

tion between selection and construction, however, prevents an overcompensation in the Kantian direction. This distinction also helps to avoid a fundamental proposition that empiricists and Kantians have had in common and that Kant inherited in large part from Hume: that those things of which we are aware in perception are ideas, phenomena, or *sensa*—and not things-themselves. My argument here has hardly been a comprehensive refutation of that proposition. But that now-gathering refutation will finally put an end to one of philosophy's most captivating digressions.

1. Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). My favorite brief statement of the position is by Michael Polanyi, "The Potential Theory of Adsorption," *Science* 141 (Sept. 13, 1963): 1010-13.

2. Stephen W. Kuffler, "Discharge Patterns and Functional Organization of Mammalian Retina," *Journal of Neurophysiology* 16 (1953): 37-68. Later experiments with monkeys showed the same result. D. H. Hubel and T. N. Wiesel, "Receptive Fields of Optic Nerve Fibers in the Spider Monkey," *Journal of Physiology* 154 (1960): 572-80. See also Hubel, "The Visual Cortex of the Brain," *Scientific American*, Nov. 1963.

3. D. H. Hubel and T. N. Wiesel, "Receptive Fields, Binocular Interaction, and Functional Architecture in the Cat's Visual Cortex," *Journal of Physiology* 160 (1962): 106-54.

4. This line of argument is found quite explicitly in the writings of the molecular biologist and structuralist Gunther Stent of the University of California, Berkeley, in "Limits of the Scientific Understanding of Man," *Science* 187 (Mar. 24, 1975): 1052-55, and in "Cellular Communication," *Scientific American* 227 (Sept. 1972): 50-51. The fact that structuralists in general tend to see the choice in these terms has the following testimony of Jean Piaget:

Structuralism, it seems, must choose between structureless genesis on the one hand and ungenerated wholes or forms on the other; the former would make it revert to that atomistic association to which empiricism has accustomed us; the latter constantly threaten to make it lapse into a theory of Husserlian essences, Platonic forms, or Kantian *a priori* forms of synthesis. [Jean Piaget, *Structuralism*, trans. Chanihah Maschler (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 9].

5. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A671, B699.

6. The preceding discussion assumes that human freedom and universal determinism are incompatible. I agree with Roderick Chisholm ("Agency," in *Person and Object* [LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1976]) that they are incompatible. Chisholm's analysis makes it clear, it seems to me, that compatibilism either denies freedom, denies determinism, or is simply the result of confusion. But the issue is a tough one, and I do not offer an analysis here.

POLITICAL TYPOLOGY: A SUGGESTED CLARIFICATION

ROBERT G. PIELKE

George Mason University

ONE OF THE MOST USEFUL TOOLS OF ANALYSIS is the practice of employing typologies, i.e., assigning labels to the objects or ideas under scrutiny. Exactly how they function as analytical tools is not of concern here, but I would highly recommend Max Weber's *Methodology of the Social Sciences* as the classic and still valuable explanation.¹ At the very least, they should enable us to understand the phenomena in question, making further interesting and valuable observations possible, if not inevitable.

Every discipline or field of study has its own set of labels that its practitioners deem particularly appropriate for its areas of concern. (There's considerable overlapping, of course, with each discipline exhibiting the expected amount of possessiveness.) In most cases these terms have had a long history of usage and have thereby acquired rather widely accepted meanings, some more so than others. Those not having this advantage are virtually useless as tools; instead of aiding an analysis, they invariably become the objects of analysis themselves. A good illustration of this is the set of labels *left*, *right*, *liberal*, and *conservative*. It's almost impossible to use them without first explaining how they're to be used, i.e., what they mean. This usually involves at least a rudimentary defense of their meanings, since objections and counter-proposals can be anticipated. Stipulating definitions (for purposes of analysis only) isn't a viable alternative either; they're far too morally or emotionally loaded for the issue to be circumvented in this way. In other words, definitional disputes are seemingly a concomitant of their usage. On the rare occasions when this doesn't happen, a shared meaning is simply (and uncritically) assumed, and the disagreements and confusions merely emerge at some other point. Frequently, *left* is associated with liberal and *right* with conservative (sometimes as their extremist forms), but no further clarification is offered. Whenever specific definitions are put forward, they turn out to be as varied and numerous as the people suggesting them.

Reason Papers No. 7 (Spring 1981) 33-52.

Copyright © 1981 by the Reason Foundation.

What I propose to do in this paper is suggest a way that these particular labels might be defined and made useful. To be useful as tools, they have to be meaningful to virtually everyone, and this can only be accomplished if their meanings are essentially descriptive and not in any way evaluative—as far as this is humanly possible. In the first section, I'll argue that *liberal* and *conservative* are best understood as equivalent to teleological ethical reasoning and deontological ethical reasoning, respectively. *Left* and *right*, on the other hand, refer to the positions people take on psychological egoism: the right claiming it to be true, and the left rejecting it. Given this scheme, two combinations are possible which at first sound rather strange: left-wing conservatism and right-wing liberalism. As I'll show in the second section, where I'll illustrate the scheme by applying it to some contemporary political phenomena, these two turn out to be perhaps the most helpful of the various possibilities.

Before beginning, I want to stress the descriptive character of these proposed definitions, because they're actually descriptive in two different senses. I've already implied above that they're essentially nonevaluative. By this, I simply mean that applying them as labels is not to be construed in any way as indicating goodness or badness. There's another sense, however, in which they're descriptive. Although they must be considered as reformative definitions in some minimal way (since my suggestions are obviously not now widely accepted, and I'm arguing that they should be), they are, at the same time, surprisingly expressive of what we intend when we use them in our ordinary discourse. Whether or not we're aware of it, we tend to understand these terms very much in the ways that I'm suggesting. So my project can actually be seen as one of clarification.

ETHICAL REASONING AND POLITICAL LABELING

Taking the terms *liberal* and *conservative* first, it should already be clear that my intention is to see them as indicating formal and not substantive characteristics. We often use them in a substantive way, of course, but I suspect that this betrays a confusion on our part. To call certain policies, institutions, and people liberal (or conservative) is shown to be absurdly confused when often just a few years later they are termed the exact opposite. I think that, behind this labeling and relabeling, there's perhaps an unconscious

recognition that the reasoning process in developing these policies and institutions is the significant thing. The fact that we're somehow reluctant to engage in frequent reclassifications, and upset when it's done to us, provides a small degree of evidence for this. We know that the way we reason can remain fairly constant, while the outcome of the process might very well fluctuate from time to time. Knowing this, we shouldn't so uncritically link the reasoning process with particular results. What I'll be doing is merely bringing to consciousness this presumed unconscious awareness. Ultimately, of course, the final proof of the typology's accuracy in depicting the way we actually intend the terms must be whether or not it makes sense to us. I think it will; and, furthermore, I think it will for the first time make them useful as analytical tools.

Others are aware of this distinction between the reasoning process and its varied results, and have attempted to make use of it in constructing political typologies. Two prominent examples are Gewirth's *Political Philosophy* (his introductory chapter)² and Oppenheim's *Moral Principles in Political Philosophy*.³ Gewirth approaches the problem as I intend to, employing the language and terminology appropriate to normative ethics. His account, however, is extremely unclear and not entirely consistent; moreover, he makes no attempt to understand ethical terminology in terms of liberalism and conservatism, much less relate them to the left and right. Oppenheim's analysis, while far clearer and much more comprehensive, is done solely with the problems of justification in mind. He's really concerned with one issue only: whether or not basic political principles can be shown to be objectively true or false. This aspect of ethical theory is of obvious significance, but it's simply not relevant for clarifying the four terms we're dealing with in this paper. Although neither Gewirth nor Oppenheim provides me with direct support for my suggested definitions, it's worth reemphasizing that both feel that ethical reasoning is the crucial factor in establishing political classifications. Also worth emphasizing is their reliance on William Frankena's exceedingly lucid explanations of ethical terminology.⁴ I plan to do the same; in my opinion, no better account yet exists.

In order to show that liberalism makes the most sense (both as a neutral tool and as a reportive account) when understood as teleological reasoning, I'll begin by briefly sketching the characteristics of this type of thinking and follow with a few ex-

amples to illustrate the complexities of the scheme.

Teleological thinking is most clearly understood as deciding moral issues by appealing only to the amount of nonmoral value likely to result from the available alternatives if they were to be adopted. The one basic obligation is to maximize the good, and the net balance of good over evil (as it is estimated) is the sole standard for assessing rightness and determining virtues (moral goodness).⁵ The nonmoral value can be (and has been) identified as just about anything (the experience of happiness, material success, power, salvation, truth, etc.); the important thing is not what, but how much. Any attempt to establish qualitative differences between competing ultimate values would be to introduce another kind of criterion, thus voiding its teleological character.

Among the many possible subtypes within teleological thinking, one kind is crucial for the clarifications I'm trying to accomplish. Teleogists must decide *for whom* the production of nonmoral value is relevant; for whom should the good be maximized? It's the question of distribution, and the possible answers are apparently endless: self, family, clan, class, race, nation, mankind, all living creatures, all life throughout the universe, all life throughout all time and space, and so on. Distribution is, of course, a moral question, but it can't be answered teleologically without begging the question. Nor can it be answered nonteleologically, since that would constitute a violation of teleology's exclusivity. (Mill and Bentham unconsciously slip into this trap when they suggest that the greatest good should be produced for the greatest number.) Some way must be found to answer the question without circularity or contradiction if teleological reasoning is to remain unadulterated as well as intelligible.

The most common approach (although not always consciously recognized as such) is to acknowledge the universality implicit in the basic obligation to *maximize* the good but to compromise with what's possible. This, after all, is precisely what the maximization principle itself is: a compromise between the obligation to do *only* good and the recognition that this is rarely, if ever, an option. Ideally, then, the good should be distributed to the greatest extent throughout all time and space (i.e., universally); to do any less would involve not doing *only* good—through omission if nothing else. Obviously, this implicit requirement can never be met, so the resolution becomes one of distributing the good as widely as possible. Possibility is the key factor; how wide a distribution depends

entirely on a factual assessment (no additional moral principle is involved); whatever distribution is likely to be optimal is the one selected. This is a defensible procedure teleologically, as long as it's kept in mind that, with one significant exception, no system of distribution can ever be permanent. The exception occurs because some persons allege that it's never possible to consider the good of anyone beyond the self, while all the others claim that it is. Although this also is a factual assessment, it's different in kind from the others in that it's based on a different assumption about human nature and not merely on a different estimation concerning the production of good. Hence, what results is a permanent, twofold distinction regarding distribution: the relevant recipient(s) of whatever good is likely to be produced being either the self alone or others as well.⁶ In other words, we have either ethical egoism or some form of utilitarianism (ethical universalism) as the two possible forms of teleology.⁷ Other refinements would have to be made at this point if I were presenting a complete description, but they're not necessary for the purposes of this paper.⁸

Notice that the kinds of people we usually associate with liberalism do, in fact, exemplify teleological reasoning. Bentham and Mill are the epitome of 19th-century English liberalism, as well as of utilitarianism. The movement that we refer to as classical liberalism, also identified with capitalism, is perfectly expressed in Adam Smith's ethical egoism. These two types of liberalism are usually seen as opposed to each other over such issues as welfare and laissez-faire economics, and they certainly are. But these two economic issues are really equivalent designations for the two forms of teleology; hence, the contrast as stated expresses an analytic truth only. As I'll show later, there is another dimension to this conflict as it has usually been expressed in American political life. To take an example of a different sort, we frequently refer to people who are flexible and open-minded as being of a liberal temperament. If we understand them as teleological, this personality description makes sense. For nothing can ever be intrinsically right or wrong according to this way of thinking; it all depends on the expected production of good. Any person who truly thinks this way is likely to appear quite flexible and open to change, since no decisions are invested with permanence; commitment is given to the maximization principle and to nothing else.⁹ On the other hand, what seems flexible and open-minded to some, strikes others as coldly pragmatic and even ruthless. Such people are seen to be

without principles or scruples, willing to do anything to achieve their ends. Again, the explanation is the same—commitment is given only to the end or goal; what differs is the evaluation done by others. These allegedly descriptive personality terms are obviously value-laden; hence, they can't be logically derived from a description of someone's thought process. To the extent that we find such people either flexible (positive) or ruthless (negative), we do so on grounds independent of the description of their thinking. In essence, these terms *are* the evaluations.

Deontological ethical reasoning is both easier and more difficult to delineate: easier, because it incorporates all forms of moral reasoning other than teleological; more difficult, because there are as many manifestations of deontology as there are deontologists.¹⁰ The one factor they all have in common is the rejection of the maximization principle as the *sole* evaluative standard. Instead, rightness and moral goodness (as well as their opposites) are determined by an intrinsic quality or qualities.

Maximization may be used to supplement one or more deontological standards (there can be more than one), but the deontological norm (or norms) always takes precedence in moral decision making. Differences emerge when the quality itself is specified. Some deontologists argue that Kant's idea of universalizability (or some variant thereof) is the decisive, intrinsic feature. Others maintain that God's will is the relevant quality (as in Divine Command theories.). Still others avoid the problems of specificity by claiming that, whatever it is, it's knowable through intuition (as in W. D. Ross's theory); the right and the good are simply self-evident (as the Declaration of Independence asserts about the equality of all men and their various rights). As deontological norms, all of them are considered obligatory completely apart from whatever good might result from their being adopted; in no way are they contingent on the production of nonmoral value. However, while unalterable and permanent, they can be stated in such a way as to incorporate considerable flexibility. The important point is that principles of this kind are inviolable, regardless of how flexible they might be.

When we consider who might qualify as deontological thinkers, we find people usually identified as conservatives rather prominently represented. All natural law theorists fall into this category, since laws of this kind are deontological. Cicero gave natural law its classic definition ("True law is right reason in agreement with

nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting"—*Republic*, III, xxii), but there have been thinkers before and since who've exemplified this point of view. Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Grotius, Edmond Burke, and John Locke are among the more prominent illustrations. Burke, of course, is noted as the "father of conservatism" and, by some, as its last and best representative. The view that rights (whether human, property, divine, or some other kind) are unalienable is a related deontological conception. As with liberalism, we often refer to people with a certain temperament or personality as conservatives. Sometimes what earns this designation is simply being a traditionalist of one kind or another. Persons having a stalwart character or strength of conviction are others that often receive the label. At other times, such people are called old-fashioned, stodgy, or, more harshly, obstructionistic. None of these trait terms is neutral. Again, the thinking that they allegedly describe doesn't change; what changes is the evaluation of it.

With further reflection, it should become apparent that we actually do use the terms liberal and conservative to refer to teleological and deontological thinking, respectively. The fact that we use the same terms for substantive issues as well is the source of much confusion. It prohibits us from seeing that liberals and conservatives can, and often do, agree on specific issues—*without abandoning their political point of view*. It also prevents us from seeing why *intra*-ideological disputes can occur without self-contradiction. Similarly, by identifying issues as liberal or conservative, we're almost forced to view people as being far more arbitrary than is consistent with our experiences of them otherwise. Recently, for example, the welfare liberalism of the New Deal has been coming under strong attack from people whom we've always understood as liberals. This doesn't mean that they've ceased being liberal; it simply means that they see another course of action as most likely to maximize the good. Likewise, the conservatives who supported the civil rights movement under Martin Luther King, Jr., weren't thereby rejecting their conservatism; rather, they saw their support as required by their political ideology.

Seen as contradictory forms of ethical reasoning, it's clear that any attempt to devise and implement an ethical theory based on two coequal principles of each type is fraught with dangers. Frankena's own position is of this kind, and, as he admits: "It does seem to me that the two principles may come into conflict, both at

the level of individual action and at that of social policy, and I know of no formula that will always tell us how to solve such conflicts or even how to solve conflicts between their corollaries."¹¹ The only solution he has is his claim that in an ideal state of affairs (wherein everyone is completely rational, unbiased, fully informed, and unselfish), the practical implications of both principles would be in agreement. Knowing this, his hope is that it might influence our present judgments and the actions based on them. But aside from his claim being suspect in the first place, it's highly unlikely that, even if it were true, our mere knowledge of it would be sufficient to influence us. In any case, his ideal consensus theory begs the question by presupposing a kind of harmony which would supposedly be the result of consensus. Theories with two fundamental, contradictory principles simply have to face the consequences: resolution by conflict or by default.

American constitutional democracy is an incarnation of precisely this kind of ethical position. Without the Bill of Rights and certain other supplementary amendments, majority rule or popular sovereignty prevails (albeit through an exceedingly complex and often unsuccessful representative system). Majoritarian democracy is merely an institutionalized procedure for determining how much good over evil is likely to result if a given program is adopted or person elected: the ideal being to maximize the number of satisfied people by having them select (either directly or indirectly) from alternative "sources of satisfaction" (individuals alone being in a position to determine what's likely to satisfy them). The alternative receiving the most support is then obliged to everyone. With the addition of the Bill of Rights, a deontological element becomes an explicit part of the Constitution—in that these rights are placed beyond legislative influence (especially speech and religious freedom). But this in no way makes it a deontological document; amendments can be voided as well as added whenever a sufficient majority so decides. This, of course, contradicts the *inalienable* character of these rights, which are provided with institutional protection in the Supreme Court.¹² The dangers of this set-up have become all too obvious throughout the years. Consider how often a more or less serious conflict has occurred between some majority's will and the rights of individuals or groups. Inevitably, the resolution has been accomplished by force or the threat of force; there just isn't any other alternative.

If we wonder how such a contradictory political system could

have received such widespread, thoughtful, and well-reasoned support, I think we're forced to conclude that another factor was at work, namely, the fact that there was a different and more significant kind of agreement presupposed by the defenders of the Constitution.¹³ For the most part, despite their differences in ethical reasoning, they held a rather optimistic view concerning the possibilities of social relationships. To explain this involves an examination of the other set of political labels: *left* and *right*. My point is that they are most accurately and most usefully understood as indicative of conflicting positions on human nature: the right maintaining that psychological egoism is true, and the left rejecting it as false. I have no intention of summarizing the debates between the two, but a brief sketch of what they do and do not entail is essential.

Psychological egoists assume that we are incapable of being concerned for anyone other than ourselves. To the extent that we do seem to show concern for others, it's only because we believe this ultimately to be in our own interests. This is what I see as *defining the right*. Notice that this does not in any way entail either a positive or a negative evaluation. Psychological egoism is a descriptive position only; judging it to be a good or bad psychological characteristic is logically distinct. Although certain descriptive features may be cited in support of the evaluative judgment, the relationship is not one of entailment. Nor does psychological egoism entail that we *ought* to be concerned for ourselves only. Some argue that, since there's no possibility of choosing otherwise, it makes no sense to adopt any other style of ethics; but this, again, is not logical entailment. One final disclaimer: it might seem that an egoistic ethic is entailed by a positive evaluation and a nonegoistic ethic by a negative one, but this isn't the case either. These evaluations are nonmoral, with no necessary moral implications, i.e., they're like aesthetic judgments. It's quite possible (however unlikely it may be) for someone to judge it negatively and still urge its adoption as an ethic, or judge it positively and yet reject it as an ethic.¹⁴

To reject psychological egoism, on the other hand, simply means that we are assumed capable of being concerned for others as well as for ourselves (although to some it means giving greater or even exclusive weight to the claims and interests of others). In either case, psychological egoism is assumed to be false,¹⁵ and this I take to be the defining quality of leftist thinking. Again, this does not in

any way imply that we ought *not* to be egoists. Nor does it imply any particular evaluation; as an assumption about human nature, it's every bit as descriptive as the assumption it opposes.

So far I've stressed that certain ideas are *not* entailed by psychological egoism (the defining characteristic of the right) or its denial (the defining characteristics of the left), but they *do* entail certain other ideas of considerable significance. The most important one for our purposes concerns the nature of society. Depending on which assumption is held, two radically different understandings emerge.

The egoistic assumption portrays human beings as totally separate individuals, with no *a priori* social bond among them. Hence, if society is to occur, it must be artificially or intentionally created (in theory, if not in actuality). While this is certainly a valid implication espoused by all rightists, they differ markedly on the ease or difficulty of creating and maintaining these social relationships. Some are relatively pessimistic in feeling that society can only be created if it's imposed more or less rigorously through legal or governmental constraints. Others express some degree of optimism in that, for them, such constraints are either unnecessary or actually counter-productive. By examining the various reasons they give for their optimism or pessimism, it becomes obvious that no sharp line divides these two basic attitudes. Rather, we're confronted with a continuum, with all of the vagueness and imprecision implicit in such a scheme. However, it is possible to distinguish the extremes in terms of their reliance on or rejection of rules in providing moral guidance and thus social stability. The greater their degree of pessimism, the more their ethical reasoning depends on rules and their enforcement; the result is some form of rule-teleology or rule-deontology. Likewise, the greater their optimism, the more they consider individual conscience as a reliable tool for moral decision making; what results is a situation ethic of some kind, either act-teleology or act-deontology. In other words, the continuum extends from totalitarianism to anarchism, with all sorts of variations in between. (The rejection of a state does not, of course, imply the rejection of society. It should also be kept in mind that "total" government does not necessarily imply a despotism or dictatorship; it refers *only* to where power and authority are located.) Among social contract theorists, who are rightists by definition, Hobbes is obviously the most pessimistic, with Hamilton a bit less so; Madison, Locke, John Rawls, and

Adam Smith exist somewhere in the middle, while Robert Nozick and Robert Paul Wolff are obviously on the very optimistic side of the spectrum.

On the other hand, to reject the egoistic assumption is to presuppose that there does exist an *a priori* social bond among individuals, an innate potential which needs to be actualized if true humanity is to manifest itself. Society is in some sense organic; and, although it can't be created or destroyed (without destroying humanity), its development can certainly be assisted or impeded. Assisting the process means bringing about the conditions which are favorable for its growth and/or eliminating those believed to be unfavorable. Needless to say, leftists differ widely on what these conditions might be and how easy or difficult it might be to manipulate them properly. As with the right, there's a continuum of attitudes ranging from highly optimistic ones to ones that are very pessimistic.

Like their counterparts, the leftists cite a variety of reasons for holding their particular attitudes. In every case, however, the coercive machinery of a state or government figures prominently as either a favorable or an unfavorable condition. So here, too, there's a direct correspondence between a rule-oriented morality (which, in its extreme form, becomes totalitarianism) and a pessimistic attitude, and between a situational ethic (with anarchism its extremist form) and optimism. Lenin and Stalin represent the extreme form of pessimism; Rousseau, Jefferson, Mill, and Dewey are much more optimistic; and Marx and Kropotkin embody an extreme form of optimism.

In order to illustrate the various distinctions and relationships I've been trying to make, I've constructed a rather complex diagram (see p. 44). The solid lines indicate logical entailments, or necessary implications, and the broken lines portray possible relationships only. Admittedly, I've designed it in a way that's most suitable for my own purposes, but it could have been accurately structured in a variety of other patterns (as long as the distinction between necessary and possible relationships is maintained). Notice that while there are sixteen alternatives (taking the assumptions about human nature into account), moral reasoning alone can only account for four (act and rule teleology, and act and rule deontology)! The addition of the differing assumptions about man quadruples the options and suggests their overriding importance in theories about social relationships. In the second section, I'll try to

support this suggestion with examples of actual political phenomena. One final point I hope will become clear in the next section is the fact that the extremes tend to meet. (Ideally, the diagram should be imagined as a tube.) Very optimistic persons of the left and right are both act-deontologists, while the very pessimistic outlook fosters rule-teleologists. More important, as will soon become evident, the former are anarchistic and the latter, totalitarian.

THE NEW SCHEME APPLIED

In applying this typological scheme to actual political phenomena, some of the more unlikely combinations prove to be the most useful and provocative of further thought. I have no intention, however, of examining any of these phenomena in detail; my only purpose in citing them is to illustrate the scheme's fundamental accuracy and usefulness, and to show, by way of example, that it's capable of eliciting some very interesting hypotheses. These qualities are most evident, I think, when the typologies are applied to political phenomena which we tend to regard as more or less puzzling. I have in mind three examples which are primarily of contemporary relevance: the practice of American democracy, the intra-Marxist disputes, and the mutual attraction of the American counter-culture and the libertarians. My comments and suggestions should be read in conjunction with the chart on p. 46 (which includes a variety of persons and groups in addition to the ones just mentioned). Like the diagram pictured earlier, the chart should ideally be imagined as a tube or cylinder.

1. Earlier I indicated that American constitutional democracy is based on two equally authoritative, but potentially conflicting, moral principles. Because of this, I suggested that the continuing support for it must be due to another factor: a widespread optimism about social relationships (not that these beliefs have always been borne out in fact). Disputes (both theoretical and physical) have been continuous in American political life from the very founding of the republic—some, of monumental proportions. Yet only once (the Civil War), if then, has the existence of the republic been severely threatened. Furthermore, virtually every *kind* of dispute has occurred, a factor I believe to be of considerable significance, since one kind of disputed position is noteworthy by its marked *under*-representation: extreme pessimism.

With the possible exception of the Hamiltonian influence,

HUMAN NATURE

| ETHICAL REASONING | LEFT (Valued Positively) | | | RIGHT (Valued Positively) | | |
|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|------------------------------------|
| | Pessimistic (Rule) ← → Optimistic (Act) | | | Optimistic (Act) ← → Pessimistic (Rule) | | |
| | TOTALITAR- IANISM | LIMITED GOVERNMENT | ANARCHISM | ANARCHY | LIMITED GOVERNMENT | TOTALITAR- IANISM |
| LIBERAL | Lenin (?) Hitler Stalin Geo. Wallace | Keynes Mill Sen. J. Buckley Dewey F.D. Roosevelt J.F. Kennedy L.B. Johnson | N. Thomas Populism | Adam Smith | M. Friedman Nixon Goldwater | Hobbes Machiavelli |
| EQUALLY MIXED | | Frankena K. Kautsky E. Bernstein Democrats H. Truman H. Humphrey R.F. Kennedy | | | Rawls Neibuhr Republicans Eisenhower | |
| CONSERVATIVE | Plato Aristotle | Burke Rousseau Jefferson E. McCarthy | Marx Kropotkin Counter- Culture New Left Mao Tse Tung Marcuse | Nozick R.P. Wolff Libertarians | Madison Locke | Hamilton Calvin Ayn Rand (?) |

Americans, to greater or lesser degrees, have found some reason to be confident about the creation and maintenance of social relationships—acknowledging the necessity of, at most, a limited form of government. This, however, is the extent of the agreement. The left and right, as well as liberals and conservatives, have contested with each other and among themselves in a variety of combined forms. The sharpest disputes would seemingly occur when the ideological differences are the most severe in all possible respects, e.g., the liberal-optimistic-left vs. the conservative-pessimistic-right, or the liberal-pessimistic-right vs. the conservative-optimistic-left. But when the issue of confidence (or its lack) is removed, the remaining differences do not appear at all very destructive. The real issue seems to be the amount of governmental power that's needed to ensure a workable society, and this is a direct function of the confidence issue. (Remember that even total governmental power need not necessarily imply a despotism or a dictatorship.)

Another one of the more interesting observations arising from a use of this schematization is the apparent tendency for more theoretically oriented persons to be conservative, while more practical "politicians" tend to be liberal. Without much doubt, liberal thinkers have enjoyed considerably more electoral success than their opposition. Why this general series of tendencies might be the case would require much further exploration not only by philosophers but by persons within other disciplines as well. In any case this multidisciplinary examination would have to deal with the seeming ineffectiveness of an exclusive concentration on the means, as opposed to the ends, of action.

Related to this is the identification of precisely what's at issue between the politicians we usually (but, as I'm arguing, erroneously) call "liberals" and those we usually term "conservatives." The first thing to be noted is that, since they both think teleologically, they're both liberals within my suggested typological scheme. Hence, the debates between them concern not methodology or the issue of practicality but the ends or goals of power (*which* non-moral values ought to be maximized). A second factor in this identification is the competing assumptions concerning human nature. While they certainly do take conflicting positions on the issue of egoism, the conflict is considerably mitigated by their similar (if not identical) levels of confidence. Hence, what divides American politicians is almost exclusively a question of goals. They're united on the notion that whatever is likely to achieve them is necessarily

right and perhaps obligatory. Apparently, the moral evaluation of the means is left to those who've not had an appreciable degree of electoral success. Such a fundamental lack of communication and mutual influence between practical politicians and political theoreticians should be cause for concern, if this observation proves to be correct.

One final observation is that there seems to be an unusually small number of people who affirm *both* a mixed position *and* an extremist position on social relationships. Perhaps the two are in some way incompatible or unstable when linked. I tend to think so myself, but the hypothesis will have to be dealt with at greater length at some other time and, again, probably from a multi-disciplinary perspective.

2. The disputes among Marxist-oriented thinkers and activists have long been a mystery to non-Marxists, especially to those with anti-Marxist sympathies to begin with. The overwhelming tendency of the latter has been to group all Marxists together, blinded to their very real differences by prejudice (or prejudicial typological categorizations?). (This is like claiming that all advocates of limited government are saying the same thing.) Increasingly, however, the intra-Marxist struggles are being recognized for the fundamental conflicts that they are. Again, I believe that my suggested clarifications can aid a realistic assessment of these divisions. By voiding the usual identification of left and liberal, it becomes obvious that, while all Marxists are indeed leftists, they are not all liberal. Marx himself is conservative, the revisionist (Democratic Socialist) Marxism of Bernstein and Kautsky is a mixture, but Stalin and Lenin are unqualified liberals. Again, their very serious differences arise from the degree of optimism they share or don't share.

Although all Marxists, by definition, are anarchists (in that the final stage of history is to be a stateless Utopia), there are vast differences among them as to how easy or difficult this will be to accomplish. Marx was extremely confident that virtually no state-like machinery would be needed to produce and maintain it. External force exerted on the individual would be both unnecessary and wrong. To oversimplify, Bernstein and Kautsky feel that a classless and stateless society will be "voted in," but their progressive electoral gains will have to be protected by means of an increasingly useless government. Lenin and Stalin, however, exhibit pessimism to the extreme (this, despite the fact that in some of Lenin's writings he appears every bit as optimistic as Marx). For them, ex-

ternal pressure on the individual is vital and virtually useless if not total. Figuring prominently in this continuing debate is the existence and character of the Communist Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat. What Lenin created is in severe violation of Marx's moral beliefs and empirical expectations, while the democratic socialists see them as necessary (minus their repressive features). Subversion, the role of the military, international expansion, and internal repression are other areas wherein the divisions are manifest. From the perspective afforded by the suggested typology, it can be seen what's at issue among Marxists, and the fact that the controversies are too severe for an easy resolution becomes clear. Apparent harmony turns out to be monumental conflict on closer inspection.

3. Just the opposite is the case with this third example. We expect the conglomeration referred to as the new left/counterculture to be fundamentally at odds with the libertarian right and its assorted relations. So it comes as a shock to find them in agreement on a number of specific issues and in their attitudes towards governmental power. For example, the New Deal liberalism of F.D.R. has come under heavy attack from both (to the surprise of the Right), while both are ardent advocates of the decriminalization (and even legalization) of marijuana (to the surprise of the Left). The primacy of the self can easily be seen as a basic characteristic of both, with the consequent unwillingness to surrender *any* authority to a state or government; hence, anarchy is their desired social condition. More important is their belief that such a situation is a realistic option—capable of being erected and sustained with little or no external pressure on the individual.

The difference between the two groups is obvious and not by any means insignificant. Their usual designations as left and right are quite accurate, and the issue is a source of considerable debate between them. But almost always the debate is at the theoretical level, and rendered moot (even to them) when their optimism is considered. As an effective political force, they've occasionally been highly vocal and visible—but hardly ever successful. Despite their similarities, their rare attempts at cooperation have usually been disastrous.¹⁶ The problem with cooperation does *not* seem to be their ideological difference, however. Rather, neither seems to be completely aware of what's implied by a primacy of the self, to which both give allegiance. Each tends to find the differing life-style of the other offensive; and, while they recognize its legitimacy

in theory, it's psychologically difficult for them to put this recognition into practice. Yet again, a multidisciplinary examination of these hypotheses would seem to be a worthwhile project to encourage.

4. As a final comment on the application of this scheme, one thing seems to be of paramount significance. In all of the examples just considered, the crucial factor in the creation of harmony or discord is the issue of confidence. Every ideological characteristic has its practical effect, but nothing seems to be of such consequence as this. Of course, the case for its overriding importance can't be made with a mere three examples. Yet they should, at the very least, establish the significance of the hypothesis.

1. Max Weber, *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. Shils and Finch (New York: Free Press, 1949).

2. Alan Gewirth, ed., *Political Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 1-30.

3. Felix Oppenheim, *Moral Principles in Political Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1968).

4. William Frankena, *Ethics*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973). Frankena has written a variety of articles and done a number of presentations with the same clarifying objective in mind. The meaning of justice and the types of religious ethics (notably agapism) have occupied most of his attention, probably because they weren't satisfactorily dealt with in *Ethics*.

5. This is obviously a simplified rendering, which unavoidably omits many significant distinctions. For example, there are good reasons for preferring estimated results to actual or intended results, and a fuller account would have to go into them in some way. (Oddly enough, Frankena doesn't really deal with this issue in *Ethics*.) There's also a question whether teleology can or should logically restrict itself to the available alternatives only. These and other issues are not relevant for the scheme I'm developing. I've also omitted at this point any reference to the debate between rule theorists and act, or situational, theorists; this distinction becomes relevant later, when I work with the left-right distinction.

6. It's sometimes suggested that a concern for others in addition to the self, while possible, is severely limited, perhaps extending no farther than one's family or close friends. Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, makes essentially this point in *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Scribner, 1932). At first glance this may seem to call the twofold distinction into question by blurring the lines, but how many others we can be concerned about is a quantitative issue. Whether we can even consider others at all is a qualitative issue, and it is from this issue that the twofold distinction arises.

7. Ethical altruism has been suggested as a third option (i.e., identifying the recipients as others only, or at least in preference to the self). But this alternative is not presented in a way that's consistent with teleology. Ethical altruists are saying that it's intrinsically *wrong* to consider the self on a par with others, and this introduces a nonteleological factor into their ethical reasoning.

I suppose it could be maintained that, for some reason, it's never *possible* to consider the self—only others. This would theoretically yield the third alternative, but I know of no one who would be willing to support it or even assert that it makes sense in the world as we know it. For example, the survival instinct would have to be creatively "explained away." Another technique might be to identify the experience of other-regarding concern as the good to be maximized. In this case, ethical altruism would seem to follow quite logically. But at some point or another, the question as to whether or not it's humanly possible would inevitably arise; hence, this technique, too, would ultimately depend on assumptions about human nature. And while the egoistic and utilitarian assumptions make sense, the altruistic one stretches our credulity. It's worth noting that the twofold distinction is maintained even if this technique is used. We can arrive at utilitarianism and egoism, but not altruism.

8. For example, the specific amount of good to be granted each eligible recipient must be decided. (In ethical egoism, of course, the problem doesn't arise.) The notion that each person should count as one and no more (everyone thus receiving identical amounts) is a nonteleological addition. To be consistent, a utilitarian must arrive at the proper proportions using only the maximization principle. Equality, or any other apportioning principle, is permissible as long as it's selected teleologically. The impermanence that this suggests must simply be accepted.

9. Even teleologically derived rules receive no real commitment; they too are subject to frequent changes in evaluation (if they're legislated, of course, other complexities are brought into play). Seeing them as Rules of Practice as Rawls has done ("Two Concepts of Rules," in *Contemporary Ethical Theory*, ed. Margolis [New York: Random House, 1966] pp. 249-79) provides no additional stability; this would merely alter the procedures for reassessment (if that) and not its ease and frequency.

10. As with my sketch of teleology, I'm postponing a consideration of the act vs. rule debate until my discussion of the left-right distinction.

11. Frankena, *Ethics*, p. 52.

12. See Robert G. McCloskey, *The American Supreme Court* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960) especially pages 11-18. McCloskey sees the same contradiction intrinsic to the American Constitution but conceptualizes it in terms of fundamental law and popular sovereignty.

13. Consider *The Federalist Papers*, especially Madison's #10, in which he recognized from the very beginning this implicit contradiction and danger. His confidence that it would work was based on more than the separation of powers, checks and balances, or even representational government. None of these institutional devices could *resolve* potential conflicts. Rather, his confidence stemmed from his belief that such conflicts could be *prevented* from occurring in the first place. He stressed the role of representation in a large, multifactioned society as the key factor in preventing fatal conflicts, but his unspoken assumption was that the losers in the electoral process would voluntarily acquiesce to the winners. Involved in this crucial assumption is the conviction that the vast majority of participants are of like mind on the really basic issues and that being a loser would not result in a violation of these beliefs. In other words, he was optimistic about the possibilities of social cooperation; despite his being aware of numerous human weaknesses, he held an optimistic view of human nature.

14. The addition of teleological reasoning wouldn't automatically create a logical connection between a positive judgment and an egoistic style of ethics (or a negative one and a nonegoistic ethic, either). For this to happen, the experience of being egoistic (or nonegoistic) would have to be specified as the highest (i.e., sole intrinsic) value and not an extrinsic value in the service of some other, higher value.

This combination *would* yield the obligation to maximize the egoistic (or nonegoistic) experience; in other words, an ethic would seem to follow. But two intervening steps are necessary in order to arrive at this conclusion (teleological ethical reasoning and a judgment of intrinsic value). Two additional steps are also required if a deontological ethic is to result: deontological reasoning and the judgment that self-concern is intrinsically right (or wrong). Put as simply as possible, a nonmoral evaluation of psychological egoism is not in itself a sufficient condition for its adoption or rejection as an ethic of either kind.

15. Frankena, *Ethics*, p. 22, identifies *both* of these as altruism, which is extremely misleading. For one thing, the term *altruism* has several evaluative connotations depending on one's point of view; and if this is intended to be the opposite of psychological egoism, it should be just as descriptive (*psychological* altruism perhaps). Also, of greater consequence, altruism implies a concern for others prior to the self or even *instead* of the self, which is not to be considered at all! This completely ignores the other alternative, that others and self be regarded the same—all other things being equal.

16. See Jerome Tuccille, *It Usually Begins with Ayn Rand* (New York: Stein & Day, 1972) for a highly informative and entertaining example.

IDEOLOGY, ECONOMICS, AND KNOWLEDGE

JAMES ROLPH EDWARDS

University of Utah

THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY as developed by those of a Marxist philosophic persuasion and transformed by them and others into the sociology of knowledge has a long and, I believe, disreputable history. In the first four sections of this paper the main propositions and assumptions of this view as presented in the writings of recent major proponents will be critiqued. But since criticism is all too easy, and there are, after all, *some* observable phenomena at the root of the ready acceptance of such doctrines, in a final section intended to be constructive, a new alternative view will be presented.

IDEOLOGIES AS CLASS PHENOMENA

Ideology is a loaded term. Depending on the person and the context, it may refer simply to a set of ideas or system of thought, in which case it is indistinguishable from "viewpoint" or "philosophy," or it may refer to "false consciousness" as Marx defined it. Martin Seliger and Hans Barth have adequately chronicled the origin of the pejorative sense with Napoleon and its development at the hands of such as Helvetius and Nietzsche. Marx's version has its theoretical roots in the dialectic.

Every science or pretender to science must be grounded at some point in constants. For Marx, however, the flux, the change in material reality, was primary. The only relevant constants he saw were the "laws" of the materialist dialectic that determines change in human history. The primary facts, as he saw them, were that men use tools to transform nature and that men's productive activities are social. In his view, the stronger appropriate the means of production and exploit the others by living off their surplus production, creating class divisions and conflict. This, along with changes in technology, results in history being characterized by successive modes of production and associated class systems.

Now the learning upon which technical change is based obviously involves going beyond, by some means, what has been previously