to traditional moral vegetarianism some problems immediately come to the fore. Who exactly is not supposed to eat animals or products of animals? This

problem is especially acute with respect to carnivorous animals. What animals is it morally wrong to eat? The answer to this becomes problematic with respect to micro-organisms but also with respect to animals that might be capable of consenting to being eaten. If animals could be created by genetic engineering, could they be created so that there were no moral objections to eating them? Depending on the answer to this question, moral arguments for vegetarianism could be undercut by technology. What exactly is an animal product, and how does an animal product differ morally from an animal part? This brings up the question of how one can distinguish between what is forbidden by lactovo moral vegetarianism and vegan moral vegetarianism. Let us consider some of these problems in more detail.

*Who Should Not Eat Meat, or
What Does a Vegetarian Feed His Dog?*

Vegetarians certainly cannot think that only vegetarians have a prima facie duty not to eat animals or animal products. For if they base their beliefs on a moral position it must be universalizable. But what is the extent of the universal moral principle? Presumably it would include all human beings, whether they are in the habit of eating animals or not. But why would it not extend to all animals, including carnivorous animals?

One might be inclined to say that this question is beside the point. Since animals cannot be judged morally praiseworthy or blameworthy, the question of whether it is morally wrong for *them* to eat meat cannot be raised. But this reply is based on a confusion between the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of a moral agent and the rightness or wrongness of the action of an agent. Although animals may be free from blame in eating meat since they are not moral agents, animals in eating meat may still be doing something that is prima facie wrong.

Does this mean that a vegetarian would have to feed his dog some meat substitute? Not necessarily. The vegetarian might argue that there are other considerations that

outweigh the prima facie wrong. For example, he might maintain that dogs need meat to live or at least to be healthy; that it would be more morally wrong for him to deprive the dog of life or health than morally wrong to feed it meat. In the case of human beings, the situation is different. Human beings can do without meat.

Now whether dogs can live and thrive without meat I do not know. It is certainly not self-evident that they could not live on meat substitutes. But even if dogs needed meat to live, it is not obvious that it is prima facie less wrong to eat meat than wrong to sacrifice a dog's health or life. This becomes especially true when one realizes that vegetarians often argue that a reason that it is prima facie wrong to eat animals is that animals must be killed to provide the food. So in order to save the dog's life or health, *another* animal must die.

The vegetarian with a dog might also argue that, even if a dog could survive on a nonmeat diet, to refuse to give the dog meat would not be in keeping with the dog's right to eat what it wants and what dogs want is meat. This argument cuts too deep, however. Many humans want to eat meat, but this does not stop vegetarians from saying that it is wrong for people to eat meat. Moreover, it is unclear why the dog's wants should overrule the alleged prima facie wrong of eating meat, especially when this wrong is based on the alleged prima facie wrong of killing an animal.

The issue of what the vegetarian should feed his dog is just the beginning of the problem. What should the attitude of a vegetarian be toward "nature red in tooth and claw"? The vegetarian *knows* that some animals in the wild eat other animals. Should he oppose this eating? If so, how? What other values should be sacrificed in order to prevent the killing and eating of wild animals by other wild animals? Suppose it were discovered that with proper training lions and tigers could live on zebra-flavored soy products. Should vegetarians promote a society that trains lions and tigers to eat such meat substitutes? This training would involve interfering with the freedom of lions and tigers, with the ecological balance, and so on. Many morally sensitive persons would look with disfavor on this interference. How

much should the disvalue of this interference be weighed against the prevention of the killing of animal life?

What Meat Should Not Be Eaten?

What is forbidden meat? Most moral vegetarians list fish and fowl as animals one should not eat. But what about microorganisms? Vegan vegetarians who eat only vegetables, fruit, and nuts do not completely remove all microorganisms from their food, even with repeated cleaning. Has the vegetarian who eats microorganisms along with his salad sinned against his own principles? Vegetarians may attempt to justify the eating of microorganisms in three different ways.

First, it may be argued that only animals who can feel pain are not to be eaten. Since it is unlikely that microorganisms can feel pain, the vegetarian can eat them without scruples. But this suggestion has a peculiar implication. If beef cattle who could not feel pain were developed, then it would be permissible to eat them. The ability to feel pain is not an obviously plausible way of morally distinguishing microorganisms from other organisms.

Second, it might be argued that although it is wrong to kill microorganisms, it is not obvious that eating them kills them. Neither is it obvious, however, that eating microorganisms does not kill them. Scientific research and expertise are needed here.

This brings us to the third attempt at justification. Let us suppose that some microorganisms that are eaten are killed, e.g., by the digestive workings of the body. The question can be raised: Why should these organisms be killed and others not be killed? What is the *moral* difference between killing a microorganism in the digesting of other food and killing a hog, e.g., in order to eat and digest it. Some vegetarians might argue that there is a difference. Killing a hog can be avoided. We do not need meat, let alone pork, in order to live. But we do need to digest food in order to live. If some microorganisms must be killed in the process, this is unfortunate but necessary for human life. But the question remains. Why should microorganisms be sacrificed rather

than humans? Why is human life more valued than the life of microorganisms?

One might be inclined to say that human beings are more valuable because of their intelligence. One might first ask, "Why does higher intelligence mean that one species is more valuable than other species?" Second, there are other species besides human beings that have high intelligence, e.g., chimpanzees and dolphins. What should our moral attitude be toward eating members of these species? This problem becomes crucial when the notion of consent is brought in.

Suppose there is a man who wishes to end his life but regrets never having given his poor and hungry family any pleasure. He requests that after his death his wife prepare a lavish dinner with him as the main course. The members of his family have no objections; on the contrary, they rather relish the idea. Putting aside any moral objections to his suicide, what moral objections would there be to a family having Papa for Sunday dinner if it is okay with Papa? In a word, what is wrong with cannibalism among consenting adults?

Whatever one thinks about voluntary cannibalism among humans, it may be argued that the situation is very different with animals. After all, we cannot communicate with them in any meaningful way, and besides, from their behavior it seems clear that they don't want to die. (Animals in the wild try to escape from hunters.) But recent experiments with chimpanzees suggest that the day may be near when we can ask trained chimpanzees if they want to be eaten for food. Suppose some of them say yes (in American sign language). Suppose there is good reason to assume that they understand the question. Indeed, some of them might express enthusiasm for the idea. Would not eating these animals be morally permissible? If not, why not?

Even if no chimpanzee would consent to being used for food, one can certainly imagine animals that would consent. In his comic strip, *Little Abner*, Al Capp created an animal called a shmoo whose greatest joy was to be eaten. We may smile at the absurdity of this idea. But shmoo-type creatures may not just be creations of cartoonists in the next century;

they may be creations of genetic engineers.

Suppose a shmoolike animal were developed, a creature programmed to want to be eaten for food. Would there be anything wrong in eating it? One might object that the act of creating such animals was morally wrong and consequently that eating them would be morally wrong. It is not clear, however, that the creation of shmoos would be morally wrong. But even if it were, it does not follow that eating them after they were wrongly created would be morally wrong. After all, shmoos want to be eaten and are unhappy if they are not eaten. It may be wrong to create creatures with such a desire, but once such creatures exist it seems cruel not to fulfill their desire.

Still, one might argue that eating such animals is wrong because it is necessary to kill them in order to eat them. And killing animals is wrong, since (1) killing involves inflicting pain and inflicting pain is wrong and (2) animals that have a self-concept have a right to life and killing animals with a right to life is wrong. But recall that shmoos want to be eaten. If they have a right to life because they have a self-concept, they surely also have a right to die and the right to suffer pain in the process if they desire.

Furthermore, genetic engineering may develop animals that lack all of the properties that vegetarians usually associate with the wrongness of killing animals for food: (1) the ability to feel pain, (2) consciousness, (3) having a self-concept. Suppose that by genetic engineering we could develop beef cattle that were born unconscious and remained unconscious all of their lives (they would be fed and bred artificially). Such animals would be incapable of feeling pain or having experiences of any kind. Would it be permissible to eat them? If not, why not?

Furthermore, genetic engineering might be able to produce meat-bearing animals that could be used for food without being killed. If so, no moral objection based on the killing of animals could be raised to the eating of meat. Suppose by genetic engineering it was possible to develop an animal that shed its legs periodically and grew new ones. Would it be morally permissible to eat such legs? If not, why not?

Now it might be argued that although such animals were not being killed they were being exploited. So it is still morally wrong to eat their meat. But it might also be possible to develop animals that periodically shed their legs and wanted to have their shed legs eaten, animals whose psychological health and well-being depended on such eating. Would these animals also be exploited? If so, would this be immoral? To be sure, we would be using the animals and in this sense would be exploiting them. But the animals would be happy to be used. Indeed, they would want their limbs eaten just as much as we would want to eat them. In this sense, they would *not* be being exploited.

What Is an Animal Part?

The last example suggests the difficulty of making a clear distinction between an animal part and an animal product. If a genetically engineered animal's legs periodically fell off, would not its legs be more like a product of an animal (analogous to eggs) than a part of the animal? If so, the lactovo vegetarian should have no qualms about someone's eating such legs.

This sort of question can also be raised without benefit of hypothetical examples from future genetic engineering. Suppose someone enjoys drinking the blood of cattle and hogs. Suppose further that such blood is obtained without killing the animal and without causing the animal pain. Would the blood drinker be sinning against the principles of lactovo moral vegetarianism or just the principles of vegan moral vegetarianism? Would the blood be analogous to milk or eggs?

Functionally, we might attempt to distinguish between an animal product and an animal part in the following way: X is a part of an animal A if X is derived or could be derived from A and A could not function well without X. X is a product of an animal A if X is derived from A and A can function well without X and X has some useful purpose for some Z. On this analysis, the shed legs of genetically designed leg-shedding animals would be a product, not a part; the blood of an

animal taken in small quantities would be a product and not a part.

But this account seems overly permissive in one respect. One can imagine the possibility of amputating the legs of animals and using them for food and fitting the animals with mechanical limbs that enabled them to function normally. Would we still wish to say that the amputated limbs were products rather than parts of the animals?

Moreover, this account also seems overly restrictive in one respect. Suppose there was a breed of sheep that became very ill when the sheep's fleece was removed; they did not function normally. Or suppose that by genetic engineering we could develop a milk-producing animal that became sick when it had the milk removed by members of other species, e.g., human beings. On the above definitions the wool and the milk of such animals would not be animal products.

These conceptual difficulties do not show that a distinction between parts and products of animals cannot be made in individual cases. But they do point up the difficulty of making any general distinction between parts and products and the correlated difficulty of making a clear distinction between vegan and lactovo vegetarianism.

The above problems and questions should give vegetarians some pause. They suggest that any simple moral vegetarianism is impossible. There are many complex problems connected with moral vegetarianism, and a fully articulate and comprehensive moral vegetarianism is yet to be produced.

Still, it might be maintained that this does not mean that moral vegetarianism is an unsound view. After all, it might be said, there are unsolved problems implicit in any moral position. Although there may be difficult problems at the core of moral vegetarianism, it may be maintained that there are sound reasons for taking the position.

ARGUMENTS FOR MORAL VEGETARIANISM

A variety of arguments have been given for vegetarianism. Sometimes they take such a sketchy form that it is not completely clear they are moral arguments. I outline two

arguments of this sort in what follows in order to illustrate some of the difficulties in evaluating moral vegetarianism. Even when it is clear that a moral argument is intended, however, exactly what the premises of the argument are is not always clear. There appears to be a gap in some of the arguments that it is difficult to fill with plausible premises.

The Argument from Monkeys

According to Gerald Carson, Dr. John Harvey Kellogg, a well-known advocate of vegetarianism and inventor of some eighty ready-to-eat breakfast foods, used to persuade people to adopt vegetarianism in the following way:

Dr. Kellogg, a superb publicist, kept a morose chimpanzee, which he used for a stunt. The doctor would toss a juicy beefsteak to the suspicious animal. The chimp would examine it and quickly slam the meat right back at him. Then Dr. Kellogg would offer a banana, which the ape munched with evident enjoyment. Kellogg drew the conclusion "Eat what the monkey eats — our nearest relative."³

I assume — although this assumption may not be justified — that Dr. Kellogg was using this stunt to show the moral superiority of vegetarianism. But it is unclear what premises Dr. Kellogg was presupposing to get his conclusion, "Eat what the monkey eats." Is he assuming that man's meat eating is a perversion of his natural instincts, which are inherited from monkeys? But even if this is true, what moral import does this have unless one also assumes that what is natural should be done? Yet this further assumption is surely unjustified. After all, it may be quite natural for both chimpanzees and men to perform acts of violence. But it is questionable whether they should perform them.

Perhaps the assumption is only that one should eat what man's nearest relative in evolutionary development eats. But aside from the fact that the truth of this ethical assumption is not obvious, it is not true that monkeys are man's nearest relatives. Scientists have discovered closer relatives of homo sapiens than monkeys, e.g., homo erectus.

There is little reason to suppose that all of these near relatives were vegetarians.

Finally, one cannot resist asking the question: What would Dr. Kellogg's chimp have done if Dr. Kellogg had tossed it a bowl of corn flakes? The animal's response and the conclusion "Eat what the monkey eats" could have ended Dr. Kellogg's breakfast-cereal empire.

The Argument from Glass-Walled Slaughter Houses

Mel Morse, former president of the Humane Society of the United States, once remarked: "If every one of our slaughter houses were constructed of glass this would be a nation of vegetarians."⁴ One might assume — although again this assumption may not be justified — that Mr. Morse was using this consideration as a moral argument for vegetarianism. But what exactly does the argument construed as a moral argument amount to? Perhaps it can be unpacked in this way: the blood and gore of slaughter houses is disgusting and is enough to turn many people's stomachs; so if people saw what went on in slaughter houses, they would not eat meat; consequently one should become a vegetarian.

But the argument so construed is weak. Even granted the premises, the moral conclusion does not follow from the factual premises. The general premises about natural reactions do not yield ethical conclusions. Furthermore, the argument cuts too deep. It should be noted that people might have strong negative gut reactions to large-scale food preparation having nothing to do with meat or animal products. One suspects that there would be fewer peanut butter lovers if the walls of peanut butter factories were made of glass, for it has been reported by *Consumer Reports* (May 1972) that rodent hairs and other disgusting materials were found in many of the jars of peanut butter they tested. Conditions inside peanut butter factories may be less than appetizing, yet this hardly provides moral grounds for refraining from eating peanut butter. Even if sanitary conditions were improved, the sight of tons of peanuts being ground and large vats of peanut butter being processed

might have a depressing effect on one's desire for a peanut butter sandwich. But again this is hardly moral grounds for not eating peanut butter.

The Argument from Speciesism

If there is some doubt whether the arguments from monkeys and from glass walls should be considered moral arguments, there can be no doubt about the moral import of the argument from speciesism.⁵ According to this argument, the view that eating the meat of nonhuman animals is morally permissible but eating the meat of human beings is morally forbidden is analogous to racism or sexism. Just as racism and sexism are to be morally condemned, so is speciesism. Although there are differences between races and sexes, there are no morally relevant differences that justify differences in treatment. Similarly, although there are differences between human beings and other animals, there are no moral differences that justify human beings' killing and eating animals but not killing and eating one another. Moreover, since it is morally wrong to kill and eat human beings, it is morally wrong to kill and eat animals.

This argument of the vegetarian has a point. Animal species per se is not a morally relevant distinction. Consequently, nonvegetarians are not on firm ground if they justify killing and eating animals simply on the ground that the animals are not humans. On the other hand, the animal kingdom per se (in contrast to particular animal species) does not provide any morally relevant grounds for the positive content of vegetarianism. To suppose otherwise would be a form of kingdomism, no different in principle from the speciesism, racism, and sexism that this argument condemns. After all, what is the justification for eating plants and not animals? Is there a morally relevant difference between the two? The vegetarian, to make his case, must draw a line — a morally relevant line — between the plant kingdom and the animal kingdom. For this another argument is needed.

The argument usually provided by vegetarians to fill the void created by the argument from speciesism is this:

Animals are sentient creatures; they feel pain and have other feelings. But no plant is sentient; no plant can see, hear, or feel.⁶ Consequently, it is wrong to eat animals but not wrong to eat plants.

Two questions can be raised about this argument from sentience. First, is it really true that plants feel no pain? The recent bestseller, *The Secret Life of Plants*, and other less well known studies may give us some pause.⁷ To be sure, most biologists have not taken the thesis of the mental life of plants seriously, and in the light of our present evidence they are undoubtedly justified. But what if new biological findings were to indicate that speculations about the mental life of plants should be taken seriously? Should we then stop eating plants as well as animals?

Without new discoveries in synthetic food made from inorganic material, our refraining from eating plants would spell the end of the human species. But is species suicide really necessary? After all, why should the discovery that plants feel pain have any effect on whether we eat them or not? Presumably this discovery should have some effect on how we *kill* plants. If we knew that plants felt pain, our killing them would, or at least should, take a humane form. We might somehow anesthetize grain before it was harvested, and so on. But it is completely unclear why the knowledge that plants feel pain should prevent our eating them.

This brings me to the second point. Even if animals but not plants feel pain, why should this make any difference to whether we eat animals or not? One would have thought that an animal's ability to feel pain would be morally relevant, not to whether it should be killed and eaten, but to *how* it should be killed if it is to be eaten. Because animals feel pain they should not suffer. But so long as they are not made to suffer it is unclear what relevance their sentience has for vegetarians.

The Argument from Actual Practice

Still, it may be objected that this is to overlook actual practice. In fact, animals used for food do suffer a great deal.

Not only are they killed in cruel ways, but it is well documented that they are raised in ways that cause them great discomfort and agony. Consequently, one ought not to eat meat until actual practice is changed.

Now there is no doubt that the actual treatment of animals used for food is immoral, that animals are made to suffer needlessly. The question that must be raised, however, is how the conclusion not to eat meat follows from this. One argument is this: The present practice of treating animals used for food is immoral and should be changed. So, if one wants to change the present practice, the best means is to stop eating meat. One ought to adopt the best means. Consequently, one ought not to eat meat. This seems to be one of Singer's basic arguments.

Becoming a vegetarian is not merely a symbolic gesture Becoming a vegetarian is the most practical and effective step one can take towards ending both the killing of non-human animals and the infliction of suffering upon them.⁸

There is at least one premise in this argument that seems questionable, namely, that the best means to change this practice is to stop eating meat. First, it is dubious that becoming a vegetarian would have much effect on present practice. Unless vegetarians were a large movement it would have little appreciable effect on the economic market. Surely the idea suggested by Singer that if only one person becomes a vegetarian he or she can *know* that his or her actions will contribute to the reduction of the suffering of animals is absurd.⁹

Second, even if it did have an economic impact, it is unclear whether this would cause a reduction in animal suffering. Knowing the irrationality of the market on the one hand and the cunning of meat producers on the other, one may well have doubts. Cattle might be overproduced because of government subsidies and new markets found for meat. Meat-packing companies might encourage, for example, an increased dog population to take up the slack.

In other contexts a similar phenomenon has occurred. It has been recently reported in the *Boston Globe* (Jane O'Reilly, "The Bottle and the 3rd World," July 8, 1976, p.

26) that in order to compensate for a declining birth rate in the U.S., infant formula producers expanded their market to Third World countries, saturating some of these countries with mass advertising. This advertising *created* a need; it did not fill any need. It is certainly likely that a similar phenomenon would occur if vegan vegetarianism became a widespread movement in the U.S. causing a decline in U.S. milk production.

More important, it might be a much more efficient means of changing practice to stage protests at meat-packing companies, put pressure on congressmen, and work through existing humane organizations. One suspects that the SPCA and the American Humane Society have done more to stop cruelty to animals than vegetarians ever could. That these organizations have not gone far enough and that wide areas of animal cruelty still exist does not show that their methods are wrong. In any case, which various political strategies would be most efficient for achieving humane treatment of animals is an empirical question. Vegetarianism is not *obviously* the best strategy, and its worth would have to be shown.

A different argument from actual practice can be made, however. It need not be claimed that refraining from eating meat is the best way to change the situation. It can be argued instead that by eating meat one is giving one's tacit consent or approval to the present situation, that the only way to be true to one's moral conviction that the present treatment of animals is inhumane is not to eat meat.

But is it true that by eating meat one is giving one's tacit consent to the cruel treatment of animals? It is certainly not clear *what* one gives one's tacit consent to in following a practice. If I visit Arlington Cemetery, do I give my tacit consent to the various wars that produced the graves? Certainly not. If I pay my taxes during the Vietnam war, does this mean I am tacitly supporting the war? It certainly is not clear that it does. What if I *don't* eat meat? Do I tacitly approve of Hare Krishna? That is absurd. The argument from tacit consent becomes extremely implausible when one remembers that most of the greatest workers for the elimination of animal suffering down through history have

been nonvegetarians. According to the present argument, these people would be inconsistent: they would be explicitly advocating elimination of cruelty and tacitly approving of it. Such a supposition seems ludicrous to me.

The trouble is, of course, that it is not clear what tacit approval is supposed to mean. One suggested analysis that may capture part of what might be meant is this: One tacitly approves of a practice or institution X by doing A if and only if doing A is instrumental in keeping X in existence. Consequently, to say that by eating meat one is tacitly approving of cruelty to animals is to say eating meat is instrumental in keeping the practice of cruelty in operation.

Interpreted in this way, however, the claim is either false or dubious or without force, depending on how one interprets "instrumental." "Instrumental in keeping X in existence" could mean a necessary condition for keeping X in existence. But my eating meat is not such a necessary condition for cruelty to animals. It could mean a sufficient condition for keeping X in existence. My eating meat, however, is not a sufficient condition for cruelty to animals. A more plausible candidate is this: "Instrumental in keeping X in existence" could mean "being part of a sufficient condition for keeping X in existence." I am not at all sure that my eating meat is a part of a sufficient condition that brings about cruelty to animals in operation, but suppose it is. The question arises: Why should such indirect causal influence have any moral import? The effect of my not eating meat on the way animals are treated would be virtually nil.

There is another reason that could be given for not eating meat in view of the present inhumane treatment of animals. It would be a way of protesting present practice, a way of saying, "I disagree strongly with the treatment of animals used for food." Certainly, not eating meat could have this protest function. But so could lots of other things: wearing an animal rights button, picketing meat-packing houses, and so on. The important question seems to me to be: Which kind of protest will be most effective in educating people to the cruelties? It is certainly not obvious that not eating meat will have the greatest effect. Indeed, it seems to me that more effective protest techniques are available, for example,

advertisements in the newspapers and protest marches.

Although it might be argued that there is something of an inconsistency in persisting in eating meat while maintaining that animals are being treated cruelly in producing meat, it is hard to see why this is so. It does not seem to be true in general that one is inconsistent if one uses a product that is produced by some process that one believes violates one's moral principles. Am I inconsistent if I drink fluoridated water rather than buy pure water when I believe that the government has no right to fluoridate water? Am I inconsistent if I am opposed to exploitation and buy an automobile from a company that I believe produces cars by exploiting labor? (If I were, then there would be an inconsistency in a Marxist living in a capitalistic society or buying anything produced by that society.) The answer seems to be: not necessarily. It is not obvious why the case of eating meat is different. We do well to remember that an inconsistency between an agent's moral principles and his practices can only be shown via the agent's other beliefs concerning the practice. Consequently, a moral principle and what might seem like an inconsistent practice can be consistent given other appropriate beliefs.¹⁰

In sum, then, not eating meat may well be used as a protest against cruelty to animals. But there is certainly no moral duty to protest in this way even if one thinks animals are being treated cruelly, and indeed, such a protest may not be the best means available. So it would seem that the argument from actual practice is not strong enough to justify not eating meat.

The Argument from Animal Rights

A stronger argument is made by people who maintain that animals have rights. In particular, it has been argued that animals have a right to life. So, even if animals are killed painlessly and raised for food in humane ways, it is wrong to kill them.¹¹ The question is, of course, whether animals do have a right to life.

The answer to this question turns on what is meant by having a right. The subject is a large and controversial one.

On some very sophisticated analyses of rights it is at least debatable whether all animals have the right to live. For example, on Tooley's analysis, having a right to life is the same as being a person. A necessary condition for being a person is having the capacity for desiring self-continuation, and for this it is necessary to have a concept of the self.¹²

Now, although it is plausible that adult animals of some very intelligent species, e.g., dolphins and chimpanzees, have such a concept, it is not clear that adult animals of other species do and it is very likely that young infants of any species do not. It is also probable that very subnormal adult human beings do not. On this analysis of right, then, many animals and some human beings may well not have the right to life although most human beings and some animals do have such a right.

This would not necessarily mean that animals have *no* rights. Presumably most animals — even infants — would have the right not to suffer. As Tooley puts it, although “something that is incapable of possessing the concept of a self cannot desire that a self not suffer, it can desire that a given sensation not exist. The state desired — the absence of a particular sensation — can be described in purely phenomenalistic language and hence without the concept of a continuing self.”¹³ Given this view of rights, then, many animals probably have no right to life, but all of them have a right not to have pain inflicted on them. Consequently, the killing of some animals for food, if done painlessly, is not morally objectionable.¹⁴

Some vegetarians have argued that it is impossible for one to maintain without absurdity that animals have a right not to suffer pain and yet have no right to life. For it is argued that since every animal will suffer at least once in its life, we have a duty to kill all animals painlessly to prevent this future suffering. To avoid this absurd consequence, it is said, we must admit that animals do have a right to life.¹⁵

I do not believe that this conclusion does follow, however. The absurd consequence would follow only if preventing animals from suffering was the only or at least the overriding factor to be considered. But this is surely dubious. After all, killing all animals would completely upset the ecological

balance of nature; it would destroy some creatures of great aesthetic value; it would destroy certain food sources for future generations; and so on. Consequently, any future suffering that could be prevented by killing animals now would have to be weighed carefully against other factors. It is certainly not obvious that these other factors would not tip the scale and allow many animals to live. Thus, humane nonvegetarians may argue that it is enough to try to prevent suffering to living animals as best we can without killing them in advance to prevent their possible suffering.

Some philosophers have disagreed with Tooley's analysis of person, and consequently with his analysis of right, and have given alternative analyses. But far from supporting moral vegetarianism, these alternative analyses seem to make moral vegetarianism even more difficult to support in terms of animal rights. S. I. Benn, in a critique of Tooley, has argued that a person is a moral agent, a being having "the conceptual capabilities of considering whether to insist or not on his rights, of manipulating, too, the 'pulls' it gives him on the actions of others, capable, in short of having projects and enterprises of his own."¹⁶ According to Benn, only moral agents have rights. It is clear that few animals, if any, are moral agents in this sense. Consequently, on Benn's analysis, few if any animals have rights of any sort. Benn argues, however, that just because a being does not have rights it does not mean that it is morally permissible to treat it cruelly. In fact, he maintains that some actions are seriously wrong for reasons other than that they violate rights. The question remains whether it is seriously wrong to kill animals for food. Clearly, given Benn's analysis, in order to establish that it is wrong to eat animals for food, another sort of argument is needed, an argument that is not based on an appeal to animal rights. An argument of this type is in fact implicit in Benn's position, and I will consider it presently.¹⁷

The Argument from Superior Aliens' Invasion

John Harris advances the following consideration to show the immorality of eating meat.

Suppose that tomorrow a group of beings from another planet were to land on Earth, beings who considered themselves as superior to you as you feel yourself to be to other animals. Would they have the right to treat you as you treat animals you breed, keep, and kill for food?¹⁸

The implication is certainly that it would be inconsistent for us to think that it is morally permissible for us to eat nonhuman animals but wrong for superior aliens to eat us.

But it is not clear that it is inconsistent if there is a relevant moral difference between animals and humans not found between humans and superior aliens. Our discussion above of the concept of person suggests a difference. Most human beings and presumably all of Harris's aliens are persons. Most animals are probably not persons. Consequently, if personhood is the ground for the right to life, there need be no inconsistency in maintaining that it is morally permissible for us to kill and eat most animals, given that we cause them no pain, preserve the ecological balance, and so on, and that it is wrong for the aliens to kill and eat us, even though they kill us painlessly and so on.

The Argument from Human Grain Shortage

All of the clearly moral arguments for vegetarianism given so far have been in terms of animal rights and suffering. New moral vegetarianism, however, rests on moral arguments couched in terms of human welfare. It is argued that beef cattle and hogs are protein factories in reserve. In order to produce one pound of beef, cattle eat approximately sixteen pounds of grain; and in order to produce six pounds of pork or ham, hogs eat approximately six pounds of grain. It is estimated that the amount of grain fed to cattle and hogs in the United States in 1971 was twice that of U.S. exports of grain for that year and was enough to feed every human being with more than a cup of cooked grain every day for a year.¹⁹ Given the people in the world who are hungry or even starving, we should not eat meat, since in eating meat we are, as it were, wasting grain that could be used to feed the hungry people of the world. It only takes a little

imagination to suppose that every bite of hamburger we eat is taking grain away from a hungry child in India.

The difference between this argument and the arguments considered above should not be overlooked. Whereas those arguments maintain that grain-eating animals should *not* be slaughtered, this argument is at least consistent with the position that they *should* be: grain-eating animals, it might be maintained by a new moral vegetarian, should be slaughtered to prevent them from eating more grain and producing new grain-eating offspring. This argument also differs from traditional ones in its selective and restrictive moral prohibitions against eating flesh. The eating of non-grain-eating animals, e.g., fish and wild game, is morally permissible on this view. Indeed, it might even be encouraged in order to utilize all food sources as effectively as possible.

These differences aside, is the argument valid? Does it follow that because grain that could be used to feed hungry people is used to feed cattle, people should not eat the meat produced by feeding these cattle grain?

To see that it does not, one must be clear on what this argument assumes in order to arrive at its conclusion. First of all, it assumes that if many people in countries with surplus grain, e.g., in the United States, did not eat grain-fed meat this would cut down on the amount of grain used to feed animals that produce meat. Second, it seems to assume that not eating meat is the best way to conserve grain. Third, the argument assumes that if the grain used to feed cattle in the United States, e.g., was not fed to cattle, the grain would be used to feed the hungry people.

None of these assumptions seems plausible. Let us take the first assumption. It is useful to remember that grain was fed to cattle and other animals in this country in order to use our surplus; it was an economic move. Given a depressed demand for meat caused by widespread vegetarianism, other economic moves could be made. More grain could be fed to fewer meat-producing animals resulting in the same consumption of grain. Or the same number of meat-producing animals could be produced and fed the same amount of grain, but new markets could be found for meat

and new needs created. Or new markets could be found among the countries of the world where meat consumption is slight; more need for meat could be produced among nonvegetarians and dogs and cats.

The next assumption is no less dubious. It is doubtful that the best approach to conserving grain is to become a vegetarian. It is important to realize that beef cattle and other ruminants do not need to eat protein in order to produce protein. Indeed, beef cattle can be fed on a variety of waste materials, e.g., cocoa residue, bark, and wood pulp, and still produce quality meat.²⁰ Various lobby groups, world food organizations, and consumer and environmentalist groups putting pressure on meat producers to utilize these waste products to feed animals might be a much more effective way of conserving grain than vegetarianism. If beef cattle and other meat-producing animals were fed on waste products instead of on grain, there would be no reason not to eat meat in order to feed the hungry people of the world. Indeed, one might feel that there was an obligation to eat meat. Eating meat from animals fed on waste products would be a way of saving grain that could be shipped to the hungry people of the world.

The third assumption of the argument is also dubious. It is highly unlikely, given the present policy of the United States government, that surplus grain, even if it were available, would be shipped to the most needy people. The government's policy has been (and it is likely that it will continue to be) to sell grain to those countries that are able to pay and to those countries in whom we perceive our national security interest. In 1974 we shipped four times as much food to Cambodia and South Vietnam as to starving Bangladesh and Swahelian Africa.

To put it in a nutshell, without vast changes in the economic systems and the policies of governments with surplus grain, not eating meat in order to help the starving people of the world is an idle gesture. Such a gesture may make people happier and may make them feel less guilty, but it does no good. With vast changes in economic systems and governmental policy, however, not eating meat hardly seems necessary.

Singer also uses the argument from human grain shortage to support his provegetarian position, although he is aware of its limitations.

This does not mean that all we have to do to end famine throughout the world is to stop eating meat. We would still have to see that the grain thus saved actually got to the people who need it.²¹

Singer is no doubt correct that the problems in getting the grain to the people who need it are not insurmountable. But the economic and political changes that would have to occur in order to do so are very extensive — more extensive than Singer wishes to admit. In any case, as we have seen, changes in how meat-producing animals are fed, together with changes in political and economic policies, would enable us to feed the starving people of the world without a vegetarian commitment.

Frances Moore Lappé, in her fine book *Diet for a Small Planet*, also points out the simplistic thinking that is involved in supposing that going without meat is going to help the starving people of the world. But in the end she still advocates a meatless diet.

A change in diet is a way of saying simply: I have a choice. This is the first step. For how can we take responsibility for the future unless we can make choices now that take us, personally, off the destructive path that has been set for us by our forebears.²²

But if Lappé is correct in the major arguments in her book, such a first step is not really necessary. There are ways to feed the starving people of the world *without* forgoing meat, e.g., by changing governmental policy. Indeed, Lappé, in the next section of her book, recommends a list of organizations that one can join in order to change government policy toward hungry people of the world and to educate Americans about the food problem. None of these organizations requires a vegetarian commitment.

How can we understand Lappé's recommendation of a meatless diet as a "first step" toward changing the present situation? Perhaps in this way: Becoming a vegetarian is a very personal, symbolic act; it symbolizes one's commitment to a cause and goal: feeding the hungry people of the world.

But for many people such a symbol is not necessary; they do not need a personal symbolic act in order to work for a good cause. In any case, one has no moral duty not to eat meat as a symbolic commitment to help the hungry people of the world, although one may have a duty to help the hungry people of the world. One may have a duty to be committed to some worthwhile cause without having the duty to express that commitment in some particular symbolic way.

In fact, not only is expressing one's commitment to feeding the hungry people of the world by not eating grain-fed meat not morally necessary, it may not be the best way of expressing such a commitment. I suggest three questions that one should ask in evaluating any way *W* of committing oneself to some goal *G*.

1. How well does the regular use of *W* bring about *G*?
2. How well does *W* educate people to the value of *G*?
3. How well does *W* induce the person using *W* to continue in the pursuit of *G*?

Considering vegetarianism in the light of these three questions, one might suppose there are better ways of expressing one's commitment to helping the hungry people of the world. For example, protesting the government's food policies by wearing buttons, putting ads in the *New York Times*, or writing one's congressman would seem to have greater educational value than not eating meat (question 2). Supporting organizations that are devoted to the solution of world food problems would seem to be a better way to achieve the goal of helping the hungry people of the world than going without meat (question 1). It is difficult to say whether, for example, wearing a button that says "Help Starving Bangladesh" and signing petitions supporting food relief programs will induce the people who wear the buttons and sign the petitions to continue in their humanitarian effort more than going without meat (question 3). But it is not implausible to suppose that, for many people, going without meat will have less psychological meaning and consequently strengthen their resolve less than wearing buttons and signing petitions.

The Argument from Brutalization

The previous argument was based on an alleged indirect effect on human beings of not eating meat. The argument from brutalization is basically of the same kind. It is argued that the killing and eating of meat indirectly tends to brutalize people. Conversely, vegetarianism, it is argued, tends to humanize people.²³

This argument can have a strong or weak form depending on what is meant by "brutalize" and "humanize." In the strong form, it maintains that eating meat (indirectly) influences people to be less kind and more violent to other people; conversely, not eating meat tends to make people more kind and less violent. In the weaker form of the argument it is maintained only that eating meat tends to make people less sensitive to people's inhumane treatment of other people and more willing to accept people's brutality and inhumanity to other people.

Whatever form the argument takes, it is important to understand its status. I have argued that there is no incompatibility between being a nonvegetarian and advocating the painless and humane treatment of animals. Consequently, there is no logical connection between being a nonvegetarian and the cruel treatment of animals, let alone the cruel treatment of persons (human or otherwise). Similarly, there is no logical connection between eating meat and being insensitive to the inhumane treatment of animals or humans.

The argument from brutalization, however, does not appear to postulate a *logical* connection between vegetarianism and inhumanity but rather a *psychological* one. Thus the strong form of the argument seems to assume the truth of the following psychological generalization.

1. People who do not eat meat tend to be less cruel and inhumane to persons than people who do eat meat.

As far as I know, no good evidence has ever been collected to support or refute (1). Pacifists like Gandhi are often cited as examples of people who are vegetarians and who are opposed to violence. But Hitler was also a vegetarian.²⁴ Indeed, Hitler's vegetarianism is a constant source of

embarrassment to vegetarians, and they sometimes attempt to explain it away. For example, the *Vegetarian News Digest* argued that "there is no information that indicates [Hitler] eliminated flesh food for humanitarian reasons."²⁵ But the reason Hitler did not eat meat is irrelevant to the present argument. Here we are only concerned with whether or not eating meat tends to make people less brutal.

But perhaps the psychological generalization presupposed is a little different from (1). Perhaps the argument from brutalization presupposes

2. People who do not eat meat for moral reasons tend to be less brutal than people who do eat meat.

In terms of (2) the comments of the *Vegetarian News Digest* are not irrelevant. The case of Hitler need not count against (2).

The truth of (2) is by no means self-evident, however, and empirical evidence is needed to support it. Although I am not aware that such evidence is available at the present time, let us suppose that (2) is well confirmed. This by itself would hardly be a strong argument for vegetarianism, since the following generalization could also be true.

3. People who eat meat after reflection on the morality of eating meat are less brutal than people who eat meat without such reflection.

The bulk of the population has given no reflection at all to the morality of eating meat. Consequently, a comparison between moral vegetarians and meat eaters at large is hardly fair. Putting it in another way, supposing (2) to be true, moral vegetarianism per se might not be responsible for humanizing people. Rather, what might be responsible for such humanizing is simply moral reflection, reflection that might lead either to the acceptance or to the rejection of moral vegetarianism.

What would be significant is if the following generalization were true.

4. People who do not eat meat after serious reflection on the morality of meat eating are less brutal than people who eat meat after such reflection.

The truth of (4) would enable us to say with some confidence that something besides moral reflection is involved in

becoming less brutal. At the present time, however, there is no reason to suppose that (4) is true.

Similar considerations indicate that the weaker form of the argument from brutalization also fails. The weaker form of the argument seems to assume

5. People who don't eat meat for moral reasons are less likely than people who do eat meat to be insensitive to people's inhumane treatment of other people.

Whether (5) is true or not is uncertain. But in any case (5) is not terribly relevant to moral vegetarianism. A relevant comparison would not be between moral vegetarians and nonvegetarians in general but between moral vegetarians and nonvegetarians who eat meat after moral reflection, that is between moral vegetarians and what might be called moral nonvegetarians. Thus, what needs to be established is not (5) but

6. People who don't eat meat after reflection on the morality of eating meat are less likely than people who do eat meat after such reflection to be insensitive to people's inhumane treatment of other people.

At the present time we have no more reason to accept (6) than we have to accept (4). And we have no reason to accept (4). Thus the argument from brutalization fails.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that moral vegetarianism will continue to be a position that attracts people concerned with the plight of animals and with humanitarian goals. If the conclusions of this paper are correct, however, moral vegetarianism cannot be separated from a number of ethical issues and questions, issues that need to be settled and questions that need to be answered if a comprehensive and considered moral vegetarianism is to be maintained: the problem of carnivorous animals; the moral status of eating microorganisms, consenting animals, and genetically engineered animals; the difficulty of distinguishing animal parts and animal products.

Although I have found no compelling moral arguments for vegetarianism, there still may be reasons why morally

sensitive people would wish to become vegetarians. As I have suggested above, vegetarianism may have a protest or symbolic function. Nevertheless there is, as far as I can determine, no moral duty not to eat meat, and one who eats meat is not thereby committing any moral error.

One final point. It might be suggested that although becoming a vegetarian as a protest against animal suffering or a way of committing oneself to helping the hungry people of the world is not a moral duty, it is still a moral act; it is a supererogatory act. This view is not implausible, but it needs to be qualified in certain ways. A supererogatory act, whatever else it is, is an act that is good but not obligatory. The question is whether becoming a vegetarian in order to protest animal suffering or as a way of committing oneself to feeding the hungry people of the world is good but not obligatory.

Suppose first that there is a moral obligation to protest cruelty to animals or to commit oneself to feeding the hungry people of the world. Becoming a vegetarian in this case would not be a supererogatory act; nor would it be an obligatory act. It would be *one* way of fulfilling one's moral obligation, although not necessarily the best way.

Second, suppose that there is no moral obligation to so protest or commit oneself. It is not implausible to suppose that doing so would nevertheless be a good thing. Then becoming a vegetarian would be a supererogatory act. If becoming a vegetarian is not the best way to do so, however, moral vegetarians would deserve some praise but not as much praise as some other people who protest cruelty to animals and commit themselves to feeding the hungry people of the world. Indeed, it is not implausible to claim that moral vegetarians deserve some criticism. Their moral idealism is in a sense wasted or at least used badly. One is inclined to say: "If you really want to protest animal suffering or commit yourself to helping hungry people, instead of not eating meat you should . . ." (see above for various suggestions).

There is, I believe, nothing paradoxical about the idea that a supererogatory act can be blameworthy. Jumping in a swift river and saving a drowning man when you are only a

fair swimmer is a paradigm case of a supererogatory act and deserves praise. But such an act may deserve some criticism as well if the drowning man could have been easily saved by tossing him a life buoy.

1. Janet Barkas, *The Vegetable Passion: A History of the Vegetarian State of Mind* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975); Judy Klemsrud, "Vegetarianism: Growing Way of Life, Especially Among the Young," *New York Times*, March 21, 1975.

2. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 35-42; Peter Singer, "Animal Liberation," *New York Review of Books*, April 5, 1973, pp. 117-24; idem, *Animal Liberation* (New York: New York Review of Books, 1975).

3. Gerald Carson, *Men, Beasts, and Gods* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), p. 128.

4. Mel Morse, *Ordeal of the Animals* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 67.

5. See Singer, both the article and the book cited above.

6. John Harris, "Killing For Food," in *Animals, Men, and Morals*, ed. Stanley Godlovitch, Roslind Godlovitch, and John Harris (New York: Taplinger Press, 1971), p. 108.

7. Peter Tompkins and Christopher Bird, *The Secret Life of Plants* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973); Lawrence, "Plants Have Feeling, Too —," *Organic Gardening and Farming* 64 (April 1971); Woodlief, Royster, and Huang, "Effect of Random Noise on Plant Growth," *Journal of the Acoustical Society of America* 481 (1969); Backster, "Evidence of a Primary Perception in Plant Life," *International Journal of Parapsychology* 250 (1968).

8. Singer, *Animal Liberation*, p. 173.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 177.

10. But what about more difficult cases? Am I inconsistent if I am morally opposed to Nazism and use lampshades made by Nazis from human skin? Not necessarily. There may be no reason to suppose that the use of the lampshades in any way supports Nazism. Nor can my use of the shade be construed as an expression of approval of Nazism. Indeed, the lampshade may be used to remind me of the horror of Nazism, a more moving and concrete reminder than pictures of concentration camps.

11. Singer does not utilize this argument in *Animal Liberation*. He says, "I have kept, and shall continue to keep, the question of killing in the background because in the present state of human tyranny over other species the more simple, straightforward principle of equal consideration of pain and pleasure is a sufficient basis for identifying and protecting against all the major abuses of animals that humans practice" (p. 19). Nozick, however, seems to believe that utilitarianism vis-à-vis animals is not adequate. He raises but does not answer the question: "How much does an animal's life have to be respected once it's alive?" (p. 42).

12. Michael Tooley, "A Defense of Abortion and Infanticide," in *The Problem of Abortion*, ed. Joel Feinberg (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Co., 1973), pp. 51-92.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

14. Tooley thinks that it may be possible that most animals are persons. Although this is possible, it is hardly very likely. See Tooley, p. 91. See also Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations," in *Philosophy and Environmental Crisis*, ed. William Blackstone (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1974). Although he argues that animals have rights, Feinberg does not believe that humans have a duty not to kill animals, provided they are killed humanely and nonwantonly in the promotion of legitimate interests (p. 56).

15. Roslind Godlovitch, "Animals and Morals," in Godlovitch, Godlovitch, and Harris, p. 168.

16. S. I. Benn, "Abortion, Infanticide, and Respect for Persons," in *The Problem of Abortion*, ed. Feinberg, p. 99.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 103; see "The Argument from Brutalization" below.

18. Harris, p. 110.

19. Frances Moore Lappé, *Diet for a Small Planet* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), pp. 13-14.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-21.

21. Singer, *Animal Liberation*, pp. 180-81.

22. Lappé, p. 55.

23. Benn (p. 102) gives a similar argument with respect to abortion.

24. Barkas, chap. 7.

25. Quoted in Carson, p. 134.