SELF

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John Hospers has contributed to the reaction against the Orphic-Platonic-Cartesian theory of the self. In a series of papers which used causal concepts as important for an understanding of human action and the ethics of human conduct, he has been one of the thinkers of this century who have argued that a certain conception of self, called "zero-point" below, was too simple a construct and left out many of the important physical and contextual aspects of the self. In his important criticism of John Rawls' device of the original position, in 1974, Hospers again reminded us of the importance of factors of physical gender, and situation, to being a self which was capable of rational choice.¹

In this article I develop an outline of the concept of self which is required for and is actually operative in an Aristotelian personal flourishing ethics. The concept of self which I find there is one which is importantly tied to the body of the person, the mind of the person, the career, family and other social relations of the person. It is a non-zero-point conception of the self which I think is consistent with the view that John Hospers has been urging on us, wisely, for the last 35 years.

I start with an outline of the kind of ethical theory which I am calling Aristotelian. Aristotle has a theory of what we now call the moral point of view. For him, being virtuous is not simply performing an action specified by a virtue. In addition, Aristotle requires that the action be performed on the basis of requisite psychological states: that they be done, in a way which is 1) characteristic of the acting agent, 2) on the basis of knowledge of the situation which calls for action, and 3) are done for the sake of kalos, which is alternatively translated as "the fine," "the beautiful" and "the noble."²

We also know that the virtues are states of character which make a human being function well. [NE, 1106a24] Further, we know that human functioning well is living fully expressive of reason [NE, 1098a13] and that happiness, eudaimonia, living well for humans is living a life expressing virtue. [NE, 1177a1] So, there is a network

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of concept, "kalos," "living, in accord with reason, fully, excellently or well," and "eudaimonia," which alternatively carry the burden of expressing Aristotle's moral ideal for humans.

Aristotle addresses ideals for relations among humans in his theory of friendship, where the self-interested moral agent takes up the concerns and values of the friend into the facts of the situation which a knowledgeable person acting characteristically will find necessarily bound up with his/her kalos. A good person always will take up the interests and values of the friend in a primary way influencing action. And, by so acting, she/he acts in a way which advances her/his own self-interest where self-interest is used in the approved way for Aristotle. One who tries to attain what is fine and good, gratifying every rational desire, and who, so helps herself/himself and others, Self-interest, morality and concern for the other are all alive in the same act towards kalos.

Aristotle holds that: a friend is another self. [NE, 1166a32 and 1170b6]

Context of use fixes the extension of a word, at least partially. The claim here is that friendship is such a context for fixing the extension of the word "self." A fact, to which Jones must attend, if she/he is to be knowledgeable about the situation calling for action, is that Smith is a friend. But Jones should act characteristically to make a kalos Jones. Now the essential Aristotelian claim comes into play: "A friend is another self." So, as the self which Jones is "involves" Smith, the values and concerns which are to be satisfied to make a kalos Smith are principles of selection in Jones' choice of the right action.

I think that this is the right way to see these matters. But the claim that this is so invites the question of what kind of conception of self am I, and perhaps Aristotle, using? Selves just don't seem to be the sort of things that one can have another of!

WHAT IS A SELF?

Existentialists rejected a view of the self as fixed by an immutable human nature. Instead of viewing a human being as an essential human nature, existentialists treat the self as zero-dimensional or as a pure freedom, theory of persons.

My view is multi-essentialist. I have essential properties, but that what particular combination of essential properties I have is a function of which true description of me is operative in the inquiry into my nature under consideration. I have different essential properties under different descriptions.

Which descriptions are appropriate to me, and so which properties are essential to me in some aspects of my life, are to some extent up to me to determine. For example, I am a philosopher by choice. In virtue of that choice, the essential features of being a philosopher
are essential to me, under the description, philosopher. In another sense of "choice," I have human limits by choice. I chose those limits, because that's where all the action is, in the sense that excellence at another life form isn't even a possibility. So, I don't even evaluate non-human ideals for choice. On the other hand, I am smart enough not to fight against the limit of being human, as some people do.

One need not be human. Some people fight against it, choosing non-human ideas as if their realization was possible for them. Were I to make some bad choices, or were I to have bad luck, then I could lose myself and turn into a vegetable thing, an alienated thing, or a corpse. But even as a vegetable things, say as an affluent alcoholic, I would have become a self of that sort. It just would not be a human sort.

I could fight a battle against my humanity. I wouldn't win it, but I could identify with it. Then, being a combatant of that sort would be the self I would have become.

In really tragic cases of advanced alcoholism and other disorders, people become inhuman in ways that effectively block a retreat back to normal human functioning. Being human is no longer a description which is open to them, either because of their bad choices or because of bad luck.

Fortunately, I am still human with a wide range of choices of action still open to me. What I am is not fixed for action. My nature is open to different descriptions at least. Under different descriptions, I have different essential properties, and what is kaloS for me changes under different descriptions.

So I do not hold the rumored essentialist view of an immutable human nature which existentialists argued against. Also, I do not hold what I call the zero-point theory of the self which hails from the Gaetae and the Trausi, north of the Danube, and from the Tracian Orphics. This view of the self was first stated explicitly, in philosophy, by Empedocles who speaks as if the same self, Empedocles, had been both boy and girl, bush, bird, and fish, in prior embodiments, in prior lives [Fr. 117] and yet, through all that, it, the self, retained enough sense of personality to discern that it is an ego, fallen to earth, who has discovered itself in a foreign land. [Fr. 119, 118] This view was taken up by Plato in the West, rejected by Aristotle, and after a time, Rene Descartes attempted to show that part of the thesis—the essential separability of the self from the body—was true and compatible with modern science.

Again, as is widely known, the self which hasn't any physical components, including components which are parasitic on physical states criteriologically, has had rough going in the middle part of this Century. Under the name "Cartesianism," it has been attacked broadly and well.9

The gist of the matter is captured well by the following passage in Plato's version of the zero-point self: "The south that [after
separation from the body, at death] survives as a recognizable self or person must somehow retain feelings that make sense only if they have physical concomitants." [Claus, 113, n. 16] Alternatively, if these are taken away from the non-physical existing part of the soul as, say, in Aristotle's theory, "it is only pure intelligence devoid of individuality that survives." [Clause, 113, n. 16] In short, there is no self remaining.

Gregory Vlastos has written well on the Platonic theory of self's inadequacy for moral discourse in one domain, the theory of friendship. In Plato, we don't really befriend people, we befriend the forms that the bodies and thoughts that are associated with the souls happen to instance. We might as well love a beautiful sunset as a beautiful person. [Vlastos, 26, 31]

The reason is that there are no people there to befriend, on the zero-point view. Nothing of what confronts us, of them, is them. It is not a boy or a girl, tall or short. Selves are supposed to be secret inhabitants hiding behind all that show. Platonic people are rather like the gods of negative theology. Whatever you think of them they are not. Because the predicates all designate the forms that the things they are visiting instance (or, in the case of the gods, that they create and transcend).

I include psychological ascriptions here, because, after Wittgenstein, we should not assign a privileged place to thinking, and the psychological, as not requiring bodily criteria for the correct application of terms. In consequence of this Wittgensteinian development, we can no longer give the immaterial souls the job which Plato, Descartes and others had assigned to the soul, the job of thinking, while hiding out, "inside somewhere."

Orphic-Platonic-Cartesian souls are only zero-points "inside" there somewhere, and nowhere. That is to say, they aren't. So what's to love!? What's to befriend?

In ethics we have to talk about friends caring for each other, hoping for the well-being of the other, and even among others who are not friends, we must have moral concerns of some sort relative to who these people are in the world. So, the selves which we discuss and have these attitudes toward, in ethical reflection, must be more "robust" than Orphic-Platonic-Cartesian zero-point selves.

**A POSITIVE ACCOUNT**

Lillian Gish, now, in 1988, in her 90s, has a new movie out. She's been an actress for over 80 years starting, as she did, as a child. Recently, a reporter asked her what she would have done if she had not been an actress. She responded in a very healthy and non-Cartesian way. She considered the question to have been unintelligible.
Having taken acting, theater and films into her life, so intensely, and so long, she refused to think of herself without that component in it. It just wouldn’t be her.

In the sense in which we use the term “self” in ethics, the self she is for choosing and undertaking actions involves activity, with others in the theatre, as part of who she is. So-called “externals” like fellow actors, audiences, plays, cameras and make-up get taken up into our selves as parts of who we are, this story shows.

What has to be added, to our picture of the self, to make an adequate, non-zero-point self, is more than just the person’s body. My self can and does include, as parts, many things and people of the world that zero-point theories would place outside of me. Above I noted, by reference to vegetable, alcohol-addicted lives, that my self also can exclude many things that others would consider to be necessarily internal to me, like humanness.

How one has lived and what one considers most important, judgmentally and characteristically, determines the issue of what has come to be constitutive of the self. Characteristically choosing the human in one’s self or not, determines whether being human is essential to the ethics-relevant self. Characteristically choosing and attaching importance to a career can do the same for the things involved in that career.

The notion of self which operates in ethics is flexible. Selves can accommodate all sorts of things, or not accommodate them, in them. Humanity, the theatrical, or the philosophical, may or may not be a part of me.

What, then, am I that allows such flexibility? I am this living thing, neither life, nor body, nor mind, but this body-mind-living-doing. I am an Aristotelian this-much, where such includes my activities and the overall structure of my activities, conferred by my history, values, purposes and intentions, and in addition to the nature of each of my particular material and psychological characteristics, the overall structure of them relative to each other.

Given a structure of importance in a person’s life, a foot or another body part can be essential to a self. But to get this essentiality, one has to view the self, and the foot that is or was its part, relative to the structure of importance a person has—relative to the picture of personal excellence she/he has. Body parts, so described, are part of the self that moral philosophy talks about.

Friends can play a role such as this as part of a person’s life. We can, and do, identify with them on the same model as we identify with our body parts. Their loss can undermine a self. Careers, abilities needed for a career, treasured objects with great personal value, geographical locations and their associated culture can all be essential to what in fact is a person’s self.

The fact that friends can be parts of my self goes some way toward showing why I will take the ends of the friend at a level of my ends
in planning action. Through friendship I can come to adopt the ends of the other as my own. In deciding whether to attend to my food, and in deciding whether to attend to my friend, we don't deliberate about non-existent conflicts of interest, we just do the thing. And it feels natural to us to do so.

An athlete, who's newly lost a foot, has a diminished self. Some parts of her/his self are missing, the activities, the goals and ambitions, the meaning. And they are missing, because another part of self is missing, the foot. Such an unlucky person would have need to build a qualitatively new self. And we'd try to help by showing opportunities in the hope of helping in the development of new structures of importance that the now diminished self can grow into.

The athlete, the widow(er), the emigre in a strange land, the writer who starts losing mental abilities, are all at risk. Their sense that their recently diminished self is not them, can be final. Suicide lies on this road. And when the continuance of life is not the continuance of self, suicide can even be indicated. But selves also can go the other way in such circumstances, for there is often great capacity for regeneration. But whether or not regeneration is possible is something which is hard to determine.

**MOIRA AND GOOD SELVES**

A person, who has the virtues and acts on them characteristically, with knowledge of the circumstances, and for the sake of virtue, for the sake of *kalos*, has developed a self, has filled it in with meanings, structures, characteristics, commitments, etc. Others do too. But an ideal person has developed a self via the virtues. So, what this person does is characteristically for the ideal. Of course, the virtues are defined for this person, relative to what that person is, what self. [*NE, 1106a31-1106b6*] And even with *kalos*, what is *kalos* for us is relative to some degree, at least to what we are. [Rhet., 1361b7-14]*

The virtuous person has defined a limit, a boundary, in terms of range of action and style of action. That person has made limits on who and what they are, and does not overstep her/his bounds. Such a person would say as a second order judgment about those actions: "I did that, because that's the sort of person that I am. That's who I am."

Some other people are loose and amorphous in their self-definition. One doesn't know what they will be or do in a situation. Yet other people flee self-definition, adopting contradictory features, avoiding commitment which might close options. Some people seek the zero-point. Finally, other people will be precisely defined by vices. One knows to expect bad things from them. But the two prior groups are groups of bad people as well, bad for failing to have developed virtue or for developing virtues at war with one another.
The concepts which are employed here, limit, self-definition, character, bounds, fitting, overstepping bounds, are all captured by the early Greek work, *moira*. In the primitive Greek world of Cornford’s *From Religion to Philosophy*, the term *moira* played a key role in religious and ethical thought.

In that ancient world, *moira* was one of the earliest Greek fumblings after the notion of the nature of *x*. Originally hailing from the art of land measurement where a *moira* was some sort of specification of the size of a piece of land, *moira* came to mean the boundaries on what a thing is and does. But this notion of boundary has normative dimensions, as it does in land measurement, where it is used to define ranges of property rights. Such a boundary is a *limit* on how far activities *should* go. I may plant my crops within my boundaries, but not outside them, in your fields. If I ignore *moira* here, I overstep my bounds and behave badly. [Greene, 401-02] So the most primitive form of ethics relative to this notion is the injunction not to overstep one’s *moira*. "Nothing too much."

In the classical tradition, if someone were to overstep one’s *moira*, then bad consequence to them. The nature, or boundary, of what it is to be me, *can* be overstepped, but if it is, then nature adjusts. This is the sense of nature of self which we need in ethics. A self which is robust in content, yet flexible, where change can come in ways that are self-denying or self-affirming.

So if the self is to have clearly defined boundaries of the sort desired here for excellence, the self must be disciplined to the point of achieving structure of actions within such limits. Because, if we overstep our *moira*, we leave the field in which we develop our *eudaimonia*—living fully and well as this thing of the sort that I am.

We must stay within our *moira*, or at most change it in internally consistent ways. If we don’t stay within it, then we are overstepping our bounds. If we change it in ways which introduce inconsistency into our *moira*, then we are fated to overstep our *moira*, even while acting within it! The common denominator of deviations from one’s *moira* is inconsistency. And consistency is a necessary, though (pace Kant) not a sufficient condition for morality.

Self-definition of the required sort to have a good *moira* is largely a matter of acquiring discipline. How does one acquire the discipline, first, to establish, and then to retain a well limited and detailed self?

Book Two of *The Nicomachean Ethics* tells us that the influence of others starts us off on self-definition, with parents, teachers and trusted others, models and friends. Our concern for their attitude, or our imitation of their style, lets their attitude and behavior constitute limits on us which we come to accept, characteristically.
PRIVATE LANGUAGE
ARGUMENT AND VIRTUE

The chief feature of the mid-century rejection of Cartesianism has been the recognition of the criteriological importance, even for our most "intimate" thoughts, of the reaction of others to our linguistic behavior and of the importance of the requirement that even "inner" thought must have "outer" (bodily-behavioral) manifestation to allow the others to have this purchase on our thought.

Wittgenstein showed that an auto-psychologist who attempted to keep a private, untranslatable diary about a psychological state, using the neologism, "E," to report the recurrence of a particular sensation, would, of necessity, fail. [Wittgenstein, PI, 258]

The project necessarily fails to fix the meaning of the private symbolism because no part of the project is capable of fixing meaning. A rule, or a reliable pattern of behavior relative to "E" has to be established to fix the meaning of "E." And it simply begs the question for the auto-psychologist to claim to have the rule or pattern fixed at the outset, without any evidence for the auto-psychologist to consult, at some point in the study, should she/he wonder whether she/he was accounting for the evidence correctly. [Wittgenstein, PI, 258]

This development is called the private language argument. We owe it to Kripke to see that this difficulty, which is announced in section 258 of Philosophical Investigations, is part of a broader difficulty of having criteria for following a rule. In his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke directs our attention back to Wittgenstein's earlier discussion of the student learning arithmetic which culminates in the now frequently cited section 202,

And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule "privately"; otherwise, thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.

The criteria of correctness are given in the social interactions of the person, relative to a group which reacts in intelligent, consistent, useful ways, relative to one's linguistic behavior.

In an actual case of a child, learning arithmetic, who has got the rule wrong, what would we do, as teachers and elders or only as friends? We'd say, "No, that's wrong." We'd "object to actions caused by vice, just as the musician enjoys fine melodies and is pained by bad ones." [Aristotle, NE, 1070a10] We'd both argue, we'd show examples from textbooks, we'd calculate it aloud ourselves, and ultimately, baring shocking new arguments or a sense that we are mistaken, we'd insist that we are right and insist that the student conform
to the discipline now (regardless of what the student will do in the future).7

In mathematics and even in psychological reasoning, we have to see ourselves as 1) manifesting thought in overt, bodily-behavioral states, and 2) as having interacted with others in ways which amount to our being of a same community with each other. So the classical, post-Wittgenstein position has been that an intelligible notion of the self must include body parts as in the self, to account for the requisites for psychological discourse.

But more is required in the notion of self, than mere body parts, to be included along with the mental. The more general point about rule-following shows that an adequate concept of a self which can wield a language must include a community with others in the linguistic group as a part of what the self is, under the description, language-user. If English were my sole language, then I am a person who is influenced by and has some same customs and practices as people who lived on or near the British Isles, and others who were so influenced, is part of who I am, capable of thought and reflection.

The reality of some others and their behaviors is part of my sense of a limited self, moira, in the self defined by virtues as well. This fact follows from the fact that Wittgenstein’s results about language and mathematics generalize to any minimally adequate theory of setting the limits of the self, moira, the virtues, and ethics.

Virtues, as capacities and tendencies, are similar to mathematical and linguistic capacities and tendencies. The life of the virtues is a life of characteristic action, designed to achieve our own excellence and happiness based on our developed ability to see the action which is kalou in the situation for action. Since “every virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state and to perform their functions well,” [NE, 1106a16] and human virtue will be “the state which makes a human being good and makes him perform his functions well.” [24]

That description compares nicely enough with what Wittgenstein said about counting to show that the learning and keeping of the virtues is the same, coming-to-follow-a-rule, intelligently that learning to count, or learning linguistic fixities of symbolic behavior is. Wittgenstein remarks:

what we call “counting” is an important part of our life’s activities. Counting (and that means counting like this) is a technique that is employed daily in the most various operations of our lives. And that is why we learn to count as we do: with endless practice, with merciless exactitude; that is why it is inexorably insisted that we shall all say “two” after “one”, “three” after “two” and so on. [Wittgenstein, Remarks, 4]8

Virtue and computational ability are similar. Learned states of tendencies toward and ability to discern intelligent action in support
of living well, of *eudaimonia*, on the one hand, and linguistic and mathematical abilities as learned states of tendencies toward and ability to discern intelligent procedures in symbolism, expression, performance and computation, on the other, have many points of psychological similarity. The same kind of problem which besets the acquisition employment and retention of the one kind of state will show up in the other.

Even if, contrary to what Aristotle says about the importance of *phronesis* and an ability to knowledgeability discern and orient ourselves to the *kalos* in right action, as if it were true that virtuous behavior was just a sort of habituated unreflective response, more like hitting home runs, or hitting tee shots well, then adding well, others would play similar roles in the acquisition of virtue.

Athletes, who do have muscle memory, get in slumps now and again. What feels right is obviously not right. Tee shots start veering for the right rough with alarming frequency. At this point it is nice to have a someone else around who has our well-bring as a goal of their own. Such a person, be it a coach or a teammate or even just a golfing buddy can sometimes give profitable advice. She/he can see what you are doing better than you can feel it.

She/he says something like “You’re letting your right elbow flare out from your body in the middle of your swing.”

On getting such advice, of course, the initial reaction is immediate. “No I’m not.” One has the direct evidence of one’s own feeling of one’s own body states. Here, at least what feels right, is right. *Following the rule* of holding one’s right elbow on a certain plane relative to the body, is just feeling that one is following the rule. One thinks: “Something is wrong with how I’m doing it, but it isn’t that!” One swings again and concentrates on the correct feeling in the right arm as one hooks the drive. Thus one confirms one’s hypotheses and knows to look for the problem elsewhere. But where.

All of that thought, of course can be as silly as the behavior described in Wittgenstein’s *PI*, 185 or 258. The sage advice of *PI* 202 is being ignored. In principle, there is a difference between thinking one is following a rule and actually following it.

The helpful other person may put a hand on our arm as we practice a swing so we can feel the pulling away, or rig straps of some sort to mold our swing. But most of all our advisor must just persist being a source of contrary evidence. This persistence will call on us to treat the advice more seriously, in time, as the athletic problem persists.

Similar things happen in business. Were I to spend the next twenty years designing and planning the fabrication of the ideal, consumer satisfying widget, and were I never to take anything to market in that time, then my prospects of success would be slight.*

Were my goal only a subjective good feeling, then whatever would
feel good would be right—anything I felt like doing, and did, would be right and so there we could not speak of right. There we could not even speak of reasons for action. For reasons require evidence, and where feeling right is identified with being right, it is meaningless to speak of feeling right as evidence of its being right. It is meaningless in the same way that it is meaningless to speak of having a toothache as being evidence for believing that I have a pain.¹⁰ I’m either enjoying myself or I am not. That’s it. Reasoning plays no role.

It might seem that autonomous thought, without social reinforcement, might be sufficient to determine the issue, if the goal sought is objective, but not public or social as satisfying the market is. My widget maker above could be working on the ideal widget, qua widget, regardless of marketability. She/he can check the produced widgets against a paradigm widget and have an objective measure. It can come out that way, as can following a rule by accident. But it also might not. Checking against the paradigm has subjective elements to it and can go awry given all sorts of psychological causes.

The history of invention and of art is rife with stories of people who lost their way, convincing themselves, while working alone, that their feeling of doing the right thing, was the same as doing the right thing. But it wasn’t.

The histories of these fields describe much accomplishment, some by lone, alienated pioneers. But also much self deception, among many other lone, alienated, would-be-pioneers. Because, as Aristotle said: “the solitary person’s life is hard, since it is not easy for him to be continuously active all by himself; but in relation to others and in their company it is easier,...for the excellent person, in so far as he is excellent,...objects to actions caused by vice.” [NE, 1170a5-101]

To learn the virtues, and so to form and keep good moira for ourselves, we are going to have to, at least, imitate the actions of good people. To learn enough quickly, we in fact, “triangulate” our picture of healthy correct action by seeing action and potential action from our own point of view and from at least one model human’s point of view. But to have a model human’s point of view at all the times relevant for action, I must have internalized her/his reactions to concrete situations of our lives—I have to have made the human model’s point of view of a part of the me that is living this life, in this way, at this time, so that the relevant inputs of the human model are there at all the relevant times.

This “multi-phonic” dimension of feedback on whether we are acting finely is essential to our mastery of right or virtuous action at the level of complexity of evaluation necessary to get all the good things there are to get—to be truly fine, in having set reasonable limits for ourselves and then in having lived fully and well within those limits.
Others, especially friends for virtue, who become so central to our interests, needs and concerns, actually enter into our selves, as other selves, provide a more intense, and so more useful form of evidence about the fineness of one's life. More useful, in conjunction with non-personal facts, about our widgets and about our lives than those facts alone may be. Friends of this sort are a great block to self deception, because they enter into our selves and block it. It is one thing to fool myself. It can be quite another to fool myself with a virtuous Katie Sue in there as a part of my self, with my knowing what she would think, after she knew what I am doing, knew why I am doing it, and her reacting to it. But even before her reaction, before my action, since she is a part of me, I see the intended action already from her point of view, automatically.

But the importantly intensified role that friends, as special kinds of other people, play in the shaping of oneself, mira and kalos is worthy of separate discussion in another article. For the purposes of this article I take the point to have been established that, the only chance we have for making a self which is capable of being determinate enough to be the subject of a virtues ethics of personal flourishing, is by taking the concerns, interests, and reactions into ourselves and letting them limit us—fix parts of our mira.

In this respect, it is not surprising that psychoanalytic theory, which has a lot to do with the flourishing of selves, with requisite self-definition, attends to the place of the ongoing projects with parents and others which inhabit our ongoing self. Selves which chose and act, worry and get blocked, have other things, people, and cultures in them as much as they have body parts and mental capacities.

What has to be added, to our picture of the self, to make an adequate non-zero-point self, is more than just the person's body. My self can and does in, as parts, many things and people of the world that zero-point theories would place outside of me, because I am this living thing, neither life, nor body, nor mind, but this body-mind-living-doing. My self includes my activities, values, purposes and intentions, friendships, cultural associations, and in addition to the nature of each of my particular material and psychological characteristics, the overall structure of them relative to each other.

2. In Aristotle, in the working of all the virtues, there is the intentional orientation to nobility or fineness. For example, kalos is referenced in the choosing matrix for sophrosyne at NE, 1119a18 and again at NE, 1119b16. The brave person chooses what is fine in war. NE, 1117b14 The person of megalošukia will aim at the fine. NE, 1122b6-7 But the vulgar person will fail of excellence because an ostentatious display of wealth, is aimed at display and admiration and not at what is fine. [NE, 1123a24-25]

The most clear statements of the issue come at NE, 1120a24, where Aristotle says, "Actions expressing virtue are fine, and aim at what is fine" and at NE, 1122b7 where Aristotle calls kalos the common denominator of the virtues.
3. "[H]e awards himself what is finest and best of all, and gratifies the most controlling part of himself, obeying it in everything" NE, 1166b30 has self-interest in this Aristotle-approved sense. "The good person must be a self-lover, since he will both help himself and benefit others by doing fine actions." [NE, 1169a11-17]

4. Aristotle may well have had such a theory. Contrast Categories, 7a36 with 8a15-16, in which a slave is a relative (owned by a master) qua slave. But "An individual man is not called someone's individual man."

5. Chief among the classical refutations are Wittgenstein, PI, and Ryle. The designation "zero-point" comes from Wittgenstein's earlier Tractatus. [5.64] "Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality coordinated with it."

6. Here Aristotle speaks as if youth, maturity and old age were discrete measures of persons. However experience shows that different persons have characteristic measures of youth, maturity and old age for different aspects of their personality at different times of their lives. Putting the same point another way, it seems that people grow up, in different aspects of their personality, at different rates and at different times. So that someone may be chronologically old, mature in work-discipline and childlike in capacity for social relations. Other people will have different arrays of these measures distributed over a time-slice of their life.

So Aristotle's theory of kaios relative to age would have to be fine-grained for this phenomenon. Further, the theory would have to be adjusted to allow for combinational effects for these different stages. For example a chronological youth who is mature in judgment is more kaios than a chronological adult who is mature in social skills and childlike for lack of mature judgment.

All of that classification would be a very large task. But someone who is good at tracking the kaios of humans, tracks those variables and their combinational effects.

7. Such discussions are sketched in Wittgenstein, 1939, pp. 26-29. Remarks, sections 1-4, covers the same ground.

8. Wittgenstein goes on to discuss truth here and at that point there is at least a surface disagreement with Aristotle. Aristotle had held that phronesis, the ability to "deliberate finely about what is good and beneficial for himself...about what promotes living well in general," [NE, 1140a25] was "a state of the soul that grasps the truth in affirmations and denials." [NE, 1139b15] Wittgenstein claimed: "...But is this counting only a use, then; isn't there also some truth corresponding to this sequence?' The truth that counting has proved to pay.—Then do you want to say that 'being true' means: being usable (or useful)? —No, not that; but that it can't be said of the series of natural numbers—any more than of our language—that it is true, but: that it is usable, and, above all, it is used." But truth in rightness of action comes to this same practical point, probably. So I don't see any room for controversy here.

Second, phronesis operates on a different level of generality than counting. But that is not a difference which makes a difference to anything under consideration here.

9. Wittgenstein's cousin, F. A. Hayek develops this point in his important paper, "The Use of Knowledge in Society."

10. At PI 246, Wittgenstein remarks: "Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviors,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them. This is the same point, if feeling right was the point of ethics, there would be no role for reason, as there would be no role for inference. This, I take it is Aristotle's views, that the life of pleasure is a slavish life at the level of grazing animals, [NE, 1095b16-20] is living at the non-rational level of the soul [NE, 1102a29-b12], where it would be absurd to place the ends of ethics, what with all it's hard work. Ethics has to involve the rational parts of the soul. [NE, 1176b29-1177a6]"
Greene, William Chase. Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1968).