PHENOMENOLOGY
AND THE
FOUNDATIONALISM DEBATE

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Two themes central to Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, the phenomenological reduction and the intentionality of conscious experience, along with certain details of Husserl's view of empirical knowledge, provide a basis for situating phenomenology in current debates about foundationalism. Phenomenology is often thought to be foundationalist because Husserl claims that philosophy is a transcendental discipline which achieves apodictic insights about experience. This paper will argue that discussions of foundationalism lead inescapably to transcendental issues and that phenomenology, albeit apodictic and transcendental, is a non-foundationalist discipline which nevertheless has a central and constructive cultural role to play.

1. Philosophical and Critical Reflection.

The phenomenological reduction is a methodological performance, a shift of attention, by which we enter the philosophical attitude. This attitude is contrasted to what Husserl calls the "natural attitude." In the natural attitude we attend directly and straightforwardly to the world and the objects therein, and we aim at those ends (cognitive, practical, and so forth) belonging to everyday, natural life. The shift to the philosophical attitude is characterized by Husserl as a reduction because we suspend our participation in what he calls the "general thesis of the natural

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attitude,” i.e. we suspend (but do not negate) our initial and naïve acceptance of the actuality of the experienced world and the veridicality of our experiences. Truthful experiences, and consequently the testing, strengthening or weakening, and confirming or disconfirming of the initial veridicality of experience, are the telos of activities undertaken in the natural attitude. The attainment of this natural end requires, therefore, the criticism of naïve experience.

“Natural” criticism, however, is different from philosophical criticism. Natural criticism also involves a change of attitude, a shift of attention to the logical domain. This shift of attention is most obviously motivated by the possibility of doubt. We might, for example, provisionally withdraw our acceptance of the truth of what is expressed in a declarative sentence; in doing so, we focus instead on the logical content of the sentence, its judgmental or propositional sense. In this critical attitude we can identify reasons for accepting or rejecting the judgment in question, i.e. we can — as the logician does — construct, consider, and evaluate arguments for or against the position asserted in the judgment. However, our concern is ordinarily with overcoming doubt and establishing the truth of the original judgment, i.e. with determining the “fit” or “agreement” (leaving these terms for the moment undefined) between the logical content of our experience and the experienced objectivity itself.

The critical attitude, therefore, has a twofold concern reflected in deductive logic's distinction between validity and soundness: the consideration of arguments and the determination of truth. For the latter, the former alone is insufficient, since arguments remain in the domain of logical content and do not themselves address the “fit” between the logical content of the experience and the experienced objectivity. The critical attitude, then, must be distinguished from the purely logical attitude; the critical attitude involves both logical and epistemological concerns. The critical thinker operates in the two-dimensional area opened by the distinction between sense (or content) and object. In naïve natural experience, our undoubted experience is concerned solely with objects; when doubt arises, we enter the critical attitude and its concern with the interplay of sense and object, but with the aim of returning to the natural and straightforward concern with objects.

In the philosophical attitude, on the other hand, we attend to transcendental consciousness, to consciousness as intentional experience. The claim that consciousness is intentional experience means simply that consciousness is always the consciousness of (an object). To attend to consciousness as intentional experience is to reflect on that whole which is the intentional correlation between the experience (of an object) and its intended object (precisely as experienced). Any analysis of intentional experience — indeed any account of knowledge — must clarify the
relations between (1) the experiencing, (2) the experienced object itself, and (3) the experienced object precisely as experienced. Our experience is always the experience of an object, but that object is experienced in a determinate manner, with a determinate content. Hence, the experienced object precisely as experienced has often been conceived as a psychic or logical content.

Whereas critical reflection occurs in the interplay between sense and object and is undertaken in order to determine the truthfulness of our experience, philosophical reflection is undertaken in order to identify and describe the structures and forms embedded in the various types of intentional experience, one of which is that all experience is filled with a determinate content. Indeed, the distinctions between sense and object and between these two and the experience itself are properly understood only from within the philosophical attitude and its reflection upon intentional experience. The philosophical thinker, in other words, works in the three-dimensional area opened by the distinction between the experiencing, the experienced object itself, and that object simply as experienced (i.e., the content or sense of the experience). From this perspective the philosopher can speak of what it is for a judgmental experience to be truthful, i.e., for the judgmental content of a judging act to “fit” the judged state of affairs.

2. Varieties of Foundationalism

Foundationalism is a position formed at the same intersection of concerns which characterizes the critical attitude. It is born of the concern to defeat skepticism by securing the foundations of knowledge, the basic truths upon which all other knowledge will rest. The skeptical challenge to knowledge depends upon a distinction between appearance and reality and claims that only appearances are knowable. This challenge produces two responses: (1) the claim that an objective reality beyond “subjective” appearances is knowable, and (2) the search for secure foundational cognitions or beliefs regarding immediately experienced content, upon which is to be based knowledge of the objectively real.

More narrowly, foundationalism is a position regarding not knowledge as such but its justification. This more narrowly construed foundationalism arises out of the concern to avoid two evils in the order of justification, viz. circularity and an infinite regress, both of which, it is argued, would leave knowledge ultimately ungrounded and open the door to skepticism. Insofar as the narrower foundationalism is concerned with justification, and insofar as justification is thought to be truth-conducive, the account of justificatory argument must eventually be related to
accounts of truth and the attempt to defeat skepticism.\textsuperscript{5} For foundationalist positions of both the broader and narrower sort I shall use the expression “epistemological foundationalism.”\textsuperscript{6}

Foundationalism, however, is also a position arising out of metaphilosophical concerns regarding the relation of philosophy to non-philosophical experience. This type of foundationalism views philosophy as a foundational discipline not because non-philosophical truths are inferentially justified by appeal to philosophical premises but because philosophical truths are about other kinds of experience or knowledge. They enable us, so it is claimed, to determine whether or not a truth is genuinely a scientific truth, whether or not a work is genuinely a work of art, whether or not an act is genuinely moral (as opposed to non-moral), and to determine how the scientific, the aesthetic, and the moral are related to one another.\textsuperscript{7} Philosophical knowledge, in other words, is the knowledge of (a) those criteria in terms of which we determine the legitimacy of various experiences or candidates for knowledge and (b) those principles in terms of which we specify the proper relations between different kinds of experiences and different kinds of knowledge. For this sort of foundationalism I shall use the expression “transcendental foundationalism.”\textsuperscript{8}

3. Modern Epistemologies and Phenomenology

Since epistemological foundationalism is born of the philosophical motivation to defeat skeptical doubts and to secure or conduce to truth, discussions thereof occur largely within the confines of the distinction between sense and object disclosed by the adoption of the critical attitude. However, since the philosophical attitude has a more encompassing concern, it is possible from within that attitude to recognize that discussions of foundationalism fail to conceive adequately the intentionality of experience and thereby fail to clarify adequately both the relation between experienced content and the experienced objectivity and that between justificatory arguments and the experience of truth. That this is in fact so is one of the claims of this paper.

Most discussions of epistemological foundationalism are also carried on within the modern understanding of the distinction between subject and object and the related distinction between the inner and the outer. Most discussions of epistemological foundationalism assume — as do modern epistemologies generally — that (1) the immediate object of experience is not the experienced objectivity itself but the experienced content, (2) the experienced content is in some sense a real part of the subject or the subject’s experiencing act, and (3) as such, the experienced content is
ontologically distinct from the experienced objectivity. Modern epistemologies, in other words, are guilty of a reduction ism, (i) they reduce the immediate object of our experience from the experienced object itself to the experienced content, and (ii) they conceive this content as a psychic content. They “subjectivize” the (outer) object by making its “objective content” a part of the experiencing agent’s “subjective” or “psychic” (inner) life. Even a philosopher such as Frege who rejects the psychologizing thesis expressed in (2) views the experienced content as belonging to a third realm of sense (logical content) ontologically distinct from experienced objectivities themselves. Hence, most discussions of epistemological foundationalism focus almost exclusively on the infallible self-evidence or at least the self-justification of the content of certain experiences. Moreover, they generally adopt the view that the relation between the experienced content and the experienced object is to be explained by an external relation (e.g., causation, presentation, representation, or projection) or left unexplained. Finally, must do not explicitly consider in detail the experiencing activity itself.

The phenomenologist, however, rejects the modern view of the subject-object distinction, and phenomenological reflection yields a significantly different account of the relations between experience, experienced content, and experienced object. The phenomenological reduction is not a reduction ism, the philosopher reflects on the intentional correlation between subject and object. Subject and object are not two independent wholes externally related, but parts of a more encompassing whole, viz. transcendental consciousness, the consciousness of an object. Hence, it is not primarily the externalized distinctions between content and object, or subject and object, or inner and outer which will provide the key to Husserl’s answer to skepticism and his views on foundationalism.

Husserl distinguishes instead the real and intentional contents of experience. However, the experienced or intentional content of experience is not “psychologized” or “logicized;” it is not ontologically distinct from the experienced objectivity itself. The intentional object is the intended object as intended; conversely, the intended object is the identity presented in a manifold of intentional objects, where the intentional object (the intended object as intended, as presenting itself in a determinate manner) is understood more simply as a presentation of the (intended) object. Hence, the intended object is an identity in a manifold of presentations.

If, for example, we consider a single, concrete, temporally extended experience, e.g. listening to John Adams’ Fearful Symmetries, its intentional object is the intended objectivity precisely as intended, Fearful Symmetries as performed and heard. However, if we consider separate
phases of experience within the temporally extended experience, then each phase of the experience has its own intentional object, the presently played notes as presently heard in the context of the surrounding, no-longer and not-yet sounding notes (ultimately all the notes comprised by the work). Since each phase intends an object in a determinate manner of givenness, for each phase there is an intended objectivity as intended, i.e. an intentional object. Thus, the intended object of the concrete experience is the identity, the composition *Fearful Symmetries* itself, present in the temporally extended manifold of notes heard in context, which are the intentional objects of the various phases of the experience. Finally, if we consider multiple, concrete experiences of the same object, each experience has its own intentional object, its intended objectivity just as intended. But the intended object itself is the identity present in each and all of these intentional objects; Adams' *Fearful Symmetries* is (at least) the identity presenting itself in its written score and in its various (and varied) performances.

As an identity present in multi-leveled manifolds of presentation, the intended objectivity itself is neither the totality of its presentations, nor some subset thereof, nor any single presentation thereof. By virtue of the associational patterns and horizontal references which are a structural part of any experience, any single experience or experiential phase incorporates a manifold, and the object of the experience is the identity revealing itself therein. The intended object is, therefore, present, by virtue of these horizontal references, in each part of the manifold and in the manifold as a whole.\textsuperscript{10}

The response to skepticism implied by this view of intentionality might appear too strong. If the intentional content is ontologically identical with the intended objectivity itself, how are we to explain non-veridical appearances and falsity? It is a second Husserlian distinction, that between empty and full intentions (as opposed to the modern distinction between subjective content and object), which provides the resources to answer this question. Our attention (except, perhaps, for perceptual attention) can be directed to objects whether or not those objects are present to us here and now (although even in perception we must distinguish between those aspects of an object which are actually sensed — say, the opening bars of *Fearful Symmetries* or this side of a door — and those which are not actually sensed — say, the remainder of the musical composition or the other side of the door). To intend an object when it is not present in the here and now is emptily to intend the object. The object of an empty intention, however, is the worldly objectivity itself and not a mental content. The worldly objectivity as (emptily) intended in the experience is the intentional object of the experience, but that worldly objectivity as intended is the existent worldly
objectivity itself in a particular manner of presentation. It is the worldly objectivity in one of its possible presentations.

The full intention, on the other hand, is directed to the object actually present in the here and now. Full intentions are intuitions, involving to some degree and in some measure a sensuous and perceptual aspect. An intuitive act can function as a fulfilling (or disappointing) intention, i.e. as an experience which fulfills (or disappoints) what is intended emptily. When the worldly objectivity is itself brought to an intuitive presence, what we previously and emptily thought about that objectivity is confirmed in a fulfilling intention or disconfirmed in a disappointing intention.

This does not, however, mean that all and only fulfilling intuitions are simple perceptions. A perception can be undertaken simply, without any reference to an empty intention; I can look around the room and note things without any reference to an empty intention seeking fulfillment. Or a simple perception can fulfill an expectation about how an object will look. However, a fulfilling intention is not always, or even usually, a simple perception. Simple perception underdetermines a state of affairs since perceived objects can be articulated in a variety of ways. An empty judgmental intending which articulates an object in a determinate manner can only be fulfilled by a full intention which presents the object in that same articulated manner, i.e. by what Husserl calls a “categorial intuition.” In the categorial intuition fulfilling a judgment, the articulated state of affairs is intuitively present to consciousness in the same way it is articulated by the (empty) judging. In other words, we see not merely a white wall; rather, in seeing the white wall we see that it is white. As an intuitive act, the categorial intuition requires a sensuous or perceptual base — to see that the wall is white requires the perceptual base of seeing the white wall itself — but the categorial intuition is not exhausted by this base.

For Husserl, then, to experience truth is to experience the “covering” (Deckung) of the emptily intended objectivity by the intuitively present objectivity. The objectivity emptily intended and the objectivity intuitively present are experienced as coincident. In this manner, the full intention becomes a fulfilling intention. To experience the coincidence of empty and fulfilling intentions is to recognize that both intentions are directed to the same objectivity. In experiencing this coincidence, we experience truth; we recognize the identity of the posited and intuited objectivities (rather than the coherence of contents or the correspondence of a subjective content and an objectivity).

The coincidence established between the empty and fulfilling intentions need not always be perfect. Fulfillment is relative not only to the empty intention we seek to fulfill but to the practical interests and the
corresponding demands for exactness inherent in the kind of experience in question. So, for example, the more theoretical the experience, the more perfect the coincidence sought. But many of our ordinary experiences and interests are satisfied by less perfect instances of coincidence in which we can, in spite of the differences in the manner in which the object is presented by the different intentions, recognize the object as an identity in the manifold of empty and full intentions.

It is, therefore, the distinction between empty and full intentions which carries for Husserl the burden of explaining dubitable or false cognitions rather than the distinction between (subjective) appearance and object. The fact that an object appears to a subject in a determinate (and non-veridical) manner does not transform the object's so appearing into an appearance which is a subjective, psychic content or a third-realm, logical content. Truth and falsity are determined by the coincidence or lack thereof existing between empty and full intentions, and the experience of truth or falsity is the recognition of that coincidence or lack thereof such that we also recognize that the posited and intuited objectivities are or are not identical.¹²

4. Epistemological Foundationalism

In its most general sense epistemological foundationalism is a position regarding empirical knowledge which maintains that there exist some foundational cognitions or beliefs (1) which are either self-evident or self-justifying or, at the least, not evident or justified by reference to any other cognitions or beliefs and (2) upon which all other cognitions or beliefs are founded insofar as they can be derived therefrom by an acceptable method. Insofar as foundationalism is concerned with the justification of founded empirical knowledge, insofar as empirical knowledge is propositional, and insofar as foundationalism founds empirical knowledge on self-evident or self-justifying cognitions, the foundationalist (1) must either (a) allow that the foundational cognitions are themselves propositional and can serve as premises in justifying arguments, or (b) claim that the foundational cognitions are non-propositional and explain how propositional beliefs can be derived from non-propositional cognitions, and (2) if a foundationalist also claims that experienced content and experienced object are ontologically distinct, he or she must explain (or explain away) the relation between content and object so as to explain how empirical knowledge results from our immediate awareness of experienced content. We shall for the moment assume (1a).

Strong foundationalism claims that the foundational cognitions are
An infallible cognition is one about whose truth it is impossible for the knower to be mistaken. Hence, for the strong foundationalist the foundational cognitions are self-evidently true. Finally, the infallibility of a foundational cognition implies its incorrigibility. An incorrigible cognition is one which is not subject to correction, and a cognition about which we cannot be mistaken is clearly not subject to correction.

Strong foundationalism's commitment to infallible foundational cognitions is sometimes — as in the case of Descartes and Lewis — couched in the language of "certainty" and "indubitability." Descartes, for example, discloses as a result of his methodic and methodological doubt what he takes to be the indubitable propositions (1) that he doubts and (2) that, as one who doubts, he is a thinking thing, a being who has ideas with both formal and objective reality. What is indubitably revealed to Descartes and given to philosophical reflection is, therefore, not the experienced objectivity about which he might be mistaken and which might not even exist, but his subjectivity, i.e. his experience along with its experienced, representational content. The truth of the content is not indubitably guaranteed, but that the idea has this content is guaranteed.

Similarly, Lewis argues that our empirical knowledge rests on "apprehensions of direct and indubitab|e content of experience," i.e. the direct experience of sensuous qualities or "qualia," which are not the objective properties themselves but the directly given content of our sense experience. Hence, what is apprehended with certainty is again subjectivity (in the modern sense), i.e. the sensory apprehension together with its experienced, presentational content. Thus, while it is by no means certain that I am perceiving water on the road before me, it is certain that I am perceiving what looks like water, what appears to be water. And in this respect at least, Lewis is like Descartes who secures the act of thinking along with its content.

Husserl too appeals to the indubitability of experiences while we are living through them. For Husserl what is disclosed in the indubitable grasp of an experience is both the experiencing act and the experienced object just as experienced, i.e. the intentional content of the experience or what he later calls the "noema." While Husserl's ontology of contents is significantly different from the modern understanding of content found in Descartes and Lewis, this difference makes no difference for claims of indubitability.

5. Epistemological Anti-Foundationalism

The basic objection to strong foundationalism concerns the relationship
between the attributed characteristics of indubitability and certainty and the asserted infallibility of foundational cognitions. Properly speaking, certainty belongs more to the knower than to the cognition; it is that property of a cognitive act such that the cognitive agent S has complete assurance in its truth. Such assurance, however, is presumably tied to the fact that there are no known or foreseeable reasons for S not to accept the truth of the cognition in question, i.e. it is tied to the cognition's indubitability for S. Consequently, the negation of a certain or indubitable cognition is *rationally* inconceivable to S (i.e. there is no rational motivation to consider negating the cognition), but such inconceivability to S does not entail the impossibility of the S's being mistaken; it does not entail infallibility. Certainty and indubitability, in other words, do not entail that S cannot be mistaken but only that S has no reason to think he or she might be mistaken. Finally, whereas infallibility entails incorrigibility, certainty and indubitability do not; a cognition is incorrigible only when it is not subject to correction, but previously unknown and unforeseen reasons can newly provide legitimate bases for doubting and correcting a cognition previously thought certain and indubitable. Hence, even if the foundational cognitions are certain or indubitable to S, this does not entail their infallibility and incorrigibility, and since this entailment is necessary for strong foundationalism to be maintained, strong foundationalism can safely be rejected.

Moreover, experience clearly reveals that S's certain judgment that he or she is undergoing an experience of a particular type with a particular content is not indubitable. It is at best indubitable only in the weaker sense of there being no reasons for S to doubt the cognition in question; it is only subjectively indubitable. S, for example, might have no known reason for doubt and might make no attempt — and might even be psychologically incapable of making an attempt — to rule out the possibility that presently unknown but foreseeable reasons might raise a basis for doubt. But it is possible that the apparently certain and indubitable perceiving of an object is not truly a perceptual experience at all. The temporarily or permanently deranged person who is hallucinating might be certain, i.e. have no known reason to doubt and be unable to foresee any reason to doubt, that he or she is perceiving what looks like a green monster. Experiences involving various forms of psychological repression or masking behaviors provide additional examples of experiences which are certain for S but only apparently or subjectively indubitable.

Experiencing agents are, then, not always correct about the nature of their own certain and "indubitable" experiences. Precisely because the world, the knowing agents therein, and the objects they know are realities *for us*, we are sometimes in a better position to judge the true character
of a person's experience than the person undergoing the experience. The certainty and "indubitability" of such experiences to the one having the experiences are no guarantee even of the truth, much less the infallibility, of S's beliefs about such experiences and their representational or representational content. Hence, S cannot be assured of the truth of any cognitions founded on such foundational cognitions.

The difficulties in thinking that particular cognitions with their experienced contents are indubitable make it impossible to think that foundational cognitions, if there are any, would always even be true. We need, therefore, to divorce ourselves for the moment from the teleological concern with truth, which cannot always be secured even by supposedly foundational cognitions, and limit our discussion to the purely logical domain and to those versions of moderate foundationalism which claim only that there are foundational cognitions whose justification is non-inferential.

Our moderate foundationalist, however, is susceptible to the charge that within the purely logical domain the justification of beliefs always proceeds by way of giving reasons. Hence, every belief will be justified by appeal to other beliefs. Consequently, there are no foundational beliefs which are self-justifying in the sense that they do not depend on other beliefs for their justification. Bonjour states this argument, which he calls "the basic antifoundationalist argument," as follows:19

(1) Suppose that there are basic [foundational] empirical beliefs (a) which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose justification does not depend on that of any further empirical beliefs.

(2) For a belief to be epistemically justified requires that there be a reason why it is likely to be true.

(3) For a belief to be epistemically justified for a particular person requires that this person be himself in cognitive possession of such a reason.

(4) The only way to be in cognitive possession of such a reason is to believe with justification the premises from which it follows that the belief is likely to be true.

(5) The premises of such a justifying argument for an empirical belief cannot be entirely a priori; at least one such premise must be empirical.

(6) Therefore, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief must depend on the justification of at least one other empirical belief, contradicting (1).

(7) It follows that there can be no basic empirical beliefs.

The controversial premises in this argument are (3) and (4). Premise (3) states the internalist view of justification, viz. that the justifying reasons be believed or known by S. Externalist accounts of justification, on the
other hand, seek to preserve foundationalism by denying premise (3), claiming instead that a justifying reason for at least a non-inferential belief is present (a) whenever a nomological relation exists between the believer and the world such that the satisfaction of that relation yields a true belief that $p$ and justifies $S$ in believing that $p$, even though $S$ has no awareness of this (nomological) reason or (b) whenever $S$ follows a reliable process in coming to believe that $p$, even though $S$ might be unaware of the reliability of this process. The advantage of externalism is that it more intimately unites the concerns with justification and truth than the internalist account which is concerned exclusively with justification.

This advantage, however, is more than canceled by two disadvantages. First, externalism fails adequately to account for the difference between truly believing and knowing. Although this problem exists for externalism whatever definition of knowledge is accepted, we can illustrate it in the context of the justified-true-belief definition of knowledge. According to that definition, $S$ knows that $p$ only if (a) $p$ is true; (b) $S$ believes that $p$, and (c) $S$ is justified in believing that $p$. Externalism’s understanding of (c) transforms it from a statement about $S$’s condition of being justified, of $S$ having reasons to believe that $p$, to a statement about $p$, that $p$ is justified for $S$ whether or not $S$ is aware that it is justified. This last clause, however, indicates the difficulty with externalism, for $S$ can know that $p$ — i.e. $S$ can truly believe with nomological or reliabilist justification that $p$ — without any awareness that $p$ is justified, even while in cognitive possession of reasons justifying the belief that $q$, when $q$ is in fact false and logically incompatible with $p$. Nevertheless the externalist would, on the justified-true-belief account of knowledge, have to consider $S$’s irrational belief that $p$ (irrational because $S$ has reason to believe that $q$) to be knowledge. The alternative, of course, is to continue to hold the externalist position while rejecting the justified-true-belief account of knowledge. In this case, the anomaly present in the last example would no longer be a bar to claiming that $S$ knows that $p$ for the possession of knowledge would no longer depend necessarily on $S$’s being justified in believing that $p$ but only, perhaps, on $p$’s being true. Such a view, however, could still not account for the subjective difference between merely believing (without justification) that $p$ and knowing (without awareness of the reasons) that $p$.

The advantage of internalism, on the other hand, is that the subjective difference between truly believing and knowing is preserved and explained. For the internalist, an adequate account of knowledge includes the requirement that $S$ be in cognitive possession of the reasons which make $p$ true or likely to be true. This requirement does not mean that $S$ must have explicit awareness of the reasons justifying the belief that $p$. 
but only that $S$ have implicit awareness thereof sufficient to allow $S$ to provide the reasons (at least imprecisely and vaguely) if he or she were asked to do so. More fundamentally, the advantage of internalism is that it responds to the intuition that $S$'s knowing that $p$ involves $S$'s being in possession of the evidence, in this case the justifying reasons, supporting what he or she knows. But internalism so understood seems to generate the infinite regress in the order of justification which a foundationalist is concerned to stop, for $S$ could always be asked to make explicit those justifying reasons.

The rejection of premise (4) of the basic antifoundationalist argument allows for the internalism of (3) while nevertheless stopping the infinite regress in the order of justifying reasons. Such a rejection requires either an appeal to a belief the mere holding of which immediately justifies its content or to basic, immediately self-warranting cognitions which are not themselves beliefs but are capable of justifying beliefs [(1b) above]. However, with respect to the second alternative, it is difficult to see how a non-propositional content would logically justify a propositional content. And with respect to the first alternative, we have already seen the difficulties in claiming that the experienced content of individual experiences is in any sense self-evidently true and thereby self-justifying. Hence, to appeal to self-justifying beliefs and to establish their character as self-justifying or self-warranting, and thereby foundational even if fallible, we would have to both identify some characteristic mark of these experiences and establish the self-warranting or self-justifying nature of the class of experiences possessing this characteristic mark.

Let us assume that we do identify a defining characteristic of self-justifying or self-warranting beliefs or cognitions. We would, then, in order to claim that a particular belief or cognition is foundational have to assert at least (i) that beliefs or cognitions of the relevant class are true or likely to be true, (ii) that a particular belief or cognition is a member of that class, and (iii) that we presently hold that particular belief or cognition. But these claims constitute a logical justification of the belief thought to be foundational. Either that justification involves empirical claims — as Bonjour claims it must — in which case premise (5) of the basic anti-foundationalist argument is true and the so-called foundational beliefs are no longer foundational, or that justification is purely a priori, in which case either premise (5) of Bonjour's argument is false or we no longer have an instance of empirical justification. Now it is clear that empirical knowledge must be justified empirically, at least to some degree. The foundationalist, then, would seem to have no recourse left but to shift ground and to claim that the argument supporting the conclusion that a particular belief is foundational is an a priori argument, i.e. the foundationalist would seem to have no recourse but to assert a
kind of transcendental foundationalism in which the foundational beliefs are legitimating beliefs about classes of experience rather than beliefs about the experienced world which function as premises in justificatory arguments.

The (epistemological) foundationalist model of justification therefore fails. Strong foundationalism cannot sustain its claims to the infallibility of our awareness of our own experiences and their experienced content. Externalist moderate foundationalism cannot adequately distinguish between the subjective conditions present in true belief and knowledge and allows for the possibility that irrationally held beliefs constitute nomologically justified or reliable knowledge. And an internalist moderate foundationalism which appeals to self-justifying or self-warranting (inner) content as foundational must move toward a transcendental foundationalism in order to justify its claim that certain classes of experience are self-justifying or self-warranting. And, in order to establish its epistemological value, internalism must justify the claim that the self-justified or self-warranted (inner) content conduces to truth regarding (outer) objects.

The alternative to epistemological (justificatory) foundationalism, then, is either a transcendental (legitimating) foundationalism or a coherentist model of justification. A coherent system of beliefs all of which are reciprocally justified is not equivalent to a true system of beliefs, for there is no assurance that the logical content of such a system possesses the "fit" or "agreement" with intended objectivities which is characteristic of truth. Since justification is teleologically ordered toward knowledge and truth, we are left with a new justificatory question, the question about whether the pursuit of coherent systems is a worthwhile endeavor when the ultimate goal is empirical truth or, as BonJour puts it, the question about how to justify the claim that justification on a coherentist model leads to truth.

The need for such a "metajustification," born of the sharp separation between an inner domain of logical content where justification is at issue and an outer domain of objects where truth is at issue, again points toward the transcendental justification of particular kinds of beliefs, viz. the system of beliefs achieved by coherentist justifications, and toward a transcendental foundationalism.

6. Transcendental Antifoundationalism

Epistemological foundationalism and the reactions thereto invariably point toward transcendental issues. Transcendental foundationalism is born of the same anti-skeptical motives as strong foundationalism and
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departs from the same initial considerations. We have seen that beliefs about momentarily lived particular experiences and their contents, even if apparently indubitable, are neither infallible nor genuinely indubitable. Nor is it clear how empirical knowledge can be immediately derived from such beliefs. However, even as we might doubt particular experiences, we have no known or foreseeable reason to doubt that in general we experience an objective world. As long as I am experiencing, and even if particular experiences are non-veridical, it is nonetheless indubitable that I experience an intersubjective world of physical objects having sensible, causal, functional, and value properties; of imagined objects such as centaurs and unicorns; and of ideal objects such as geometrical figures and musical compositions. Moreover, it is indubitable that in general we accept the existence of such a world and the initial veridicality of our beliefs regarding it. In other words, the general thesis of the natural attitude is indubitable, and this attitude embodies an ontological realism.

The transcendental foundationalist claims that our natural experience of the world in general — rather than particular natural experiences — provides the basis for a transcendental reflection in which we disclose philosophical truths which are “foundational” relative to our empirical cognitions. On this view, individual empirical beliefs would not be argumentatively justified by appealing to non-empirical philosophical premises. Instead, philosophy would be a foundational discipline on which empirical disciplines and other conscious endeavors of the natural attitude would be legitimated by virtue of the fact that philosophy would identify the categories governing genuine instances of the various disciplines and types of conscious endeavors.

There are two approaches to transcendental reflection, which I shall call the “Kantian” and the “Husserlian.” The Kantian, which is foundationalist and is adumbrated in the preceding paragraph, departs from the material content of the world as experienced and argues to transcendental principles and forms which underlie that content insofar as their application to a manifold of sense-data produces representations of objects and empirical judgments embodying those principles and forms. Kant himself takes as his material starting point Newtonian physics and paradigmatically related theories, arguing to a particular set of transcendental categories of understanding, that set whose application is productive of Newtonian science. In this way Kant begs the question about the truth of Newtonian science. He is concerned solely to legitimate the categories operative in it by grounding them transcendently. Insofar as the Kantian approach to transcendental reflection departs from the content of our experience, it will always beg the question concerning the truth of the content given by particular experiences.
Husserl criticizes this Kantian approach to transcendental reflection as a form of "transcendental psychologism." The analogy is with the empiricistic and psychologistic views of logic criticized by both Frege and Husserl. The thrust of those criticisms was that the meanings expressed in language cannot be reduced to the psychological or psychic content of ideas; correlative to the laws of logic, which properly concern ideal relations among meanings, cannot be reduced to empirical laws governing the activity of thinking or the combination of acts of thinking. Psychologism is the reduction of the ideal, the objective, and the "outer" to the empirical, the subjective, and the "inner."

Kant is not a psychologist of this sort, but, according to Husserl, Kant makes a comparable mistake insofar as he reduces objective categories to the transcendental forms of thinking organizing psychic data, i.e. sensuous contents. More specifically, Kant identifies the categories said to underlie the logical forms of judgment as those underlying Newtonian mechanics, and reduces these categories to transcendental categories governing the activity of representing objects. The net result is that the objective has been internalized to the transcendental categories of understanding and the psychic data upon which they operate.

It is at this point that we return to our earlier remarks about the modern epistemological assumptions underlying most discussions of epistemological foundationalism. Kant's distinction between appearances and the thing-in-itself is located within the modern understanding of the subjective and the objective. It is the appearance that we know, not the thing-in-itself, and the relation between the appearance and the thing-in-itself is unspecified and unspecifiable. The appearance, furthermore, is a complex of psychic data organized according to transcendental rules. For Kant, then, the phenomenal object of knowledge is an experienced content, a complex of psychic representations.26

It is modern philosophy's understanding of this distinction between appearance and reality in terms of the externalized distinctions between subject and object and between experienced content and experienced object which creates the arena in which Descartes and Lewis and Kant can find common ground, in which internalist and externalist theories of justification can find meaning and application, and in which psychologism of either an empiricistic or transcendental sort can find a home. And so it appears, given the failures of epistemological foundationalism and the psychologism and question-begging character of a Kantian transcendental foundationalism, that the alternative to all forms of foundationalism is very likely to be a coherentist account, not merely of justification but also of truth, despite the well-known difficulties of pure, anti-realist, coherence theories of truth. Bonjour's antifoundationalism is philosophically interesting precisely because he wants to avoid this conclusion and
therefore superimposes on his coherentist account of justification a realistic correspondence theory of truth. But the correspondence theory of truth also presupposes the modern understanding of the relation between subject and object or, more precisely, between an (inner) experienced psychic content and an (outer) known object. The justified belief and the known state of affairs are externally related, and, given the modern view that the immediate object of our experience is the experienced content rather than the experienced object, the question of how we ever come to be in a position to judge the correspondence between content and object remains a crucial issue for correspondence theories. The theory of intentionality herein adumbrated rejects the distinction assumed by the correspondence theory, while remaining non-foundationalist and preserving the ontological and epistemological realism embedded in the natural attitude.

7. Non-Foundational Realism: Justification and Evidence

The Husserlian approach to transcendental reflection differs from the Kantian. The Husserlian approach does not argue indirectly from the content of our empirical knowledge to the forms of objects' presentations. It instead identifies directly and describes the formal structures inherent both in the conscious activity in which objects present themselves and in the objects as so presenting themselves to our conscious activity. The thesis that consciousness is intentional and that in directing ourselves to (intended) objects we are aware of (intentional) objects in a particular manner of givenness (i.e. the intended object just as intended) is the first identification of such a structure.

The phenomenologist claims (1) that the intended and intentional objectivities are ontologically identical; (2) that they are distinguished by virtue of the difference between the natural and philosophical attitudes; and (3) that from within the philosophical attitude we recognize that the logical content and the experienced objectivity are also ontologically identical but distinguished by virtue of the difference between the natural and critical attitudes. Consequently, for the phenomenologist the concerns with justification and truth, while attitudinally distinguishable, can in the context of discussions of empirical knowledge never be wholly separated. The propositions justified by logical argument are judgmental intentions presenting presumptively existing worldly states of affairs in determinate manners of presentation. The teleology of such presentations is invariably to determine their truth, and this _telos_ is achieved only to the extent that full intentions fulfill these judgmental intentions.

Moreover, the premises of such arguments are not formed in the
abstract; they are formed in an intentional encounter with the world.\textsuperscript{28}
Judgments articulate the presentational possibilities in objects which are presently or previously experienced in their actuality in perception. The judgment, then, is founded upon the perceptual givenness of an object. The founding of judgments upon perception does not, however, imply a foundationalism, for two reasons: (1) the truth of the judgment is not logically secured by a propositional assertion concerning perception and its experienced content, and (2) our perceptions are themselves associationally informed by judgments previously made both by ourselves and by others whose judgments are in various educational practices handed down to us as culture, as the inherited wisdom of the ages, as common knowledge, and so forth.

Let us consider the second point first. Abstracting for the moment from any associations which might inform our perceptions, we experience an object as a sensible thing.\textsuperscript{29} The sensible determinations in the object define the range of possibilities initially available for judgments articulating the sensible properties of the object. Continued acquaintance with the object in its interactions with other objects provides the basis for additional judgments articulating the causal and substantial properties of the object (beyond its merely sensible ones). All these judgments subsequently inform future perceptions of the object, as do judgments made by others and passed on to us in the form of speech, writing, theory, and, in general, in our cultural inheritance. These transformed perceptions in turn present new possibilities for further judgmental articulation. Hence, perceptions of sensible material objects found in part judgments (insofar as the articulating activity is also necessary for the judgment), and judgments found in part subsequent perceptions of material objects (insofar as sensing is also necessary for the perception). There are no ultimately foundational experiences (say, perceptions) which are not subject to further clarification and emendation by those very experiences (e.g. judgments) which are originally founded upon the candidates for ultimately founding experiences (the perception). Hence, foundations present themselves in the form of a hermeneutic circle. The experience of parts (e.g. the purely sensible object, material objects, individuals) informs our experience of wholes (material objects, states of affairs, communities and societies), and the experience of the whole transforms our understanding of parts. Our experiences, in other words, have founding moments reciprocally related to one another but no foundational moments.

Returning, then, to the first point, we can see that these judgments, although grounded in perceptions, cannot be confirmed by appealing to a propositional content identifying the content perceived in the original perception, for any judging activity, which is required to the emergence of
propositional content, adds articulations not simply perceivable. Hence, the judgment is not confirmed by an argument deriving its premises from reports of perceptions and their simply perceived contents; it is confirmed instead by categorical intuitions, by intuitions which are themselves transformed by the judgments they seek to fulfill. Here is where truth and, since justification is teleologically ordered toward truth, here is where justification are ultimately located.

Since most discussions of foundationalism focus primarily, if not exclusively, on the self-evident truth of the (ontologically distinct) content of a foundational cognition or on the self-justifying character of a foundational belief, they misconceive evidence as applying exclusively to the content and its logical justification. Evidence is instead the evidencing of objects, the experiencing of objects in their actual, sensuously based presence. But this presence is the presence of the objectivity itself and not merely the presence of a psychic or logical content. In phenomenological terms, we can say that in the presence of the (intentional) content the (intended) object is itself presented as an identity in a manifold of presentational contents, one of which is at the moment given directly and sensuously, the others of which are given in horizontal associations with the presently sensed contents.

This view of intentionality and of the relation between intentional content and intended object not only yields a non-foundationalism but undercuts the basis upon which most discussions of foundationalism are constructed. Nevertheless, it also preserves the advantages of both internalist and externalist approaches to justification. First, it preserves the intuition that truth is somehow tied to objects rather than merely to the content of our experiences. Externalism achieves this by tying the experienced content to the experienced object such that the realization of a nomological relation or a reliable process yields a true content. Internalism as a theory of justification does not necessarily preserve this intuition, for it is coherent with anti-realist, coherentist accounts of justification and truth, although Bonjour's version of internalist anti-foundationalism does preserve it since it allies a coherentist account of justification with a correspondence account of truth.

Second, this view of intentionality preserves, as does externalism, the close connection between justification and truth. Externalism, however, obliterates the subjective difference between truly believing and knowing. Internalism, on the other hand, focusing so exclusively on justification and the cognitive possession of reasons (propositional content), preserves the distinction between believing and knowing but either completely identifies justification and truth (in a coherence theory of truth) or completely separates them (by superimposing a correspondence theory of truth). The present view of intentionality, however, teleologically ties justification to
truth while preserving the distinction between belief and knowledge. It achieves both these *desiderata* at once by virtue of its distinction between empty and full intentions. Empty intentions (not previously or presently fulfilled) correlate to belief; full (fulfilling) intentions yield knowledge. However, even mere beliefs, empty intendings of objectivities (not previously or presently fulfilled), do not belong solely to the realm of content, for the intending is directed to a (presumptively existent) worldly objectivity, although only in a particular and not yet fulfilled or disappointed mode of presentation.

Moreover, this view of intentionality, as does internalism, insists on the cognitive possession of reasons in order to think a belief justified; these reasons might include other propositions, but they might also include evidential presentations (e.g. categorial or theoretical intuitions) in which case the belief is recognized as not only justified but true.

Philosophy, in describing these forms of presentation and the forms of experience involved in the experience of truth does not itself decide between rival experiences, e.g. rival scientific theories; that is a task to be undertaken by qualified individuals in the natural and critical attitudes. Philosophy does tell us, however, that no natural experiences of the world are indubitable or infallible. Hence strong epistemological foundationalism is ruled out on phenomenological grounds. But even moderate epistemological foundationalism is ruled out on phenomenological grounds because philosophical reflection discloses the hermeneutical character of our experience. And since the phenomenologist does not decide between rival claims advanced in the natural and critical attitudes, a transcendental foundationalism which purports to determine that one rival is truth-producing and the other is not is also ruled out on phenomenological grounds. But if all this is true, it would seem that phenomenology has no relation to our natural and empirical pursuits other than to depart from them; it appears to be an activity carried on wholly within its own attitude and with its own interests, originally wed to but now divorced from and incapable of returning to our natural experience.

8. Is a Non-Foundational Phenomenology an Arid Discipline?

The conclusion that phenomenology is arid is too hasty. We have seen that questions raised by skepticism and foundationalism, issues involved in the criticism of beliefs, and discussions of the nature and character of knowledge all point toward transcendental issues. Phenomenological claims about the structures of intentional experiences and of worldly objectivities as they are intended complete our natural and critical
experiences by both clarifying and enriching them. I shall attempt to illuminate this claim with two examples.

Phenomenology identifies indubitable truths about the nature of our intentional experiences and objects as experienced therein. These truths are indubitable in the proper sense, for Husserl's technique of imaginative variation, of systematically varying in imagination the components of a particular type of experience in order to determine which components belong to it necessarily, is a methodological technique to ensure that there are no known or foreseeable reasons to doubt the identified truth. As we have seen, however, the indubitability of such truths does not guarantee their infallibility. But to the extent that the method is properly and fully carried out, the possibility of there existing a reason for negating the asserted belief diminishes. However, since indubitability does not entail incorrigibility, it remains perfectly conceivable that in an ongoing philosophical reflection such truths will be corrected not by negation but by refinement and more precise qualification.

The philosophical truths identified by this method would, again within the limits imposed by the fallibility of philosophical claims, allow us to distinguish genuine from non-genuine examples of a particular type of experience, e.g. genuine sciences from pseudo-sciences, because we would describe those forms of intentionality belonging to any (known or imaginable) possible sciences. We would, however, upon recognizing, say, that both Newtonian and quantum mechanics are genuine instances of science, be unable to decide on philosophical grounds which theory is true. Moreover, this philosophical reflection on science would clarify for us the nature of scientific presentation (models and theories), the nature of scientific evidence, the relation of scientific theory to an observed world, the methods of science, and the purposes and goals of science. In so doing, this reflection would reveal to us that scientific theories are world-intending experiences which seek confirmation in "theoretical" intuitions. We would recognize that such intuitions are not the perceptual apprehensions of theory-neutral contents, but that they involve experimental and verificatory procedures undertaken in the light of the very theory whose confirmation we seek. Nevertheless, since it is the experiencable world itself which is the direct object of such world-intending experiences, and since it is the experiencable world itself which is the direct object of the fulfilling "theoretical" intuitions, the coincidence of the two, the degree to which the intuited world "covers" the merely intended world, is a ground for asserting the truth of the theory intuitively confirmed. What makes the case of incommensurable scientific theories difficult is that both theories claim intuitive confirmation. However, at this point issues concerning the degree of "fit" between theory and confirmation, issues concerning a theory's scope (hence, how
world-encompassing the intuitively fulfilling experience is), and issues concerning a theory’s resourcefulness for opening up the possibility of new insights into the world (for making the world-intending theory more encompassing) come into play. While the theories (the empty intendings of the world) are plural and incommensurable, the world itself is one, and we can recognize which of the theoretical presentations thereof (the [one] intended world as [differently] intended) is more adequate in exhausting the phenomena.

Without, then, interfering in or prejudicing scientific judgment, philosophical reflection describes scientific experience and thereby gives scientists a new and deepened perspective on their own natural activity. Whereas science allows them to understand those worldly objectivities to which their scientific undertakings are directed, philosophical reflection makes them more aware of their own role in the fashioning and confirming of world-presentations. Moreover, philosophical reflection enables the non-scientist to understand and appreciate the character of scientific theories. And it enables both the scientist and the non-scientist to recognize more clearly the limitations of the scientific method and the scope of its proper applications. In this way, we better understand the relations between science and other, non-scientific experiences.

A second example concerns the moral dimension. Moral decision-making about individual cases and, to some extent, even the identification of moral principles and rules is an everyday, natural activity. Philosophical ethics is the reflection on the nature of and the intentional structures embedded in morally significant acting, moral evaluation, and moral judgment. And, to the degree that the identification of moral action’s intentionalities permits, philosophical ethics identifies the most general goods, norms, and principles which derive directly from our being as rational and desiring intentional agents and which ought to govern our actions. There are several distinctions revealed by reflection on moral agency; morally significant actions are the point of intersection between reason and desire, ends and means (in the sense both of instrument and that which is chosen in the light of the end as conducive to that end), end and rule, rule and instance, act and consequence, intended end and realized effect, virtue and happiness. Philosophical reflection on these distinctions clarifies the nature of moral action, evaluation, and judgment, and makes us more aware as agents of the subtlety and nuances present in them. It also makes it possible for us to realize that an exclusive emphasis on any one of these (partial) dimensions of moral action as determinant of the moral worth of an action involves what Sokolowski, borrowing a phrase from Whitehead, calls the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” Utilitarianism in identifying effects as the determinant of moral worth, deontologism in identifying the rule as the determinant of moral worth,
and a teleological ethic which ignores the moral status of what conduces to the end in its focus on the end itself all commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. But this fallacy is visible only from the philosophical attitude, and an awareness of it can enter our everyday moral decision-making only after we have come to understand our natural moral experience by virtue of, so to speak, a “detour” through philosophical reflection.

Philosophical reflection plays a continuing critical role in our culture by clarifying the nature of experience and revealing its many dimensions. Philosophical reflection also plays a continuing constructive role in our culture, for in disclosing the intentional structures at work in natural experiences it enriches those experiences by disclosing the manner in which objectivities present themselves therein and by revealing the ways in which our natural experience can mistake parts for the whole, e.g. in which science can be defined solely by reference to a certain style of verification apart from the other intentionalities operative therein, or in which the moral good can be defined exclusively in terms of the motives or effects of an action. Insofar as we can now recognize these characteristics of our own experiences and the possible ways in which they might naturally be misunderstood, philosophy accomplishes a non-foundational return to natural experience, contributing to the hermeneutic of everyday experience not by adding determinate content but by keeping us aware of and open to all the dimensions of our natural experience.


2. Husserl discusses focusing on the judgmental content in Formale und transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft (hereafter FTL), ed. by Paul Jønsen, Husserliana XVII (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974) [Formal and Transcendental Logic, tr. by D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969)], §§41-49. While Husserl never specifically compares the critical and philosophical attitudes, both of which involve a withdrawing from our natural engagement with things, the difference between them can be clearly inferred from a comparison between the texts in FTL cited here and other
texts, including _FTL_ and _Ideen I_, in which Husserl speaks of the phenomenological reduction. For other discussions of these attitudinal changes, cf. Robert Sokolowski, _Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigation of Language and Being_ (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), ch. 13; and John J. Drummond, _Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object_ (hereafter _HINFR_), Contributions to Phenomenology 4 (Boston: Kluwer, 1990), §§9-10.

3. Cf. _FTL_, §51 for Husserl's distinction between two logics: consequence-logic and truth-logic.

4. Cf. _FTL_'s extended argument that the philosophy of logic leads to transcendental logic, i.e. to the transcendental philosophy of judgments and of logic.

5. Cf. Laurence Bonjour's statement of the twofold task of an epistemological theory: "to give an account of the standards of epistemic justification" and "to provide what I will call a _metajustification_ for the proposed account by showing the proposed standards to be adequately truth-conducive;" _The Structure of Empirical Knowledge_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 9.


8. I have previously used this expression in contrast to "rationalistic" and "empiricistic" foundationalism; cf. "Modernism and Postmodernism: Bernstein or Husserl?" _The Review of Metaphysics_ 42 (1988): 279-83, and _HINFR_, §44. Both rationalistic and empiricist foundationalism are versions of what I here call "epistemological foundationalism." I shall below distinguish variants of epistemological foundationalism on grounds other than, but compatible with, those used in these other _loci_.


One need not be a modern to be a foundationalist. Both Platonic and Aristotelian dialectic, for example, yield self-certifying knowledge. Plato's forms and Aristotle's first principles are known, and recognized as necessarily true, in the very intuition of them, but it is not a mere content which is known; it is an intelligible reality itself which is known. For Plato, the knowledge of forms provides non-deductive support for our ordinary empirical beliefs. For Plato, our knowledge of sensibles is always opinion and subject to error; even the geometrical physics of the _Timaeus_ yields only a _likely_ story. For Aristotle, on the other hand, these foundational insights provide the premises for demonstrations whose deductive validity preserves for the conclusion the necessarily true character of the premises. Indeed, Aristotle's account of _noos_ (intuitive reason or rational insight), i.e. the intuitive comprehension of the first principles, and his account of the demonstrative character of scientific knowledge, suggest that Aristotle is in this respect a strong "rationalistic" foundationalist. Aristotle is an interesting case, however, for his views (1) that scientific knowledge is grounded in sense-experience and "induction" therefrom, (2) that this sensory experience, at least the sensory experience of proper sensibles, is free from error (De _Anima_ 418a, 427b), and (3) that intuitive comprehension built upon this
sensory knowledge and induction yields necessary truth suggest that Aristotle is an "empiricistic" foundationalist; cf. Post. Anbl. 1.1-4; Nic. Ethics 6.3, 6.6-7; and Metaph. 1.1-2. Finally, Aristotle is an interesting case also because in everything he does he is sensitive to the need constantly to examine and to revise opinion; in his disciplinary investigations, in other words, he appears the opposite of the rationalist his more theoretical discussions about knowledge would lead us to believe he is and the dogmatist some would make of him.


11. Acts other than direct sensation and perception (e.g. some memorial acts, imaging acts, and hallucinations) sometimes appear to have sensuous contents; these can be distinguished, however, from acts truly possessing such contents on the basis of phenomenal changes which occur in perception relative to our bodily activities. Dots appearing before the eyes after pressing upon one's eyeballs do not, for example, expand in the visual field as I walk forward whereas the appearance of (the seen) door I am approaching does expand or "balloon" in size; I can, for another example, after approaching the door, reach and touch it, but cannot do so for the dots. Memorial acts can sometimes be fulfilling insofar as the memory is clear and they function as surrogate perceptions. In speaking with someone about an absent object, for example, I might be reminded of its position in a house: "You remember it; it's on the left as you enter the living room in my parent's house." This stimulation of memory can serve to produce a memorial image which can in certain contexts fulfill a judgment made about that object.

12. Although the intended objectivity is invariably the identity presenting itself in a manifold of presentations, the kind of identity appropriate for different kinds of acts and different kinds of objects will vary. So, for example, the identity appropriate for the perceived object, i.e. a material thing in space, is minimally the identity of a spatial individual but also an identity in a manifold of causal properties. The manifold presenting the spatial individual must conform to certain phenomenal requirements in order to be recognized as a spatial individual; cf. John J. Drummond, "On Seeing a Material Thing in Space: The Role of Kinaesthesia in Visual Perception," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (1979): 23-31. And, since the causal properties of an object are articulated only in judgments, the identity of the material thing qua material is grasped both in the manifold of sensory appearances and in the manifold of judgments and categorial intuitions in which we recognize the actuality of the object's causal properties. Similarly, the world as emptily presented in a scientific model is made evident in the experiments confirming that theoretical model, experiments which involve a sensory base (or at the least an extension of our sensory capabilities insofar as we use sense-extending instruments like the telescope or microscope or advanced technologies whose readable measurements can be correlated by certain rules to non-observable phenomena); this we might call a kind of "theoretical intuition." The scientifically known world, therefore, is the identity in the manifold of scientific model and experimental confirmation. Finally, a text, for example, is the identity in the manifold of drafts, manuscripts, printed copies, and interpretations. The notion of "identity," in short, must be relativized both to the kind of experience in question and the kind of objectivity experienced therein.


14. Cf. e.g., Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes tr. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), Il: 12; and C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of
Some strong foundationalists are concerned to defeat every imaginable form of skepticism; hence they are committed not only to finding infallible foundations but to preserving infallibility at every stage in the development of a system of beliefs. While strong foundationalism logically requires only a *truth-preserving* or *truth-conducive* method for building knowledge, the anti-skeptical *spirit* of strong foundationalism is thought by this species of foundationalist, to require an *infallibility-preserving* method for building knowledge, for there is, it could be argued, little point in disclosing infallible origins only to reopen the door immediately to skeptical attacks by allowing a method for building upon these foundations beliefs less secure than their foundations. Indeed, Jonathan Dancy [cf. *An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 58], in a series of rhetorical questions, raises this issue as an objection against what he calls "classical" foundationalism.

A strong deductivist foundationalism, however, whether the source of its foundational beliefs characterizes it as "rationalistic" or "empiricistic" foundationalism (cf. n. 8), responds to Dancy’s puzzle insofar as it seeks to preserve the idea of conclusive evidence throughout the system of beliefs. A strong deductivist foundationalism requires that the foundational beliefs function as premises in deductive arguments, for deduction at least provides a *method* which, when rightly applied, preserves the necessary truth, and therefore the infallibility, of its conclusions. Whether any actual strong deductivist foundationalism is successful in deriving a system of empirical beliefs from its foundational beliefs — or even whether anyone has asserted such a strong foundationalism — is not our present concern; our critique shall focus instead on the defining claim of all versions of strong foundationalism, viz. that there are infallible foundational beliefs.

We should recall that Dancy’s objection is not directed to this strong deductivist foundationalism but to what he calls "classical" foundationalism, which is an "empiricistic" foundationalism of a non-deductivist sort. Indeed, it is Lewis that Dancy has in mind. For Lewis the foundational beliefs provide non-conclusive support for our founded empirical beliefs. Lewis’ view — more reasonable as an account of our actual empirical knowledge than strong deductivist foundationalism — is not concerned to defend each empirical belief against the skeptic’s challenge, but is concerned to defend the whole system of beliefs against challenge by securing its foundations, by showing that the foundational beliefs upon which the system is built are immune to challenge and that the method of derivation is truth-conducive, yielding beliefs *likely* to be true. In Lewis’ classic formulation of the position, he claims that the *probability* of our empirical beliefs requires the *certainty* (i.e. infallibility) of their foundations; cf. Lewis, p. 180.

16. Lewis, p. 182; cf. also p. 188.
17. Husserl introduces this term in *Ideen I*, cf. §88.
22. Bonjour chooses the latter option; cf. chap. 5 for his explication of the concept of coherence.
24. This is, once again, Husserl’s thesis of the natural attitude. Cf. Bonjour’s notion of the "doxastic presumption" (pp. 101ff.), which is similar in that it involves a practical attitude
and practice toward our own experiences and a starting point for reflection.


27. Bonjour, chap. 8.

