My argument is for the necessary conjunction of politics and ethics. It is therefore at odds with the modern resolve to divorce politics, as descriptive science, from prescriptive thinking, on the “is-ought” distinction. In the beginning of modernity, 400 years ago, the realpolitik initiative was expressly the resolve to rid politics of moral ideals and confine it to what Machiavelli termed verità effettuale, and what Hobbes termed “unvarnished facts.” This disjunction was institutionalized in classical liberalism’s distinction between the “public sector” and the “private sector,” the former being the sphere of politics and the latter the sphere of morality. And the disjunction has lately been perpetuated by positivism’s bifurcation between the objectivity of socio-political laws, and the subjectivity of the moral inclinations and disinclinations of persons as individuals.

Given the predication of political modernity upon the disjunction of politics and morality, to reopen the question of their interrelationship would be quixotic if the consequences of the realpolitik, classical liberal, and positivistic initiatives, as we live them today, were reasonably gratifying or satisfactory. But I believe they are demonstrably unsatisfactory, and in respects which directly reflect, and therefore call into question, the bifurcation of politics and morality.

As we understand it today liberty is a political concept which has scrupulously been cleansed of moral connotations. It is, as we say, “negative” in two senses. It is negative in the sense of representing “freedom from” rather than “freedom for;” and it is understood as a right which is negative, by which we mean a right to abstentions and not to performances by others. Liberty is understood as the condition in which the individual is not subject to coercion by other persons or...
by human institutions. Historically it was the right to liberty in this sense that was the telling weapon in the enterprise to enfranchise the individual against the collective authorities of church and state, identifying the dominant theme in political modernity as "the rise of the individual." But as Michael Oakeshott says, there were from the start premonitions of future trouble in this enfranchisement, for there were many "who found themselves invited to make choices for themselves in matters of belief, language, conduct, occupation, relationships and engagements of all sorts, but who could not respond. The old certainties of belief, of understanding, of occupation, and of status were being dissolved not only for those who had some confidence in their ability to inhabit a world composed of autonomous individuals (or who had some determination to do so) but also for those who by circumstances or temperament had no such confident determination."

Modernity has nevertheless witnessed a substantial achievement of liberty in the Western democracies; yet today liberty is everywhere endangered, and the trouble can be recognized as those early premonitions cited by Oakeshott, coming home to roost. The threat to liberty comes not from ignorance of it but from knowledge of it, and not from external agencies which seek to extinguish it, but from the relinquishment of it by those who possess it and the rejection of it by those who might have been expected to aspire to it. It is being exchanged on the one hand for ideological servitude, and on the other hand for distributive benefits, and the burning question in both cases is, Why? I will try to show that the answers in both cases embody fundamental fallacies, but also that the fallacies embodied in the rejection of liberty are generated by the foundational realpolitik fallacy of conceiving of liberty in independence of morality.

Those who trade liberty for ideological servitude assume at least that they are free to do so with impunity, and at most that they are obligated to do so by the absolute moral character of the ideology in question. The legitimating supposition in either case is false, but it is endorsed by the rights-primitivism of classical liberalism. For if liberty is a right, and rights are primitive in the logical sense of being undervailed, then liberty can be traded with impunity. The reason for this is that exercise of a right is not obligatory; included in the concept of a right is one's freedom to forego his exercise of the right. To choose servitude is to choose to forego the exercise of one's rightful liberty in perpetuity, but this too is a choice one can make with impunity in a rights-primitive framework. Why persons in large numbers should so choose is not hard to see if we compare the security of dependence with what Michael Oakeshott identifies as the "notorious risks" of self-responsibility. I think we see this in its proper light when we recognize the developmental fact that no human being is born autonomous and self-responsible. Every person is in the first stage of his life a dependent being in whom subsists the potentiality for becoming an autonomous and self-responsible individual. Devel-
opmentally this means that toward the end of one's obligatory de-
dependence one is likely to be comfortable with the terms of one's de-
pendence and skilled at enacting them. On the other hand one's au-
onomy is one's introduction into a wholly novel world, to be navig-
gated at first only by the clumsiest groping. There is, then, a distinct
attractiveness to regression and developmental arrest. It occasioned
only momentary surprise in Nietzsche's prophet when his news of the
death of God only produced in his hearers the demand for newly-
invented gods to obey. Nietzsche himself was a moral individualist,
and thus well-armed with arguments to deplore the rejection of lib-
erty in favor of perpetuated dependence. But where liberty is con-
ceived as an exclusively negative freedom, as it is in the tradition of
modern political liberalism, then its exercise is strictly non-criteriol-
ogical, and the choice to exchange it for perpetuated dependence is
faultless.

Turning to the exchange of liberty for distributive benefits, the fall-
lacy it embodies is what I will term the distributivist fallacy of sup-
posing that all benefits can be conferred. If all benefits can be con-
ferred, then an irresistible temptation exists to conceive of
government as a vast distributive agency whose paramount function
is to fulfill the needs and gratify the desires of citizens. The irresist-
ibility arises from the inevitable problematicity of individual initia-
tives. As John Dewey says, "The distinctive characteristic of practical
activity, one which is so inherent that it cannot be eliminated, is the
uncertainty which attends it." Famously, Dewey identifies the Greek
metaphysics of incorporealized, changeless essences and eternal
truths, and also Christian soteriology, as compensatory myths arising
from the uncertainty of practical life. But there is a third compensa-
tory myth generated from the same source, namely the modern wel-
fare-statist myth of government as the guarantor of benefits which
persons can only problematically self-provide.

Here is the place to begin to speak of the virtues. In one important
aspect, the virtues are the personal resources by which individuals qua individuals can in significant measure overcome the uncertainty
of practical life and enjoy significant success at achieving their ends.
This is most evident with such of the traditional virtues as courage,
fidelity, and wholeheartedness, but our extended argument is that it
is no less true in the cases of justice, temperance, honesty, wisdom,
generosity, and love. For example, wisdom in the classical Greek
meaning importantly includes the ability to distinguish in oneself be-
tween true and false desires, right and wrong desires. And one of the
severest impediments to the gratification of one's true desires is one's
distractability in this undertaking by false desires. It was in recogni-
tion of this that Democritus is reported to have plucked out his eye
when it followed a passing woman, while he was engaged at his stud-
ies. (There is no suggestion in the tale that he would have done the
same thing had his studies been in a condition in which he could leave
them for a time.)
Or consider love—not, however, in its Christian but in its classical Greek meaning. As Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle make abundantly clear, love is a development. It begins in self-love, which, however, by no means precludes but is instead the precondition of love of others. As self-love its object is not the actual but the ideal self, i.e. the innate potentiality in each person which it is that person’s responsibility to discover and progressively actualize. Eros is the energy of actualization associated with right aim, and is thus a cardinal resource in the armory of the individual by which to overcome obstacles and thereby diminish the problematicity of practical activity. But we must postpone consideration of other virtues and trust that the present point is sufficiently made for our immediate purpose.

In their aspect as personal resources, the virtues outfit individuals to more effectively achieve their ends, thereby diminishing the uncertainties of practical life. But in the first place the uncertainties can only be diminished, not removed; and in the second place, these resources can only be acquired by persons through extended hard work. If the ends with respect to which the virtues are (in one aspect) means can be conferred upon persons, then the arduous enterprise of acquiring the virtues is gratuitous, and the objective becomes that of constructing the distributive agency.

Perhaps, as has been argued by von Mises, Hayek, Oakeshott, Tibor Machan, and others, the notion of government as a beneficent distributive agency contains an internal contradiction which blocks its realization. But the fallacy I want to lay bare is the supposition that benefits can be conferred. I will put the supreme question as it was presented upon the tragic state of Hellenic Greece, but I do so in the belief that this same question lies unarticulated beneath much contemporary alienation and anomie. Does it matter that you and I live? Will matter that you and I have lived? The answer of Greek eudaimonism is that it matters and will have mattered if we live lives of worth. But worth must be earned, it cannot be conferred. The task of living a worthy life is a job, a piece of work, namely the work of progressively actualizing the distinctive potential excellence subsisting within us as a potentiality and distinguishing each of us as the individual he or she is. The work is arduous but intrinsically rewarding. The intrinsic rewards are the virtues themselves in another aspect (and in this aspect virtue is rightly said to be its own reward). As Aristotle says, no person who has experienced these rewards will trade them for rewards of any other kind. And like the objective worth of actualized personhood, these rewards cannot be conferred but must be earned.

Let me return now to the fallacy alluded to earlier in the exchange of individual liberty for ideological servitude. If liberty is a right, and rights are logically primitive, or as Ronald Dworkin insists, “axiomatic,” then this exchange can be made with impunity. But from the eudaimonistic standpoint rights are not logically primitive. In the minimal conception of personhood what is logically primitive is not
rights but responsibilities, beginning with the fundamental moral responsibility of every person to discover and progressively actualize his or her distinctive potential excellence. Rights derive from responsibilities by the logic that “ought” implies “can”. If a person ought to discover and progressively actualize his distinctive potential excellence, and if such self-discovery and self-actualization has necessary conditions, then he or she is entitled to those conditions. Notice that this conception “takes rights seriously,” in Dworkin’s phrase, for to take rights seriously means to affirm their inalienability. True to the classical liberal tradition, Dworkin supposes that this can be done only by axiomatizing rights in a rights-primitive conception of man. But rights are also inalienable when they are entitlements to necessary conditions of inalienable responsibilities. Our main point here is that if liberty is a necessary condition of inalienable responsibility, then it cannot with impunity be exchanged for ideological servitude.

Returning once again to the fallacy of supposing that all benefits are conferrable, we have by adopting a eudaimonistic perspective introduced the idea that the highest rewards which life affords must be earned and cannot be conferred. But to understand the illusion of conferrability it is important to recognize that eudaimonism is a developmental perspective. Thus Aristotle, for example, cautions that nothing he says in the NIchomachean Ethics is applicable to children or youths. The earned benefits of self-actualization presuppose the autonomy of individuals, and no person is born autonomous. From birth persons may be said to possess the potentiality for autonomy, but every person in the first stage of his life is a dependent creature. It is upon the external authority of parents and community that the child is dependent for language, for concept-formation, for judgments, for the principles of conduct which lift his behavior out of randomness, for his repertoire of functional feelings, and indeed for his very identity. In this stage and by the very nature of dependence itself, benefits cannot be earned and must be and are conferred. Developmentally, then, the belief that all benefits are conferrable represents the thesis that persons are dependent children, not just in the first stage of their lives, but from the beginning of their lives to the end. And this is precisely the assumption of the realpolitik initiative with which political modernity begins. In Hobbes famous words persons have a life that is by nature “nasty and brutish.” Before him Machiavelli laid the realpolitik cornerstone by declaring that “one can make this generalization about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, liars and deceivers, they shun danger and are greedy for profit.” What realpolitik did was to build social order out of this understanding of persons. It did so by teaching persons to conceive of themselves in exclusively economic terms as selfish utility-maximizers. As A.O. Hirschman documents in his book, The Passions and the Interests, the 16th and 17th centuries witnessed a striking “semantic drift” by which such terms as “interest”, “enterprise”, and “worth” became con-
stricted in their meaning to "economic interest," "economic enterprise," and "economic worth." Social order was generated from the fact that, be he prince or peasant, so long as a man pursued his economic self-interest, his behavior became predictable.

The genius of realpolitik in building social order out of a conception of human being which corresponded to "the unvarnished facts," in Hobbes's phrase, is not to be denied. Indeed, realpolitik is faultless in its choice of starting-place. But by its non-developmental conception of human being, the social order it constructed was such as to ensure that the human life which was nasty and brutish should remain ever such. To put this in Aristotelian-developmental terms, the first stage of life subsequent to childhood dependence is devoted to what we would today term utility-maximization; it is what we would term the economic stage, and according to Aristotle it contains no virtue or excellence. But beyond it is the socio-political stage which is the stage of the moral virtues, and beyond this is the philosophical stage which is the stage of the intellectual virtues. In light of developmental knowledge today there can be no question of slavishly following Aristotle's format of the stages, but his basic point remains telling, namely that political modernity has conspired to produce developmental arrest in the first, or economic stage, and that with respect to this stage, the amputation of morality from politics meets with no resistance, for in this stage moral initiatives are merely latent.

The illusion of the conferrability of all benefits has been fostered by the economistic conception of man upon which political modernity was founded. From the standpoint of economics as the science which quantifies value, value is transferrable; it is exchange value. This eradicates the distinction between earned benefits and conferred benefits, for the unit of exchange value is monetary, and the money in one's possession represents the same purchasing power, no matter whether one has earned it, found it, or received it as a gift. But to generalize an exclusively economic conception of man, realpolitik had to overturn the ancient moral doctrine of intrinsic, non-transferrable, earned rewards which had received new currency in Renaissance humanism and the so-called via moderna. It did so by a slow but relentless redefinition of benefits which rendered them distributable.

Consider "happiness." In Aristotle's meaning it is activity in accordance with virtue, and must be earned. In the modern meaning, happiness is "pleasure in the long run," or "a sum of pleasures," where "pleasure" is the feeling of gratified desire. If what we desire is economic in the sense of distributable, as realpolitik teaches, then happiness is conferrable, for our desires can be gratified by awards by others or by distributive agencies.

Another telling example is afforded by the concept of "worth." From the eudaimonistic standpoint, fundamental moral motivation subsists in all persons and consists of the aspiration to live a life of worth, where living a life of worth consists in self-discovery and progressive self-actualization. This motivation is neither selfish nor al-
truistic, but is instead a unity from which "egoism" and "altruism" are subsequently extracted and developed as abstractionist fallacies. Eudaimonistically, worth is to be earned by self-actualization, and as objective, is of worth to and for whomever is capable of appreciating and utilizing it. But in Hobbes we find the famous redefinition according to which "The value of Worth of a man is, as of all other things, his price—that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power—and therefore is not absolute but a thing dependent upon the need and judgment of another." It is the Hobbesian spirit at work today when B. F. Skinner economistically identifies "dignity" as being in no sense intrinsic to the person who possesses it, but instead awarded as a distributable commodity.

I will conclude on the modern redefinition of benefits with a note on the progressive devolution of the concept of justice to an exclusively distributive justice. Eudaimonistically, justice is first of all not "recipient" but "productive", and centers in each person doing what he or she does best and finds intrinsically rewarding to do. Distributive justice derives from this through the indispensable concept of desert. On the face of it what we mean by desert still requires to be earned, and for this reason many modern theories of justice endeavor to disregard it. But modernity's striking enterprise of redefinition is in this case epitomized in John Rawls, for as Wallace Matson has been the first to point out, A Theory of Justice makes desert a distributable commodity.

First Rawls disposes of the ground of desert according to eudaimonism. That ground is the innate potentiality within every person which it is his or her responsibility to discover and progressively actualize. Desert has both a lower limit and upper limit. Its lower limit is the desert which inheres by virtue of pure unactualized potentiality; its upper limit is entitlement to the distributable goods whose potential values can be actualized by virtue of the actualized potentialities of the individual. The foundation of this thesis is the recognition of potentiality as responsibility. Rawls disposes of it by regarding potentialities as benefits, unevenly distributed by the "natural lottery" of birth. As benefits they are not merely non-deserved but undeserved, and require "to be somehow compensated for." But Rawls retains the concept of desert and furnishes it with a new foundation in connection with his "difference principle." He says, "At this point it is necessary to be clear about the notion of desert. It is perfectly true that given a just system of cooperation as a scheme of public rules and the expectations set up by it, those who, with the prospect of improving their condition, have done what the system announces that it will reward[,] are entitled to their advantages. In this sense the more fortunate have a claim to their better situation; their claims are legitimate expectations established by social institutions, and the community is obligated to meet them. But this sense of desert presupposes the existence of the cooperative scheme..."

It takes but a moment's thought to note the striking transformation
which is wrought by Rawls. That desert is the product of the just sys-
tem means that Rawls’s conception of justice is logically independent
of desert. Moreover desert cannot here be a criterion of good govern-
ment, as it is for Aristotle, for as Matson observes, Rawlsian desert is
the creation of government. Desert is here distributed, as worth is
distributed by Hobbes, and dignity by Skinner, as the reward for ac-
cepting the terms laid down by the social system. The reason that
Rawls, here as elsewhere, finds the prima facie intuitive support upon
which he relies, is that Rawls’s readers are the end products of 400
years of conditioning in political theory based upon a rights-primitive
conception of man, and rights-primitivism establishes a fundamental
recipient orientation by which, not merely benefits, but the very self-
identity of persons is conferred. Developmentally, a recipient orien-
tation is appropriate to the essential dependence of the first stage of
the life of all persons. Here the paramount question necessarily is,
What shall I receive? But adolescence marks the displacement of this
question by the primacy of the question, What shall I do?, with con-
squent exchange of a rights-primitive for a responsibilities-primitive
framework. Consonant with political modernity as a whole, Rawls
does not acknowledge the development of autonomy out of depend-
ence, and what he means by autonomy turns out to be the internali-
zation and voluntary endorsement of the terms of dependence.

If we now undertake to rectify the realpolitik conception of man
with which modernity began by introducing the responsibility for the
development of persons, the right to liberty exhibits new-found sig-
nificance. It expresses the thesis and the determination that this de-
velopment is to be the self-development of individuals, with respect to
which political liberty is a paramount condition. But this conception
of individuality as moral development is a eudaimonistic doctrine.
The reason that man thus conceived is zoon politikon, is that this de-
velopment has necessary preconditions, some of which cannot be self-
supplied by persons as individuals, and are therefore social condi-
tions. As Professor Fred D. Miller has pointed out, to follow Aristotle
in identifying man as zoon politikon is not necessarily to imply the ap-
paratus of the modern state, for in Aristotle the concepts of politics
and the polis are not clearly identified with what we would term the
political state as distinguished from the social community. There
are serious questions of responsibility and authority here, but to try
to answer them at this point would be premature. What must be done
first is to demonstrate the paramount importance of the self-devel-
opment of persons as individuals, while recognizing that the imper-
avtive of self-development applies to all persons, and not an elite few
who are privileged by the “natural lottery” of birth. What follows will
be an attempt at such demonstration, by connecting the virtues of the
self-development of which political liberty is a paramount condition.

Eudaimonistically conceived, the virtues are not a number of
things which they have regularly been mistaken to be. In the first
place they are not innate dispositions given to some but denied to oth-
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ers by the “natural lottery” of birth. Nor are they socializing or moralizing “side constraints” on natively acquisitive conduct. Neither are they portable attributes, first learned independently and thereafter attached to selected behaviors. Finally they are not in a proper sense supererogatory functions. Eudaimonistically conceived, the virtues are the natural expressions of self-actualizing individuality. They are not supererogatory because self-actualization itself is each person’s fundamental moral responsibility. They are not “side constraints” because, in the first place, “side constraints” are a concession to the social character of existence, while for eudaimonism, true individuality is intrinsically social in character. In this light the virtues are not concessions, but expressions of self-fulfillment which are themselves self-fulfilling. They are not sparsely distributed innate dispositions, but potentialities in all persons which are only rarely actualized, and the politics of eudaimonism is directed to securing the conditions under which their actualization can be generalized. And they are not portable attributes but natural expressions of an individuality which, by Spinoza’s dictum omnis determinatio est negatio, is highly selective. It was the mistake of regarding the virtues as portable attributes that produced in Kant, for example, the conclusion that they are in themselves morally neutral, becoming good or evil according to the purpose to which they are put. In this light courage, for example, is epitomized in the six-guns of an old West gunslinger, which are available for hire to the highest bidder. But in fact courage is highly selective, arising in the recognition that what the individual is responsible for doing will not and cannot be done if he or she does not do it.

To set forth eudaimonism’s theory of the virtues as concretely as possible we can consider by way of example the much misunderstood virtue of generosity. Generosity is not self-sacrifice but self-fulfillment. For the self-fulfilling life is not the life of idle self-indulgence but the life of meaningful work, and in meaningful work lies a native theme of generosity which is expressed in two ways. In the first place meaningful work is self-actualizing work, and self-actualization is the objectivization of the self which is to be recognized as the gift of the best that one is to others. But “objective” here must be strictly distinguished from that objectivity which has shaped modernity in the depersonalization of civil association and objective social structures. In this modern usage “objectivity” and “subjectivity” bear mutually exclusive meanings, and endorsement of the objective has been accompanied by active disparagement of the “merely subjective.” But this is an abstractionist fallacy. Nothing in human experience is “merely subjective.” Every human impulse is subjective in its inception but objective in its intended outcome, and because its outcome is within it implicitly in its inception, it is never “merely subjective.”

When objectivization is understood as the expression of subjective selfhood in objective and public form, then the generosity inherent in self-actualization becomes apparent. Self-actualization expresses the intention to live a worthy life which, as objectively worthy, is of worth
to whomever is capable of appreciating it as such. It is in this sense a gift which enriches the giver. It is likewise a gift which by its own nature selects its recipients. The gift comprises, distinguishably but inseparably, the distributable products of the enterprise of self-actualization and the qualities in the self-actualizing individual which we term the virtues. As Aristotle notes, "every virtue or excellence (arête) both brings into good condition the thing [person] of which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be well done." By virtue of the nature of self-actualization as objectivization we may say that giving to selected others is the intention of the self-actualizing individual, implicit perhaps in the beginning, but becoming progressively more explicit as self-actualization proceeds. If this is correct, then the corollary of the labor theory of value, namely that the products of labor are by nature the exclusive property of the laborer, is a serious error. To account for it we may say, first, that it derives from the error of conceiving of individuality "atomistically", i.e. as exclusive of other persons. But to this must be added the consideration of theft, which not only thwarts generosity, but can turn it into the reaction-formation of possessiveness and hoarding. Here it will not be purse-snatching and embezzlement that lay first claim upon our attention. What extinguishes the native generosity in meaningful work necessarily lies deeper than these. We find it where theft is ubiquitous under the aegis of law and popular morality, as it is by the egalitarian supposition that at bottom all persons are alike, and that every person is by nature possessed of equal entitlement to everything. This thwarts the native generosity in meaningful work, for when the individual gives himself through objectivization, he selects his recipients by virtue of the qualitative distinctiveness of the gift. The gift is meant for those who can appreciate and utilize the qualitatively distinctive values which have been embodied in it by the expressive labors of its maker. Thus Stravinsky's Rite of Spring is meant for those who possess the cultivated capacities to appreciate and utilize its distinctive values. This appreciation and utilization by others is a condition of the self-fulfillment of the individual. The reason is that self-actualization causes objective worth to appear in the world which, as objective, is of worth, by no means to the self-actualizing individual alone or primarily, but in principle to all persons, and in fact to such persons as fulfill in themselves the conditions of appreciation of worth of the distinctive kind in the given case. Therefore self-actualization is incomplete without recognition of its worth, not, to be sure, by all other persons, but by some others. We spoke earlier of necessary conditions of self-fulfillment, some of which cannot be self-provided by persons as individuals. Here is one such non-self-supplyable condition, namely the proximity of other persons who through their own self-actualization have the capacity to appreciate and utilize the contributions of a given individual. I think the glorification of solitude by romantic individualists is a reaction-formation to their own discovery that no one in their time and place is capable of appreci-
ating their distinctive excellence. Where such is the case, then by eu-
daimonistic lights genuine injustice exists. But the glorification of sol-
itude, though perhaps satisfying to the vanity of the individual, is a self-
defeating resort. The task instead is to generalize self-actualizing in-
dividuality by uncovering and instituting its necessary preconditions,
thus insuring as far as possible that virtues do not go unrecognized.

Our description of the eudaimonistic conception of generosity is far from complete, but within the limits of this paper I can only very briefly touch upon one more aspect. Eudaimonism abhors what Durkheim called the "malady of infinite aspiration." Individuality is qualitative finitude, which means that in the domain of value the fulfilled, self-actualized individual is a determinate this which is not that and the other. But the "thats" and "others" are likewise determi-
minate kinds of value. To actualize them is the responsibility of others. It is an aspect of the native generosity in the self-fulfilling individual that he entrusts to others the varieties of value which it is their re-
sponsibility to actualize. In so doing he acknowledges the entitlements of others to those distinctive kinds of goods, in appropriate amounts, which constitute conditions of their fulfillment of their responsibili-
ties. To their goods he recognizes that he has no claim, and he ad-
vances none. On the other hand egalitarianism extinguishes this form of generosity by endorsing equal claim by all persons to all goods.

The effect of this is supply mindless envy with spurious warrant.

We have spoken here only of generosity, but the extended eudai-
monistic thesis is that what is true of generosity holds equally for such of the virtues as wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, honesty, wholeheartedness, resourcefulness, and love. Alike they are natural
expressions of developed individuality. Alike they represent the exp-
lication of a form of sociality which inheres in personhood from the begin-
ing, and is progressively explicated through self-development, namely the intrinsic sociality of true individuals. The principle of this sociality, as I have argued elsewhere, is not the "at bottom" uniform-
ity of persons, but the complementarity of perfected differences. In this aspect the virtues are this complementarity, as it is manifested in different but overlapping situations. Justice, for example, is not a non-
natural artifact, but an expression of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is knowledge of one's fundamental moral responsibility, and of the fi-
ite entitlements which derive from it by the logic that "ought" implies "can". The foundation of justice appears in the acknowledgment by the individual with the lesser claim to a distributable good that his claim is the lesser.

The history of political liberalism has been the history of resolute defense of the right of the individual to political liberty. What remains is to connect liberty with worthy, self-responsible, self-determined, intrinsically rewarding individuality. But to do this requires going be-
yond liberty to identify others of the necessary preconditions of self-
discovery and self-actualization, and by instituting them, to general-
ize self-actualizing individuality itself. It is noteworthy that Hobbes
acknowledged self-responsible, self-determined individuality to be the securest foundation of justice, but declared it politically irrelevant by reason of its rarity. But Hobbes took it to be an endowment sparsely distributed by the natural lottery of birth. The eudaimonistic thesis is that it is, instead, a potentiality in all persons which is only rarely actualized, thanks to neglect of its preconditions. Today we possess sufficient knowledge of development to be able to identify these necessary preconditions, and we are capable of instituting these preconditions, thereby generalizing the opportunity of self-development. The meaning of Aristotle's identification of man as zoom politikon is that self-actualizing individuality requires a supportive cultural context. To provide such is, I suggest, our paramount social responsibility.*

2. Ibid., p. 236.
16. Ibid., p. 103.
18. R.M. Hare has documented Rawls's extensive reliance upon the "intuitions" of his readers; see Hare, "Rawls' Theory of Justice—I," Philosophical Quarterly, 23, No. 91 (1973), pp. 144-155.
22. Eudaimonistically conceived, personhood is intrinsically social in the beginning (as dependent childhood) and intrinsically social in the end (as autonomous individuality); but the two socialities are very different in kind. This is developed in my Personal Destinies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Chs. 8-10.

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