Discussions

On Kelley on Kant

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Randall Dipert, in a review of David Kelley’s *The Evidence of the Senses: A Realist Theory of Perception* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986 [henceforth: ES]) appearing in the Spring 1987 issue of *Reason Papers*, characterized it as "an important book," citing among his reasons the fact that ES is "a professionally competent defense of epistemological theses originating with Ayn Rand" (57). Dipert also, however, found Kelley’s treatment of Kant "most bizarre" and "profoundly uninformed" and recommended that Kelley "should bow out of historical criticism" (60-61). In the Spring 1988 issue of *Reason Papers*, Robert E. Knapp attempted a defense of Kelley’s interpretation of Kant. For reasons of my own, however, I find myself in agreement with the general thrust of Dipert’s characterizations, both positive and negative.

In this paper I propose to submit Kelley’s analysis of Rand’s and Kant’s views of the activity and passivity of mind to a close and critical examination. Rand claimed that "[o]n every fundamental issue, Kant’s philosophy is the exact opposite of Objectivism." Even discounting for Rand’s usual hyperbole, this statement seems to be glaringly false in light both of Kelley’s book and Rand’s own *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology* (New York: New American Library, 1979 [Henceforth: IOE]). To see that a universal affirmative proposition is false only one counterexample is necessary. That is, we need to find a fundamental issue upon which Rand and Kant agree (against the background of another philosopher who disagrees with both of them). Take the question: Does consciousness have an identity, i.e. does consciousness exist as a finite, determinate faculty? Rand’s answer is yes. Indeed, the principle of the identity of consciousness is at the center of her system (IOE, ch.8). Her antipode, therefore, must say no. What does Kant say? Or, more importantly, what do Rand and Kelley say that Kant says? Rand writes that, for Kant, "Man is limited to a consciousness of a specific nature, which perceives by specific means and no others . . . " According to Kelley, Kant rejects the notion that consciousness has no identity, which latter view Kelley baptizes the "diaphanous" model of consciousness (ES, 37-38). But if this is the case, then it would seem that Kant’s philosophy is not "the exact opposite of Objectivism," at least not on "every fundamental issue."

Are there philosophers who do deny that consciousness has identity? G.E. Moore is one that Kelley cites in *The Evidence of the Senses*. Aristotle is another! (ES, 37-38). Although the evidence for the inclusion of Aristotle is a bit more tenuous, even John Hermann Randall, Jr., whose book *Aristotle* is cited by Kelley (ES, 38, n44), admits that had nous an identity, then we could not know *without distortion*. Note that this is the very view attributed to Kant by Kelley and Rand. In fact, if one recalls Rand’s assertion that the "hallmark of a mystic is the savagely stubborn refusal to accept the fact that consciousness, like any other existent, possess identity . . . " (IOE, 106) this would make Aristotle a mystic! Whether or not this latter claim ought to be pressed, we can see that on this interpretation, and restricted to this "fundamental issue," Aristotle (not to mention Moore), not Kant, is Rand’s antipode.
This discovery makes one suspicious. What about other issues in philosophy? Specifically, what about the activity and/or passivity of consciousness? While this may or may not be construed as a fundamental issue, the purpose of the remainder of this paper will be to look at Kelley's exposition of both Kant and Rand on this issue to determine how "exactly opposite" they really are. I shall begin with Rand.

According to Kelley, Rand holds that consciousness is metaphysically passive but epistemologically active. To say that consciousness is "metaphysically passive" is to say that consciousness does not create its "contents" ex nihilo; consciousness, rather, is fundamentally receptive, receiving its "contents" from outside itself. Rand also calls this position "the primacy of existence," and she regards its truth as a self-evident axiom, a principle which must implicitly be affirmed in all acts of consciousness, even in the very act of denying it. (IOE, 79). (Conversely, a consciousness that is metaphysically active would be one that creates its own objects. This is what Rand and Kelley call "the primacy of consciousness." It is this position that they ascribe to Kant, of which more in due course.)

Consciousness, while fundamentally receptive, is not, however, completely passive. Consciousness is active, but only in the epistemological sense. Once it is given the basic material of knowledge, it must process or - to use one of Rand’s favorite metaphors - "digest" the material in order to know it. Rand claims, further, that the epistemological spontaneity or activity of consciousness follows from the fact that consciousness "has" an identity, i.e. that it exists as a finite, determinate faculty; it has a nature of its own. Kelley describes the epistemological spontaneity of consciousness as follows "[consciousness] responds in specific ways to external stimulation, processing in specific ways the material provided by the environment." (ES, 40). Immediately after the colon we read the following quilt quotation from IOE:  

All knowledge is processed knowledge - whether on the sensory, perceptual or conceptual level. An ‘unprocessed’ knowledge would be a knowledge acquired without means of cognition. Consciousness . . . is not a passive state, but an active process. And more: the satisfaction of every need of a living organism requires an act of processing by that organism, be it the need of air, of food or of knowledge. Then comes the "stomach" metaphor. "[Consciousness] no more creates its own contents than does the stomach" (ES, 41).

Now let us turn to the meaning of the word "create" here. Checking Rand’s Philosophy: Who Needs It we find two senses of "create," viz. (1) "[t]he power to rearrange the combinations of natural elements" and (2) "the power to bring something into existence out of nothing." We may call these two senses of creation the rearrangement and the ex nihilo senses, respectively. Rand regards the first form of creativity as possible and the second form as metaphysically impossible. The stomach, therefore, cannot be said to create its contents ex nihilo. But what about the other sense of creativity as rearrangement? In that sense the stomach does create its own contents. Returning now to the context of consciousness, one can say that Rand’s concept of metaphysical passivity denies the creativity of consciousness in the ex nihilo sense. But her concept of epistemological
spontaneity affirms the creativity of consciousness in the rearrangement sense. Now this raises a question about Kant: In what sense did he affirm the creativity of consciousness? In the ex nihilo sense, or in the rearrangement sense? Obviously the exciting thesis would be that Kant claims that man creates ex nihilo the objects of experience. The important terms here are "create" and "object." It is to their examination that we must now turn.

Philosophers can be divided into groups. Some are reasonably consistent with respect to their usage of key terms. Aristotle and Hegel are two that come to mind here. Kant and Plato, however, belong in that infuriating category of thinkers who, even after expanding much effort to clearly define a term, will then go on to use another and sometimes opposite term in its place. In the famous divided line of the Republic, Plato uses noésis and epistémé to name indiscriminately the upper fourth section of the divided line as well as the entire upper half of the line itself. But with Plato the context is usually more than sufficient to set the wary on the right track.

Kant is worse. He will spill much ink to differentiate, say, "transcendental" from "transcendent" and then use the latter when the former is seemingly called for. His use of the words "create" and "objects" are in this category. Let us look at some uses of "create" in the Kantian system.

It is surely strange that one clear use of "create" (in the ex nihilo sense) in Kant's work is not even mentioned by Kelley. It is here that we find a consciousness that is truly metaphysically active, viz., God. God has, according to Kant, an intellectual intuition, i.e. he "knows" an object by creating it. In God, there is no distinction between receptivity and spontaneity, between sense and reason. When Rand defines reason as the "faculty that perceives, identifies and integrates the material provided by his senses" she joins Kant against those who would deny the difference between sense and reason, a difference not found in the Deity. (Here Spinoza can be taken as an example of the whole rationalist tradition wherein perception is understood as a confused conception).

Kant's position is interesting and, at least initially, puzzling. One might be tempted to guess that Kant would conceive of God as having a creative spontaneity, since receptivity by its very nature seems to be a dependent capacity. One can only be receptive to what is given to be received. (A wide receiver presupposes a quarterback). But in God's case, this assumption would be a mistake. God has an intellectual intuition. "A divine understanding" does not "represent to itself given objects, but through whose representation the objects should themselves be given or produced . . . the categories would have no meaning whatsoever in respect of such a mode of knowledge" (Critique of Pure Reason, B145). Since the categories are for synthesizing and organizing the material provided by the senses, and since God does not receive but creates the objects, spontaneity would be useless to God. (It would be, to use a metaphor from Kelley's The Art of Reasoning, a filing system in an entity with nothing to file.) For Kant there is a major difference between God qua infinite knower and us qua finite knowers. And for Kant one of the effects of this difference is that we are metaphysically passive vis-a-vis the "object" of knowledge. This conclusion is, of course, directly contrary to Kelley's position on Kant.
Heinz Heimsoeth is even more insistent on the importance of the distinction between an infinite and finite knowers, i.e. between God and us. He traces the source of this dichotomy back to Augustine and the Augustinian tradition. This tradition equates knower and maker in such a way that the maker is the privileged knower. So privileged in fact that knowing becomes a problem for any finite knower, i.e. any knower radically dependent on the existence of an object it hasn't created.

Heimsoeth doesn't mean to imply that, for Kant, all knowing is problematic for a finite consciousness. Kant notes and dismisses as unproblematic two kinds of knowing. First "sensible representation, where the object affects the subject; this is limited to the object of the senses and the representation only indicates the manner in which the subject has been affected by the object" and second, "where understanding creates objects as in mathematics." No, for Kant the problem is how can we finite knowers have universal and necessary knowledge of objects we have not created, i.e. of objects that exist independently of us, objects over against which we are metaphysically passive. In other words, i.e. in (some of) Kant's words, how are synthetic a priori judgements of non-created objects possible?

If Kelley and Rand were correct vis-a-vis the metaphysical activity (in the sense in which God's consciousness is creative) of the Kantian consciousness, we would have no way of explaining Kant's entire problematic! Many of his moves would be simply unintelligible. The first Critique and the Prolegomena would be unintelligible.

But let us explore further Kant's notion of the radical finitude of human knowing. Man, according to Kant, is doubly passive (triply if you count his very existence which Kant tells us is dependent on the existence of given objects). Man's receptivity is passive vis-a-vis objects being given to it, and man's spontaneity is passive vis-a-vis his receptivity. (This is not to be interpreted to mean that spontaneity is epistemologically passive. It is not. That is Kant's very point in calling it Spontaneität.) Just as reason in Rand works only on the material provided by his senses, likewise, Kantian spontaneity only works on the material provided by receptivity, which, in turn, works only when material is provided to it by the (noumenal) world. That is, "intuition takes place only insofar as the object is given to us" (A19/B30). At B71 Kant tells us that thought "always involves limitations." He means by limitations the fact that we are metaphysically passive, we depend on an object being given to us. Heidegger, in his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, agrees, writing that "Thinking is simply in the service of intuition." It would seem that neither sense nor reason is creative (ex nihilio) for Kant.

But what about the second sense of create? The mathematical sense of "create" referred to above in the quotation from Heimsoeth brings little comfort to Kelley's thesis. According to Kant, we "create" mathematical objects. What this means for Kant can be seen from the following passage from the Critique of Pure Reason.

We cannot think a line without drawing it in thought, (ohne sie in Gedanken zu ziehen) or a circle without describing it. We cannot represent the three dimensions of space save by setting three lines at right angles to one another from the same point. (B145-5 and A713/B741)
Needless to say, this "drawing," "describing," and "setting" has nothing to do with consciousness being metaphysically active in the ex nihilo sense condemned by Rand.

Let us draw a preliminary conclusion. Kant uses "create" in at least two senses, the ex nihilo sense and the mathematical sense. The first he attributed to God and never to man. In fact, it is because man does not create the objects of the world that Kant finds synthetic a priori knowledge (in mathematics and the natural sciences) a puzzle and a problem. The second sense is innocuous and need not detain us further.

But what about the concept "object"? We now have to place it under our glass. Perhaps Kelley is right after all, i.e. namely that for Kant consciousness does create its objects and we have missed this because of unclarity vis-a-vis the concept "object." Needless to say, Kant is not univocal in its usage either. Let us take a closer look.

According to Kemp Smith, Kant uses the term object (Gegenstand) in two senses. It may mean content (Inhalt) and it is clear that Kant "has in mind its distinction from conception (Begriff) which as expressing the universal is related to objects only indirectly . . . " But as is clear to anyone familiar with Kelley's exposition in chapter one of ES, this is Rand's position, or at least her position according to Kelley. That is, perception is direct = non-conceptual; whereas the indirect knowledge of reality is conceptual. But more of Kelley's exposition below.

If Kemp Smith is correct here, it means that Kant rejects both the realist notion that direct perception is diaphanous and the representationalist position that the object of perception is in our heads or minds. We may supply the form of perception but the object or content (Inhalt) is given. "But intuition takes place only insofar as the object is given to us." How Kelley can go from "the object is given to us" to "we create the object" - a premise he must use in his attempt to saddle Kant with the primacy of consciousness error - is hard to understand. Nor is this an isolated expression in the Critique. In the first paragraph alone he uses these and equivalent words four times. Kant reiterates "the object is given to us," (line 5); "we are affected by objects" (line 8); "Objects are given to us" (line 9, emphasis in original), and "an object be given to us" (line 14). It is almost as if Kant did not want to be misunderstood here. Writing in Germany he had no empiricist tradition to count on - most of his readers were rationalists of the Leibniz-Wolff variety. So he had to beat them over the head - objects are given, given, given! That the readers of the first edition didn't get the message is evident in the long footnote in the second edition at Bx1 where Kant writes that the consciousness,"of my existence in time is bound up in the way of identity with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me, and it is therefore experience not invention, sense not imagination, which inseparably connects this outside something with my inner sense." But Kelley doesn't cite this passage. In the first sense of object, then, we can confidently say that humans do not create the object and in that sense Kant adheres to the primacy of existence, not the primacy of consciousness.

To continue with Kemp Smith. The second meaning Kant gives to the concept object is even more damaging to Kelley's thesis. If the first meaning emphasized object as content, the second emphasizes object as given. Since I have stressed this giveness in the
paragraphs above I won’t repeat myself here. But there is an ambiguity in Kant’s language that Kemp Smith points out, and it may be responsible for, and make understandable, Kelley’s misinterpretation.

After exposing Kant’s second sense of object, he goes on to distinguish between "object of intuition" and "cause of intuition," and it is the latter that has no tinge of the subjective. If by "object" Kelley means "object of intuition," (and it is clear that even if he doesn’t he should) then a tinge of subjectivity follows. But even granting this usage of object, he still has a long way to go before demonstrating that, for Kant, we create the object of intuition. We contribute something to the object of intuition, but we are totally metaphysically passive vis-a-vis the cause of intuition. When Kant is being precise about this latter meaning of object, it is normally in sentences where he talks about us being affected by the object. For example, in the second sentence of the Introduction to the Critique, he writes "For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations . . ." Likewise on the first page of the Transcendental Aesthetic he tells us that intuition takes place only "insofar as the mind is affected in a certain way" (A19-B33). Kant even admits that "with long practice of attention" we may "become skilled in separating" any addition we make to what is given by extramental reality! (B2). Hardly the kind of admission that a primacy of consciousness philosopher should make. Finally, consider A19-B34 where he tells us that intuition can take place only "insofar as the mind is affected in a certain way."

Of course the above depends a lot on Kemp Smith. Let’s consider Paton, who finds four usages of "object" in Kant.

It is used for the thing as it is in itself, [this corresponds to Kemp Smith’s second usage] and for the thing as it appears to us; or, in more technical language, it is used for the thing-in-itself and for the phenomenal object. Furthermore the phenomenal object is itself composed of a matter given to sense [this seems to be Kemp Smith’s Inhalt usage] and a form imposed by thought; and each of these is called by Kant the object, the former the indeterminate object, or the object as appearance, the latter the object in general. Hence, he is capable of saying that the [1] object is not known, and that the [2] object must be known; and again that the [3] object is given to us apart from thought, and that there is no [4] object apart from thought. (Numbers in brackets added.)

Now obviously there are senses of "object" suitable to Kelley’s purpose in this paragraph. He uses sense [4] to establish Kant as an idealist - remember, the television screen is all; and sense [1] to establish that we can’t know the object. "We can really know only our own manner of cognition" (ES, 22).

But what a different Kant emerges from an emphasis of [2] and [3]. Then we find him saying that even though objects are given to, and not created by us, we can, nevertheless, know them. Consider the following form A277=B333:
For we can understand only that which brings with it, in intuition, something corresponding to our words. If by the complaints - that we have no insight whatsoever into the inner (nature) of things - it be meant that we cannot conceive by pure understanding what the things which appear to us may be in themselves, they are entirely illegitimate and unreasonable. For what is demanded is that we should be able to know things, and therefore to intuit them, without senses, and therefore that we should have a faculty of knowledge altogether different from the human . . . Through observation and analysis of appearances we penetrate to nature's inner recesses, and no one can say how far this knowledge may in time extend. 

All human knowledge originates when the object (here in the sense of an independent extramental existent) affects the senses and gives rise to an appearance, and by patient "observation and analysis" we can know the "inner recesses" of nature. In fact, the only questions we shall never be able to answer are those that go "beyond nature" (A278=B334). But since, for Kelley, there is no "beyond" beyond nature, this is hardly a nasty consequence.

In other and more poetic words, Kant's words, the "light dove" is wrong:

The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that this flight would be still easier in empty space. It was thus that Plato left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance - meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand, to which he could apply his powers, and so set his understanding in motion. (A5=B8)

The error of the light dove is to mistake that which makes flight possible - the resistance of the air - as a hindrance to flight. It is to mistake the enabling condition for flight as a disabling condition, and thus to hold that the removal of the air's resistance would liberate the power of flight, allowing the dove to soar even higher. In fact, however, such liberation would make flight impossible. It would be like liberating a goldfish by smashing its bowl. In the same way, the severing of the intellect from its dependence upon the sensible conditions of knowledge would not liberate its powers, but destroy them.

Both Kemp Smith and Paton, or at least what I have chosen to emphasize in my reading of those two commentators, make Kant sound like Kelley's kind of realist. A realist who would eschew all talk of finite knowers creating the (ultimate) contents of their own consciousness.

But if what I have said about Kant is near the mark, we might ask: Where did Kelley get this idea - i.e. the idea that, for Kant, consciousness creates ex nihilo its own objects?
Let us take a look at Kelley's text, especially the first chapter (and Preface) of ES where he tells us that his "defense of the primacy of existence will take Kant as its major foil," (ES, 27) and see where he goes wrong. The first question I propose to ask may seem, if not insignificant, at least irrelevant. And that question is, why does Kelley seem to prefer radio over television? In the Preface (and haven't we, since Hegel wrote his famous Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, learned to worry about what goes on in this dangerous supplement?) Kelley waxes enthusiastic about how we humans are "high-fidelity receivers of astonishing range" and compares us to "radios . . . tuned to a portion of the energy that eddies around us." But by the time we get to page 7, the first page of chapter one, where he ranks realism, representationalism and idealism in order of descending correctness, representationalism is portrayed, metaphorically, as regarding the senses as television camera while idealism (hereafter the villain of the book) maintains that "the television screen is all" - and television (camera or screen) is *bad*. If one likens realism to radio, we then have a choice between radio, television cameras, or the television screen, and Kelley would have us choose the first, whereas he finds Kant and other idealists opting for the television screen.

But isn't Kelley's choice of these metaphors rather harmless - harmless in such a way as to make my citing them at all seem rather capricious? What I find interesting is not so much the choices made, but the characterization he gives of them. As radios, we are wonderfully sensitive and complex (ES, 1) whereas, as television cameras, we are "subject to all the distortions that medium is prey to" (ES, 7). No proof is offered to show that radios are not subject to a similar distorting effect. I think one reason that the proof wasn't felt needed was a shift of metaphor to describe the realist position. On 7 our senses are no longer described as radios "bathed in streams of physical energy" but as "open windows." Open windows don't have wires and tubes and transistors to "distort" reality (this is almost a mediumless medium, which seems to be a version of the diaphanous model that Kelley wants to reject) - reality simply pops in through a window that just happens to be open, thus obviating the need for Windex to clean the glass and cut down on *distortion* caused by dirt, scum and bugs.

But what is accomplished by these four metaphors (and the switch from "radios" to "open windows")? One result is that the reader is being set up rhetorically for the logic to follow. That is the most benign possibility I can think of. Kelley, in cashing these metaphors out, will cash them in.

To see if this is so, let us turn to a case where his poetry turns to prose - his rhetoric to logic. On 7 he uses the adverb "directly" three times (and I include the adjectival form "direct" in this number). Does he manage to use it univocally? Let us see. When describing realism in the first paragraph, he writes that it (A) "holds that we directly perceive physical objects existing independently of the mind . . . " In the very next sentence, when describing representationalism, he tells us that this theory of perception (B) "denies that we can perceive this world directly . . . " And in the second paragraph, he tells us that he will be arguing for a theory in which perception is (C) "the direct awareness of objects in the physical world." He identifies his position as realism (First sentence, second paragraph).
I maintain that there is an equivocation in Kelley's use of "directly." Read univocally he seems to be saying "realism holds and representationalism denies that we directly perceive reality - and I'm on the side of the realists." But the traditional realist meant by "directly" something different from an antithetical to Kelley's meaning. And the traditional representationalist meant by "indirectly" something similar and congenial to Kelley's meaning. By "directly," the traditional realist meant, at least in part an awareness that was diaphanous - a perception without the means of perception. Since Kelley will argue at length against any form of the diaphanous model, he can't agree with the traditional realists that we directly perceive reality.

As for the representationalists, when they use "directly" they also mean diaphanous perception and they deny it - they are aware that perception requires some "means" (to which Kelley agrees) and hence they conclude that perception must be indirect. So far so good. But when Kelley uses "direct" for the third time on 7, he shifts its meaning from "diaphanous" to "preconceptual." That he doesn't want to accept the "directly" = "diaphanous" equation should be obvious to anyone familiar with his arguments against the diaphanous model in Part I of ES. That perception for him is preconceptual is explicitly stated on 3 where he writes "perception is a preconceptual mode of direct awareness of physical objects" (emphasis mine). But note the problem with "direct" here. How shall we interpret its meaning? Given the thrust of Part I, it can't mean "diaphanous," and "preconceptual" is pleonastic - the sentence would mean that "perception is a preconceptual mode of preconceptual awareness of physical objects." Hope lies, no doubt, in exploring the umbra of "direct" as used by Kelley. It means more than "preconceptual." It also means an automatic (hence non-inferential) integrative process (ES, 3) providing access to physical objects. But all this business about automatic integrative process would destroy the diaphanousness that the traditional realist identifies with consciousness. So when Kelley says he sides with the realist in advocating the direct perception of physical objects he is guilty of an equivocation.

His position is really an amalgam of both realism and representationalism. From the former he takes the claim that we're aware of physical objects in the world (as opposed to "ideas" in our heads) and from the latter the claim that we have to access these items by some means (i.e. that consciousness has an identity). But, and this is a big but, from the former he rejects the claim that we're aware of physical objects diaphanously and from the latter he rejects the notion that we're directly aware only of ideas in our minds.

But then why call yourself a realist? Kelley certainly shares the realist's metaphysic. His main objection is to its metaphysic of perception, i.e. the view that man is the kind of being that perceives things diaphanously. The representationalist, despite his recognition that consciousness has an identity, is a villain because the position is a slope slipping into the dank march of idealism. With idealism, one no longer has an independent reality to account for the origins of our perceptions - hence "creation" is necessary. Enter Kant. But we have seen that Kant explicitly denies "creation" in any interesting sense to all finite knowers. This means that he is not an idealist in the "television screen is all" sense.

But surely he is an idealist in some sense. But here we must be careful. Any man who wrote seven different refutations of idealism was a man trying to cover his aspirations.
He tells us in many places what kind of idealist he is and what kind he is not. Beginning with the latter we find Kant denying that he is either a genuine (or dogmatic or mystical) idealist, a position he identifies with the Eleatics and Berkeley\(^3\) (and the position most near to Kelley's "television screen is all"), or a skeptical (or problematical) idealist like Descartes.\(^3\) In the same second appendix to the Prolegomena just referred to, Kant terms his idealism "transcendental" or "formal" or "critical." And he tells us that his (supply your own adjective) idealism "does not by a long way constitute the soul of the system."\(^\text{32}\) Kant admits that his usage is directly contrary to its usual usage, but he could come up with no better name. Moreover, Kant not only describes his position as transcendental idealism, but as empirical realism as well. The plot thickens. But enough said about Kant's "idealism." What is important for our purposes is to note that Kant's brand of idealism is not the "television screen is all" variety. Therefore, and for what it is worth, Kant cannot serve as the foil to Kelley's realist theory of perception.
Notes

1. Although I will be taking ES to task in most of what follows, I want to go on record as one who regards it as the book on epistemology that Rand promised but never wrote. I can't pay it a higher compliment.


5. From IOE, 109.

6. I don't know if this is true of sleep.


8. Whether Kant has a system is something I have been led to question by Professor Ramirez of Duquesne University. He claims that Kant, along with only two other thinkers - Plato and Augustine - were seminal rather than systematic thinkers. That is, rather than having a vision of the truth early on and spending a lifetime developing the details of that vision, seminal thinkers spend a lifetime constantly rethinking their (non) positions and coming up with seminal ideas that others may or may not develop. But nothing hangs on this point for our purposes and hence its regulation to this endnote.

9. "For as he does not as it were create (schafft) himself, and does not come by the conception of himself a priori but empirically, it naturally follows that he can obtain his knowledge even of himself only by the inner sense . . ." *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, T.K. Abbot, trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1952), 282.

10. Ayn Rand, *Atlas Shrugged* (New York: Random House, 1957), 1016 (paperback edition, 942). This definition has a history. The inclusion of "perception" as part of the differentia continued until July 17, 1962 when, in a newspaper column Rand wrote for the Los Angeles Times, it was unceremoniously dropped. This column has been reprinted in *The Objectivist Newsletter* 1 (Aug. 1962). (Occasionally the words "evidence of reality" were substituted for "materials" - cf. *The Objectivist Newsletter* 1 [Jan. 1962], 3.) In the *The Ayn Rand Lexicon*, Binswanger gives the shorter definition also, and cites the essay "The Objectivist Ethics" in *The Virtue of Selfishness* as his source. This is not quite correct. The earlier versions (I have the fifth printing) contain "perceives" while the later ones (of which I have the 29th printing) do not. The earliest copyright on the hardcover edition of *The Virtue of Selfishness* is 1964 and contains "perceives" in the reprint of "The Objectivist Ethics." Since no announcement was made, one can only guess why the differentia was
changed. Perhaps it was realized that since reason is volitional and perception is not, it would be inappropriate to have "perceives" as part of the differentia.

11. It is possible, however, to read Rand as closer to the rationalist thinkers than to Kant. What I mean is that one can see her endorsing a continuum view of sensation-perception-conception. On such a reading, percepts are integrated sensations and concepts are integrated percepts. For Plato, sense and reason are distinct, at least as concerns their objects, sense being concerned with the realm of becoming and reason the realm of being. Yet a closer reading of the divided line passage reveals that the various "sections" of the line differ in degree (rather than in kind) of clarity (Republic, 509d). If this reading of the line does not give the death blow to the idea of Plato as some kind of two worlds metaphysician, then a close reading of the Philebus would. Such a reading is provided by Kenneth M. Sayre in his Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) which makes the Philebus read as if it were written by Aristotle! To pursue this would take us too far afield. Kant, to get back to him, does suggest the possibility that sense and reason have a common root.

12. Ethics, Part II, Prop. 29, Schol., many editions. See Leibniz where every substance (monad) knows the universe in varying degree of confusion - not a difference in kind, but rather one of degree. See L. Couturat, Opuscules (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1903), 10. I owe this citation to Nicholas Rescher's The Philosophy of Leibniz (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 61. For a somewhat different view of the distinction, the interested reader is directed to Mortimer Adler's "The Intellect and the Senses" in Ten Philosophical Mistakes (New York: Macmillan, 1985). Adler does however, agree that the distinction is the correct move and that those who deny it are wrong.


15. Heimsoeth probably has in mind, though he doesn't say, passage like the one to be found in De Trinitate, XV, 13, where Augustine writes "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are." (In an interesting quotation from The City of God [not mentioned by Heimsoeth] we find the Saint on both sides of the primacy of consciousness vs. the primacy of existence question. The last sentence of XI, 10, says "... this world could not be known to us unless it existed, but could not have existed unless it had been known by God.") I think Heimsoeth is wrong to restrict this distinction to Augustine and the Augustinians. Thomas Aquinas has written extensively on the same subject matter and arrives at the same conclusion. The most pertinent quotation can be found at Summa Theologiae, I, Q14, A9 where he writes "The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art." See next note for the root of this Thomistic notion in Aristotle.

16. Who knows Galt's motor better than Galt, the man who made it? Cf. Aristotle when in Metaphysics, Delta 2, 1013a24-35 he uses the image of the maker to describe his four causes. Wilfred Sellars sees this image as the "root metaphor" of the Aristotelian system.
See his "Aristotle’s Metaphysics: An Interpretation" in *Philosophical Perspectives* (Springfield: Thomas, 1959), 77. That the maker is the best knower is contested, however, by Vladimir Horowitz who claimed to know the "Moonlight Sonata" better than Beethoven. In a TV interview he pointed out that Beethoven bothered little with his sonatas after he composed them whereas he, Horowitz, had played and thought about this work for over 40 years and in that sense knew it far better than the Master. Kemp Smith says the same vis-a-vis his knowledge of Kant’s philosophy!


18. See B72. Man is "dependent on its existence as well as in its intuition, and which through that intuition determines its existence solely in relation to given objects."

19. "... one cannot assume human reason to be of one kind with the divine reason, distinct from it only be limitation, that is, in degree - that human reason, unlike the divine, must be regarded as a faculty only of *thinking*, not of intuiting; that is thoroughly dependent on an entirely different faculty (or receptivity) for its intuitions, or better, for the material out of which it brings forth knowledge..." (Brief 362: An Marcus Herz. 26. Mai 1789, XI, 54) quoted in John Sallis, *The Gathering of Reason* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1980), 183, n16. Cf. *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, p.282.


22. This word choice goes back to the *Dissertation* (Westport: Hyperion, 1979), 44: "various things which affect the sense," "objects... strike the senses" and "various things in the object which affect the senses," etc.


24. The reader who suspects an allusion to Derrida and Rousseau is correct. Cf. Derrida’s *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakroverty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), part II, ch. 2, which bears as its title three words taken from Rousseau’s *Confessions*, viz., "... that dangerous supplement..." In Rousseau it means both writing and, as Philip Roth might put it, "whacking off." In Derrida hand(s) (no pun intended) the meaning is of a supplement that subverts what it was intended to supplement, as well as that which *defers* access to what it purports to provide access to.
25. Since Kelley will argue in Part I of ES for a theory of perception as a "preconceptual mode of direct awareness of physical objects" I must confess I find the images he uses rather confusing - actually I know so little of the "innards" of radio and television that if Kelley had reversed the metaphors I still would have been confused.

26. Even here one has to be careful. For example, the same English word, "revelation," is used by Kelley in opposite senses and with contrary emotional designs. On 31 he uses it to describe, positively, his "direct" perception of his typewriter, desk, etc. Whereas on 37, he uses "revelation" to describe the diaphanous first person account of perception. In fact, it is in that very paragraph that he quotes Moore's use of "diaphanous" for the first time.

27. "The position I defend is a type of realism. I argue that in perception we are directly aware of physical objects and their properties, and that perceptual judgments about these objects and properties can be based directly on perception, without the need for any inference" (ES, 2).

28. This caveat is necessary because there is much more to the concept "directly" than its diaphanousness.

29. For details on these seven see the Commentary of Kemp Smith, 298ff.

30. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Can Qualify as a Science, 2nd appendix, any edition, Cf. "Refutation of Idealism" B274. Of especial interest is n49 where Kant explicitly connects genuine with mystical idealism and states in no uncertain terms that he is in no way a mystic and that his idealism is "solely designed for the purpose of comprehending the possibility of our a priori cognition of objects of experience . . ."

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.