

Articles

Nietzsche: The Myth and Its Method

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As the number of Objectivist oriented academic philosophers continues to increase, the lenses under which the philosophy will be examined will undoubtedly grow more powerful. Likewise, Objectivist scholarship will become rigorously more intensive; forgoing the entertaining broadside for the well documented and exacting examination. As examples of this development, witness David Kelley's *The Evidence of the Senses* and Allan Gotthelf's and James Lennox's anthology *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology*, to name but two recent efforts. I wish I could include John Ridpath's article "Nietzsche and Individualism," printed in Vol. 7, ##1 and 2 of the now defunct *The Objectivist Forum*, as another instance of this trend, but alas, I cannot. The reasons for my reservations constitute the body of this essay. What follows is divided into three parts: (1) a recapitulation of Ridpath's exposition of Nietzsche's philosophy along with a running commentary suggesting alternative interpretations, (2) a short catalogue of Ridpath's errors of scholarship, and (3) a short list of reasons for devoting time to the study of Nietzsche's thought.

Exposition

Why did Ridpath choose to author an article on Nietzsche? It was, Ridpath tells us, in an effort to ascertain whether Nietzsche is on the side of individualism.

The purpose of this article is to examine Nietzsche's philosophy in order to ascertain which side Nietzsche is really on. Based on a study of the complete corpus of Nietzsche's works, this article will present Nietzsche's general philosophical outlook and then use this as the context for understanding his social views, and for judging whether or not he is a defender of individualism. (I, 9. All quotations from Ridpath will be given in part-page format, i.e. I,9 means part I, page 9.)

Before commencing the actual examination of the entire Nietzschean corpus, Ridpath asks "What is individualism?" We obviously cannot know whether Nietzsche is on the side of individualism until and unless we know what is meant by that term. After a short historical survey of the term, Ridpath exposes its deeper philosophical meaning.

Individualism has other, deeper, philosophical roots. The crux of individualism is free will. Acknowledging the presence of free will in each man knocks the metaphysical props out from under any claim that the individual is merely subordinate to, or is a fragment of, some higher collective entity. The acceptance of free will is the basis for seeing the individual as a sovereign, independent being. This, in turn, is the first step in the defense of rationality, egoism, and an individualist society. (I,10)

Ridpath concludes his preliminary exposition by claiming that the question of Nietzsche's individualism rests on two issues: Does he advocate individual rights and more importantly "does he advocate the philosophical fundamentals that can provide a grounding for individualism?" (I,10)

By "philosophical fundamentals" Ridpath means metaphysics (especially the metaphysics of man) and epistemology. And it is to these areas that he turns to next. But before he details Nietzsche's views on these matters, he finds it "fruitful" to start with a short description of Nietzsche's view of his own age, an age of nihilism in the face of the death of God. By "death of God" Nietzsche meant, not the actual death of an actual God, the God of Christianity, but rather the fact that "the Christian values and world-outlook that had formed the heart of European culture had lost the allegiance of men, and the culture, adrift without a framework, was threatened with impending collapse into despair, nihilism, madness, and doom." (I,10) To take the place of Christ and Christianity, Nietzsche proposed the figure of Zarathustra, the "anti-Christ and anti-nihilist, this victor over God and nothingness." (I,11) Zarathustra will teach mankind how to rise up off of their knees and consecrate the earth as the highest reverence, to realize the hero in one's soul, to reject altruism and the welfare state and mysticism in all of its forms. For those having difficulty in figuring out what is wrong with such a harbinger, Ridpath quickly reminds us that the espousal of values, even heroic and life affirming values, is not a primary. (I,11) They rest on a metaphysics and an epistemology. And the place to begin the search for Nietzsche's basic philosophy is his first major work: *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music* (hereafter BOT. Ridpath only directly quotes this work once and gives no abbreviation) which was published in 1872. Nor is this starting point an option, for Ridpath tells us that "one *must* turn" (I,11. Emphasis mine) to BOT in order to understand Nietzsche. Ridpath also tells us that not only will we find metaphysical and epistemological pronouncements in BOT but also Nietzsche's "basic philosophical system" despite the fact that other commentators as well as Nietzsche himself go to great lengths to deny that such a system exists. It may be implicit, but it is there.

Here we must halt our presentation to ask a question or two. The very title of the work, BOT, tells us that this book is about aesthetics. In fact, the opening line of the first section of BOT talks of "the science of aesthetics." Let us assume that every aesthetics rests on and derives from a metaphysics and an epistemology. The question is why begin with Nietzsche's aesthetics rather than ethics? Why BOT rather than *The Dawn or Human, All Too Human*? But we have already been told, a mere two paragraphs earlier, why we cannot begin with ethics, viz., that "[a]n espousal of values is not a primary. It presupposes an underlying philosophical base." (I,11) Certainly Objectivism agrees. But the same is true for aesthetics. Both aesthetics and value espousal presuppose an underlying philosophy of what there is and how we know it. To repeat, why choose to begin with Nietzsche's aesthetics rather than his ethics? Might it not be the case that if one proceeds from Nietzsche's life affirming catalogue of values one would unearth a different basic philosophy, one more consonant with individualism? The only reason Ridpath gives for not beginning with Nietzschean values is that they are not primaries; but since this pertains *mutatis mutandis* for aesthetics, Ridpath's starting point seems rather arbitrary.

I said a question or two - the second question pertains to Ridpath's claim that Nietzsche, his denials to the contrary notwithstanding, had a philosophical system. Ridpath's claim is based on the notion that "[p]hilosophy [i.e. metaphysics and epistemology], either explicitly or implicitly, is inescapable, and applies even to those, such as Nietzsche, who deny it." (I,11) Ridpath does not prove, or even attempt to prove this claim, a claim that which, according to Richard Taylor, "[n]othing could be sillier."¹ (Taylor *does* try to prove his claim). By "philosophical system" Ridpath means, in essence, a metaphysics and an epistemology. Take metaphysics. To test Ridpath's statement *vis-a-vis* metaphysics it is crucial to know exactly what Ridpath and Nietzsche mean by metaphysics. Metaphysics is the study of ultimate reality. It is the "study of existence as such or, in Aristotle's words, of 'being qua being'..." For Rand, existence can only be defined ostensively; it is something one could literally wave one's arm at.² Leaving aside the amount of agreement or disagreement between Aristotle and Rand on this point and focusing on her notion of existence, one can say with a certainty normally denied one engaged in Nietzsche exegesis, that this is definitely *not* what Nietzsche had in mind when he used the term "metaphysics." He invariably meant the two world variety that he attributed to Parmenides, Plato, Christianity and Kant to name but four. For Nietzsche, metaphysics is the study of the "real" world, i.e. the realm of Being, heaven, or the thing in itself. I suggest that one of the reasons for Nietzsche's aversion to systematic philosophy is this identification of metaphysics with the other worldly variety. When Rand sweeps her arm and calls that "existence," I think Nietzsche would agree, although he might simply call it the physical world.³ You cannot sweep your arm at heaven.

If one keeps Nietzsche's meaning in mind, then Ridpath's assertion that metaphysics is inescapable translates into the claim that a "two world metaphysics" is inescapable - and that is simply wrong on Objectivist's grounds. If Rand is right, any two world view is a mistake and definitely escapable. Ridpath's case against Nietzsche is based on a simple equivocation. If one makes the issue very specific, i.e. whether a one world or two world view is correct, then both Nietzsche and Rand are in agreement. If, and this "if" is much more questionable, a one world metaphysics is a necessary condition for individualism, then Nietzsche passes this test with flying colors.

To return to exposition. After telling us that "everything he wrote later is based on the metaphysics and epistemology contained in the *Birth of Tragedy*," Ridpath proceeds to explicate the text. Curiously, this explication is done away from the text itself. Notes 17 to 54 covering I, 12 to II, 5 contain only one direct reference to BOT. Leaving aside the advisability of explicating a text one hardly consults, what are Ridpath's findings? Nietzsche is an eclectic. An unholy marriage of Hegel, Schopenhauer and Heraclitus (and Kant). (See I, 12, and cf. II, 4 where we are told that "Nietzsche is, in regard to philosophic fundamentals, an explicit and even militant Kantian.")⁴ From Hegel, (who is not even mentioned in BOT), Nietzsche got Heraclitus. From Heraclitus, who makes only three more or less parenthetical appearances in BOT, "Nietzsche took," according to Ridpath, "the view that the universe is a random process, a flux, a becoming, out of which specific things emerge, temporarily, and then are reabsorbed." (I,12) Firstly, according to Kirk and Raven,⁵ the flux doctrine is a misinterpretation of Heraclitus due to Plato (and Aristotle followed his master on this point) insofar as it overlooks Heraclitus' emphasis on the "logos" which governs all becoming. If one accepts Kirk and Raven's analysis, then

describing Heraclitus' becoming as "random" is simply wrong. Secondly, the two quotations used by Ridpath to support his findings on Heraclitus are not from BOT but, (via F.A. Lea's *The Tragic Philosopher*) from *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (Hereafter PTA). N17 tells us that Nietzsche thought Heraclitus had "the highest powers of intuitive conception" and n18 tells us that Heraclitus taught, according to Nietzsche, that reality is "[t]he eternal and exclusive Becoming, the total instability of all reality, which continually works and never is..." This latter statement could well be true without it being the case that the process was "random." In fact, had Ridpath read more section 5 of PTA (from which nn 17 and 18 are indirectly taken) he could hardly have missed Heraclitus' characterization of becoming as "[l]awful order, unfailing certainties, ever-like orbits of lawfulness,..." Also, he would have noticed that, according to Nietzsche, Heraclitus "denied the duality of totally diverse worlds...[H]e no longer distinguished between a physical world from a metaphysical one, a realm of definite qualities from an undefinable 'indefinite'." In other words, for Heraclitus, there is only one world, this one, and it is both orderly and lawful. This is the Heraclitus that influenced Nietzsche.

Ridpath then concludes that for the Nietzsche "there is no 'being' behind the doing" and that "the doing is everything." (I,12) These last four words are from *On the Genealogy of Morals* (hereafter GM. Actually so are six of the seven words quoted first but Ridpath does not bother to indicate that fact with quotation marks). From those two quotations Ridpath would have us believe that for Nietzsche there is "change without entities that change, a change of nothing into nothing." (I,12) Whatever warrant there may be for the first clause, it is a staggering leap to the second. But in §13 of GM, the very section from which Ridpath's quotations are taken, Nietzsche tells us what he is after, the prey he is seeking to destroy, viz. the "subject," the "substratum," or the "Kantian 'thing-in-itself'." Nietzsche does not believe in a "thing" without effects; a "doer" whose identity cannot be gleaned from its "deeds." If Kaufmann is correct, Nietzsche is here following none of the four philosophers Ridpath mentions but rather Goethe.

We really try in vain to express the essence of a thing. We become aware of effects (*Wirkungen*), and a complete history of these effects would seem to comprehend the essence of the thing. We exert ourselves in vain to describe the character of a human being; but assemble his actions, his deeds, and a picture of his character will confront us.⁶

(Ridpath's total neglect of Goethe goes a long way toward explaining his anti-developmental interpretation of Nietzsche as well as how he can miss the metamorphosis of Dionysius that is so evident in a section like §49 of TOI entitled "Goethe" wherein we find the spirit of this German antipode of Kant baptized with the name "Dionysius." All of which more in due course).

So when Nietzsche says that "there is no being behind the doing" this does not imply that there are no entities for Nietzsche. Merely, and not merely "merely," that for Nietzsche, "entity" does not mean what it means for, say, Kant and Aristotle; an amalgam of two elements, substance and attribute, a knowable part identified by Aristotle with form and an unknowable part identified with matter (Kant's noumenal/phenomenal distinction is a variation on this theme to say nothing of Being and becoming in Plato or any of its

Christian variants). Objectivism rejects this view of entities also.⁷ An entity, for Nietzsche, is the sum of its effects and behind these effects there is no mysterious and unknowable matter, substratum, thing-in-itself, ὑποκειμένον or what have you.

And finally a brief word about Schopenhauer, who is mentioned eight times in the original edition of BOT.⁸ From Schopenhauer Nietzsche got Hegel and Heraclitus! "Schopenhauer also had, in essence, a Heraclitean-Hegelian view of reality" (I,12). Poor Schopenhauer, whose hatred for Hegel equaled Rand's hatred of Kant, and who spent a lifetime spewing his worst invective on Hegel only to be pictured by Ridpath as a transmission belt for "the ponderous and witless Hegel." One of Schopenhauer's reasons for despising Hegel is due to latter's attempt to destroy (or at least to aufheben) the distinction between phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, a distinction Schopenhauer considered Kant's greatest achievement. Since Schopenhauer is, according to Ridpath, a recapitulation of Hegel and Heraclitus, we may safely ignore him and press on.

If we grant to Ridpath that BOT contains a two-world metaphysics, however deviously derived, we next have to deal with the assertion that Nietzsche never altered that metaphysics. According to Ridpath, Nietzsche simply "took that metaphysics one step further" (I,13) by replacing the will of Schopenhauer (which, according to Ridpath was Schopenhauer's transformation of Hegel's Spirit which was Hegel's transformation of the Kantian thing-in-itself) with the will to power.

But how then do we explain that much commented on section of *The Twilight of the Idols* (hereafter TOI), which bears the title "how the 'True World' Finally Became a Fable" and subtitled "The History of an Error." The error Nietzsche is referring to is any and all two world metaphysics, whether Platonic, Christian or Kantian. And what is left when we hear the cockcrow of positivism (here taken to mean a one world, this world view) on the morning when this two world "ideal" can no longer even obligate? The apparent world perhaps? Nietzsche asks. No, he replies, not even that. The "true" and apparent worlds live or die together. At last. Man can love this earth, this world. There is no counterworld against which this world could be unfavorably compared.⁹

If this interpretation is accurate and TOI (cf. also BGE §§10-11; GS §54; esp. HAH § 9, 10 & 18) not only does not contain a two world view but actively denounces such a position, then we are left with the following alternatives: either Nietzsche did change his metaphysical view from BOT to TOI or he never held a two world view at all. On either alternative, Ridpath's reading of the "metaphysics" of Nietzsche is extremely problematic. That is, either Ridpath is in error in claiming that Nietzsche never changed his two world metaphysics from BOT until the end or Nietzsche never held such a view.

What of this former possibility? What especially of Ridpath's claim that the metaphysical vision in BOT is dualist? Since he directly quotes BOT only once, it may be more revealing to see what the dualist interpretation of Nietzsche in general does to Ridpath's ability to read BOT itself. Kaufmann used to "wonder how *The Birth of Tragedy* could ever have been so thoroughly misconstrued."¹⁰ Approaching BOT with the two-world interpretation in hand, Ridpath was almost compelled to see Apollo and Dionysius as antagonists representing the phenomenal and noumenal (to use Kantian language) realms

respectively. "But [the Greek tragic] plays also pay homage to the truth that *underneath* the individual entity (the Apollinian element) lies the Heraclitean furnace (the Dionysian element), which ultimately defeats the hero." (I,13. Emphasis mine). I would like to suggest that the vertical orientation is wrong. Dionysius is not "under" Apollo or more fundamental. Rather than see Greek tragedy through a metaphoric of foundation and superstructure, of fundamental and non-fundamental, Nietzsche employs the image of warp and woof, and both Dionysius and Apollo are seen as integral to the tapestry of Greek tragedy as developed by Aeschyles and Sophocles. It is in his reflections on the chorus and the tragic hero that Nietzsche came to realize that it is "this duality itself as the origin and essence of Greek tragedy, as the expression of two interwoven artistic impulses, *the Apollinian and the Dionysian*." (BOT, §12) Sexual procreation is another image Nietzsche uses (e.g. in §1 of BOT) to give the reader a premonition of his theory concerning Attic tragedy which is "an *equally* Dionysian and Apollinian form of art." (Emphasis mine.) How could Ridpath apply his vertical orientation to sexual reproduction? Is woman the thing in itself and man the appearance or vice versa?

Nor is Ridpath's metaphor of foundation/founded adequate to explain the death of tragedy at the hands of Euripides/Socrates. Does Euripides destroy tragedy by undermining its foundation (=Dionysian element)? Since, according to Nietzsche, Euripides is a mask for Socratic rationalism, this would mean that Euripidean tragedy is also a two story (two world) structure with reason as the base supporting the Apollinian *principium individuationis*. But this is precisely what Nietzsche denies.

The Euripidean drama is a thing both cool and fiery, equally capable of freezing and burning. It is impossible for it to attain the Apollinian effect of epos, while, on the other hand, it has alienated itself as much as possible from Dionysian elements. Now, in order to be effective at all, it requires new stimulants, which can no longer lie with the sphere of the only two art-impulses, the Apollinian and the Dionysian. These stimulants are cool, paradoxical thoughts, replacing Apollinian contemplation - and fiery affects, replacing Dionysian ecstasies; ... thoughts and affects copied very realistically and in no sense dipped into the ether of art. (BOT, §12)

The real opposition is, as Nietzsche tells us explicitly, "[T]he Dionysian [NB. here the meaning of Dionysian includes the Apollinian - a presagement of development in the later Nietzsche] and the Socratic." (BOT, 12) He tells us in BOT and reiterates this claim in *Ecce Homo* (EH) where he writes of the two decisive innovations of BOT: (1) is the "understanding of the Dionysian element ... as *one* root of the whole of Greek art," and (2) Socratic rationalism as a sign of disintegration, as a "dangerous force that undermines life" (EH-BOT, 1. Emphasis mine.) Compare Rand's notion that rationalism keeps reason and gives up the world). That the Dionysian element is one of two equally important roots is eloquently stated in the last sentence of BOT where Nietzsche, speaking through the voice of an Aeschylean stranger says "[N]ow follow me to witness a tragedy, and sacrifice with me in the temple of *both* dieties!" (Emphasis mine). In the same section we find the following:

Thus these two art drives must unfold their powers in a *strict proportion*, according to the law of eternal justice. Where the Dionysian powers rise up as impetuously as we experience them now, Apollo, too, must already have descended among us, wrapped in a cloud; and the next generation will probably behold his most ample beautiful effects. (§25 Emphasis mine).

Approaching the text with a preconceived notion about Nietzsche's two world metaphysics prevents Ridpath from seeing what the real conflict, the real issue, is in BOT, viz., tragedy vs. rationalism. Since they cannot be fitted into the vertical metaphors, a metaphors that Ridpath seems unable to do without, he fails to notice, simply because he lacks the instrument, the horizontal images Nietzsche puts into play throughout BOT. Apollo/Dionysius¹¹ are twin roots of Attic tragedy; likewise Dionysius/Socrates form a pair of more or less equal participants in a struggle for the Greek ψῦχῆ and no member of either set can be understood as more fundamental, at least not in the base/superstructure sense of fundamental.

What is Nietzsche trying to accomplish in BOT? Let the author himself have the last word. It was, he tells us an "attempt to assassinate two millennia of antinature and desecration of man..." Thus spake Friedrich Nietzsche.

Ridpath begins part II of his article by exposing Nietzsche's view of man. He claims that for Nietzsche feelings, not reason, constitute the essence of man. Since the issue of feelings vs. reason will be examined at length in the Grammar Switch section of part II, I will say no more about Ridpath's version of Nietzsche's philosophical anthropology.

What of Ridpath's interpretation of Nietzsche's epistemology? After a short paragraph listing "certain positive things" Nietzsche has to say about reason and its efficacy (II,2-3), Ridpath proceeds to consider the dark side of Nietzsche's view of reason. But Ridpath's recognition of Nietzsche's positive appreciation of reason is only apparent, for a mere two pages later he tells us the "Nietzsche's 'praise' of reason is *totally* undercut by his view of what reason is." (II,4. Emphasis mine). And if we take this word "totally" with seriousness - if not with gravity - Ridpath's Nietzsche is a total irrationalist.

There is no truth, no correct awareness of the facts, Nietzsche tells us, because in a Heraclitean world of flux without entities 'there are no facts'. We are only deceiving ourselves when we think 'there would be a world left over once we subtracted the perspectival.' This is known as Nietzsche's doctrine of perspectivism, or his doctrine of illusion. The intellect, out of its own need for facts and structure, *subjectivity creates within itself* the world it requires. In this, it engages in what Nietzsche approvingly refers to as 'lying in the extra-moral sense' - creating the illusion of an external worlds of things, facts, identity, causality, laws, and the like - when actually all of this is fantasy, 'articles of faith.' ... The whole external world of facts, structure, necessity are inside the human mind... Nietzsche in fact prided himself in going one step further than Kant by holding that even the theory *that knowledge is subjective is itself a completely subjective* and arbitrary theory. (II,3. Emphasis mine).

The phrase "there are no facts" is from §481 of WTP and is Danto's translation of "*Tatsachen gibt es nicht*." A different picture of Nietzsche's meaning emerges when one reestablishes the context of this remark. Nietzsche seems to be on the attack and two of his prey are positivism and Kantianism. Listen to the first paragraph of §481 (=Schlechta 903). All translations of this section are Kaufmann's with slight modifications to conform more strictly to Nietzsche's German.

Against positivism, which halts at phenomena - "There are only *facts*" - I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only *interpretations* (*Interpretationen*). We cannot establish any fact "in itself": perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing.

I would point to the first two words as evidence for my claim that Nietzsche is writing against positivism here while the phrase "in itself" is a definite indication that some Kantian doctrine is under assault. Putting this in terminology agreeable to Objectivism seems a relatively simple matter. There are no *noumenal* facts, since there is no *noumenal* world. But what about Ridpath's charge of "subjectivity" against Nietzsche. Listen to paragraph two, which Nietzsche seems to have written in anticipation of such an accusation.

"Everything is subjective," you say; but even this is *interpretation* (*Auslegung*). The 'subject' is not something given, it is something added and invented and projected *behind* what there is. - Finally, is it necessary to posit an interpreter *behind* the interpretation? Even this is invention, hypothesis. (Last two emphasis mine).

Here Nietzsche has not only Kant's 'transcendental ego' in mind, but the whole of the subjective turn in philosophy since Descartes. (Descartes comes up for additional knocks three sections later in §484). As noted above when discussing Nietzsche's "metaphysics," he never tires of fighting against a "behind" the appearances approach to philosophy. The charge of "subjectivity" made against Nietzsche by his imaginary interlocutor (positivism and Kant and Ridpath) presupposes that such a view is the only alternative to an intrinsic view like Kant's. But isn't there a third possibility? A place between the Kantian "rock" and the subjective "hard place?"¹² Between the intrinsic and the subjective? Nietzsche will have nothing to do with a "subject" that has nothing to do with its actions, an "ego" behind the scenes. This is a variation of his view that the "thing is the sum of its effects" which we examined above (See text to n3).

As for Nietzsche's perspectivism - paragraph three.

In so far as the word 'knowledge' (*erkenntniss*) has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is *interpretable* (*deutbar*) otherwise, it has no meaning *behind* it, but countless meanings. - "Perspectivism." (Last emphasis mine. The quotation marks around "perspectivism" are in the original German!).

With just this much of the context restored to §481 (there remains one last paragraph) we see a different Nietzsche emerging: a Nietzsche who rejects any form of Kantian

intrinsicism, a Nietzsche who rejects subjectivism, a Nietzsche who grants that knowledge of the world is possible. Where is the downside to this Nietzsche?¹³

But one might object that the Nietzsche I find in the texts is almost too good to be true. He sounds like a man who has read, if not *Atlas Shrugged*, at least the first edition of *We the living*.¹⁴ Perhaps I overextend to Nietzsche the principle of charity. To this charge I can only plead guilty. With Nietzsche's text, the principle of charity is especially important since, given the poetic nature of his writings and his doctrine of masks (in which the surface meaning of the text can actually mask the real meaning, which may even be the opposite of what was said) we can never be sure that "something precious and vulnerable" may appear "rude and round as an old green wine cask with heavy hoops" to a superficial reader.¹⁵

Finally, before we turn to Ridpath's scholarship, let us look at his summary of Nietzsche's ethics. Ridpath seems to make two contradictory claims about the ethics of Nietzsche: (1) that he is "an amoralist" because he is "opposed to principles as such" and since ethics is a set of principles to guide one in the art of living well, Nietzsche cannot have an ethics (II,5); (2) that Nietzsche has an ethics, but it is elitist, not individualist. (II,8-9). Let us examine these charges in order, ignoring the fact that they cannot both be true.

Certainly Nietzsche thought himself to have a morality. In a draft of a letter to Paul Rée dated 1882 he wrote "...She told me herself that she had no morality - and I thought she had, like myself, a more severe morality than anybody..."¹⁶ If Ridpath is correct in identifying morality with the adherence to principles, and if Nietzsche does indeed have a morality, we need to ask about the principles upon which he bases his moral conduct and theory. One such principle is "self-overcoming," a concept we find throughout his corpus.¹⁷ A person who acts on whim or the range of the moment is amoral, whereas a person who acts on principle may be immoral (if the principles are life negating) but not amoral. The strength (or will to power) to overcome one's impulses is the mark of a moral man for Nietzsche. And the faculty that enables one to overcome one's impulses is reason. Reason is the highest faculty man possesses, not simply because we can form concepts, "but because these skills enable it to develop foresight and to give consideration to all the impulses, to organize their chaos, to integrate them into a harmony - and thus to give man power: power over himself and over nature...reason gives men greater power than sheer bodily strength. Foresight and patience, and above all 'great self-mastery'..."¹⁸

While this is certainly not conclusive, it does seem to cast doubt upon Nietzsche as an amoralist. As for those passages where Nietzsche calls himself an "immoralist," they are typically contexts in which he identifies morality with Altruism or Christianity. The gist of his message is "if this be morality, then I am an immoralist."¹⁹

As to the second charge, that Nietzsche's morality is not individualist but elitist - what can be said? It is certainly true that Nietzsche writes of masters and slaves, of overmen and last men, of creators and those who cannot create - but even these last can give birth to future creators.²⁰ This last notion must not be lost sight of despite Nietzsche's talk of "breeding" and "blood."²¹

But I would also suggest that the whole notion of an elite/mass dichotomy fails to comprehend a salient feature of Nietzsche's methodology and one of the many meanings hidden in the title of "Beyond Good and Evil," and that is the notion of nuanced as opposed to antithetic thinking.²² To take but one example, consider §260 of BGE. Although he talks about two basic types of moralities, (and even prints "master morality" and "slave morality" in italics) he is quick to point out immediately after their introduction that most moralities are mixed - and hence most people are a rather promiscuous jumble of unintegrated moral bits and pieces.²³

Finally, Nietzsche's alleged elitism is probably no more than a throwback to the Greeks²⁴ and especially Aristotle. As for Aristotle, recall his division of mankind into natural slaves and freemen. Also, Aristotle's notion of ἀρετή (virtue or excellence) as the habit (or settled character) of choosing the relative mean according to a rational principle is close to Nietzsche's use of the word instinct (in contexts where he negatively contrasts it with reason) and such a reading goes a long way in answering Ridpath's charges of irrationalism against him (11,4-5). Finally, Nietzsche, alone of the great philosophers, has praise for greatness of soul (μεγαλοφυχία).²⁵ Kaufmann even goes as far as to suggest that a work like EH owes much to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.²⁶

Summarizing Ridpath's interpretation of Nietzsche we find that he is a two world metaphysician, an irrationalist who advocates instinct and denigrates reason, and an amoralist (or immoralist) who preaches sacrifice of the masses to the ideal of the overman. (For more on Nietzsche's politics, see below).

To support this reading, Ridpath appends to his essay 87 notes as evidence of his scholarship. It is to this scholarship that we now turn.

Scholarship

Within the context of my knowledge, there exists no agreed upon list [the members of my own will be defined *en passant*] of possible errors one can make in scholarly research - mine is surely rough and by no means exhaustive. My list includes the "Deadend," the "Misdirection," the "Edition switch," the "Grammar Switch" and "Context Dropping" (the last identified by Rand herself). Please note that in this section I will not attempt to impugn Ridpath's interpretations and conclusions, although I certainly disagree with most of what he has to say about Nietzsche. In fact, in personal conversation we agreed that our differences may be ones of emphasis. He thinks my reading more Apollinian while I find his more Dionysian (if I may misapply Nietzsche's own famous distinction from BOT). When I do make substantive points concerning Nietzsche's philosophy (itself a rather questionable bit of labeling, especially if one means by "philosophy" something more or less systematic), it will usually be by way of illustration, not interpretation. Let us now look at these scholarly lapses, beginning with the most venial.

THE DEAD END: By the dead end, I mean a note that goes nowhere, i.e. when one checks the text, it has nothing to do with Ridpath's comments or point. Fortunately, this occurs only once, at n37 and has to do with a famous Nietzschean motto, *amor fati*. Ridpath cites p.330 of WTP, but this page has nothing to do with *amor fati*, a phrase that occurs

but once in all of WTP, viz. in §1041 on p.536 of the Kaufmann edition. Since p.330 is cited again by Ridpath at n39, he might have misread his notes, or perhaps it is nothing by a typo.

THE MISDIRECTION: By misdirection I mean the citing of a secondary source that has itself quoted Nietzsche without giving the passage in the original text of Nietzsche. If one does this infrequently, little scholarly fuss should be made. But Ridpath does this 42 times out of 87 quotations! In fact, the very first quotation is a misdirection. Upon turning to n1, one reads "Quoted in *What Nietzsche Means*, G.A. Morgan,...p.116." Observe what this does. It directs (and hence misdirects) attention away from what Nietzsche said and causes the reader, or at least the curious reader, to ask whether Morgan has a particular ax to grind. Does he know Nietzsche and how well? Is he a philosopher? Did he do his own translations and, if not, whose did he use etc? An obvious solution, and one used by careful scholars, is to cite the primary as well as the secondary source. After all, it is Nietzsche that we are really interested in, not Morgan. Ridpath surely knows this practice since he does use it, once, at n25 where the secondary source happens to be an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. In that case he references *Ecce Homo* (EH) as well as the secondary source.

A particularly dangerous form of misdirection occurs when the secondary source material is a collection of essays and Ridpath does not indicate who the author is. Ridpath takes 12 of his 42 misdirections from R.C. Solomon's *Nietzsche*, a collection of 21 essays by various authors. Since these dozen quotations are from five authors, we never know who is speaking and Ridpath never gives the individual author's names. What is so bad about this? Since there are various and contradictory interpretations of Nietzsche's thought, one can easily make Nietzsche say whatever one wants. For example, when Ridpath wants to make Nietzsche into a mini-Kantian, he quotes the essay by Hans Valhinger, a famous Kantian (in fact he founded the journal *Kant-Studien*)²⁷ with a definite ax to grind.²⁸ Using this method one could make Nietzsche into an existentialist by quoting Jaspers or Heidegger from the same volume. Prefer a phenomenological twist? Try the Scheler. Analyst more to your liking? Then there's Danto. Meanwhile, we have forgotten Nietzsche. And all because we lack the primary sources.

And even if one happens to have the Solomon collection, the problem of checking the original is compounded by the fact that different authors use different editions and translations of Nietzsche's work. For example, Danto, whom Ridpath cites four times, does his own translating of WTP and hence does not cite the Kaufmann English translations but rather the three volume Schlechta German edition. In the latter work, no dates or other possible ways of correlating the passages cited to the Kaufmann are provided. And even if one has the Schlechta, as I do, this is little help when a different author (Ivan Soll, author of "Reflections on Recurrence: A Reexamination of Nietzsche's Doctrine, *die Ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen*," and listed as article 17 in the Solomon collection, comes to mind), uses another German edition. Most readers get bored with this hunting and checking and give up, relying on Ridpath's (and who knows how many others') scholarship. That this is a risky intellectual gamble is the thrust of this essay. [While we are on the subject of WTP, a brief explanation of this work is necessary. The WTP is not a work but rather a collection of notes that Nietzsche penned from about 1883 to 1888 -

they were not intended for publication and a careful scholar owes his readers an explanation of how he evaluates these notes *vis-à-vis* the works Nietzsche completed to his own satisfaction and to what extent he believes they can be quoted as representative of Nietzsche's mature thought. There are some notes (and here I have in mind ##158ff) which Nietzsche, and this according to Kaufmann,²⁹ used in his *Antichrist(A)*. These could be quoted as more representative of his considered opinion than, say, the cosmological exposition of the eternal recurrence,³⁰ which he never used in any of his published works. For a fuller story, see Kaufmann's introduction to his translation of WTP.]

Needful to say, Ridpath quotes from the WTP as if it was a completed text and gives the reader no warning that these are notes until n80. Thirteen of his 87 quotations are from WPT. This number may even be higher since the reader does not know how many of the secondary source quotations are also from WTP. A quick check of Morgan's book, *What Nietzsche Means*, indicated that eight of fifteen citations are from Nietzsche's notes, three of four from Danto, (Ridpath's cites from F.A. Lea's *The Tragic Philosopher* are the best of the lot with only two out of 10 from WTP - but he "remedies" this by quoting only one major work in the other eight cites, GS; the remaining seven cites are to notes, letters and minor works that Nietzsche never published) and so it goes. How much this colors Ridpath's interpretation is, of course, impossible to calculate. To really experience the point of this complaint, compare the Roark we get in *The Fountainhead* with the Roark from Rand's notes. As Peikoff warns, the latter Roark is only 'fiction'.³¹

A final species of misdirection needs to be mentioned. It occurs when we are referred to a secondary source for something that, according to Ridpath, Nietzsche wrote, only to find upon checking that the words are not Nietzsche's but the secondary source. n21 is a note to a purported sentence from Nietzsche, whereas the words between the quotation marks actually belong to Lea.

THE EDITION SWITCH: For some inexplicable reason, Ridpath refers to two different editions of EH. n14 refers to the Ludovici translation, while n25 and n57 refer to the Kaufmann. And he switches editions without informing the reader. n25 simply says "also EH, p.273." If the reader does not know of the Kaufmann he assumes Ridpath means the Ludovici. If so, he will conclude either that Ridpath has committed another dead end or that EH is a much longer work than it actually is. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the Kaufmann translation is available in both hard and soft covers, which have different paginations. Ridpath's n25 and n57 are to the latter, a fact nowhere indicated in Ridpath's endnotes. If one has the hardcover edition and tries to check Ridpath, confusion results.

THE GRAMMAR SWITCH: By grammar switch I mean placing the words of the quoted author in quotation marks but changing, without benefit of brackets or similar alerting devices, the capitalization and the punctuation. These grammar switches are too numerous to count (there are six on p.9 of Vol. 7 #2 alone). Below follow two examples of quotations containing several grammar switches. Consider n26. Ridpath is discussing Nietzsche's metaphysics of "will" or "energy" and is trying to expose "will" as "some mystical force that underlies both consciousness and matter" and he quotes Nietzsche's WTP [remember these are the notes we talked about above] as follows:

And do you know what "the world" is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself...a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, eternally self-destroying, this mystery world.

This little passage contains three grammar switches: (1) the four dots after the "itself" should be a semi-colon followed by three dots since the sentence does not end here as Ridpath's punctuation implies; (2) the capital "A" at the beginning of the quotation should be lower case - this is not a new sentence; and (3) the period after "world" is not to be found in the original.

But this is mild and perhaps excusable since the meaning has not been greatly affected. But the next grammar switch *does* dramatically alter the meaning of Nietzsche's text. Ridpath is trying to develop the thesis that, according to Nietzsche, our feelings are tools of cognition, that they are "the voice of a 'higher truth'" and that Nietzsche would have us trust our feelings instead of our reason. Ridpath tells us that according to Nietzsche, we should "trust our feelings...[because (sic)] that means to obey one's grandfather and one's grandmother, and their grandparents" (II,2). Now this grammar switch is also a misdirection. n34 directs us to the Solomon collection, specifically to an article by Mitchell Ginsberg on "Nietzschean Psychiatry" and the words themselves are from §35 of a work by Nietzsche entitled *Morgenröte* which Kaufmann translates as *The Dawn* (D) while Hollingdale, in his translation of the same book, employs *Daybreak*. Anyway, Ginsberg is quoting §35 because, according to him, Nietzsche is warning us NOT to trust our feelings at the expense of our reason - the *exact opposite* of what Ridpath is claiming. Ridpath has managed, I contend, to misunderstand both Ginsberg and Nietzsche. This will become clear if we consider Ginsberg's context. Before Ginsberg quotes from D, he writes the following:

Nietzsche's belief that the person, viewed as a total organism, will evolve to health (freedom sic.) to the extent that he/she reverses the social training of self-sacrifice...starts from the notion that man has been crippled by what is now approvingly called "socialization." Morality, the key to society...crushes self-reliance... It is for this reason and others that Nietzsche realizes that one cannot *simply*...trust one's feelings...: 'To trust one's feelings - that means to obey one's grandfather and one's grandmother and their grandparent's more than the gods which are in us: our reason and our experience' (*Dawn* 35 sic.)³²

Isn't Ginsberg's meaning clear? Could not Objectivists agree that "the social training of self-sacrifice" is something that one must reverse if health is to be achieved by the individual?

What about Nietzsche's own context? D is an aphoristic work in which many aphorisms stand alone whereas others may (or must) be read as connected. As an example of the disconnected variety one could instance §267 which is about the difference between a noble and common character and which is followed by an aphorism on the difficulty of

speaking in ancient Athens and writing in contemporary France without being formally repellant.

267

Why so proud! - A noble character is distinguished from a common one in *not possessing* a number of habits and points of view which the latter does possess: he chances not to have inherited or acquired them.

268

The Scylla and Charybdis of the speaker. - How difficult it was in Athens to speak in such a way as to win one's hearers *for* one's cause without repelling them *through the form* in which one spoke or drawing them away from one's cause with it! How difficult it still is in France to write in this way! [Hollingdale trans.]

But §35, the one that concerns us, can be read as more or less connected with several that precede it. (I say "more or less" because the connection here is not as strong as, say, that between §342 of *The Gay Science* and the opening paragraph of *This Spake Zarathustra* where Nietzsche literally repeats almost word for word in the latter what he wrote in the former). First I will consider §35 alone and then I will go on to examine the sections immediately preceding it.

§35 consists of a title and three sentences. I have translated it as follows:³³

Feelings and their Origin in Judgement. 'Trust your feelings!' But feelings are not ultimates; primaries; behind feelings stand judgements and value assessments; which in the form of feelings (like and dislikes) are transmitted to us. The inspiration, which descends from the feelings, is a grandchild of judgements, and often false! - and in any case not one's own! To trust one's feelings - that means to give more obedience to one's grandfather and grandmother and their grandparents than to the gods which are in *us*: our reason and our experience.

It is only the last sentence that Ridpath quotes. Ridpath's full sentence reads "And Nietzsche urges us 'to trust our feelings...[because] that means to obey one's grandfather and one's grandmother, and their grandparents.'" (II,2) Notice the grammar switches. (1) 't' for 'T'; (2) '...for'-'; (3) he places 'because' in brackets suggesting that he is supplying only continuity whereas he is, in fact, changing Nietzsche's meaning. Nietzsche's text suggests that what follows the '-' is an explication of what went before it whereas Ridpath's reading suggest that what went before the '-' is a conclusion and what comes after the 'because' is a reason for that conclusion; (4) the period after 'grandparents' is the most unkindest cut of all. It suggests that Nietzsche's thought is complete, whereas he goes on to recommend that we listen to our own reason and experience. With these types of grammar switches, Ridpath can make Nietzsche say anything. And that is the problem.

Note also that Ridpath commits the same four grammar switches on his secondary source for this quotation, Ginsburg, i.e. Ginsburg quoted Nietzsche correctly and Ridpath manages to destroy the intention of both his primary and secondary source.

Go back and read Nietzsche's original. Isn't his meaning clear? Misunderstanding Nietzsche is one thing; getting it exactly backwards is an accomplishment that requires real effort. Or no effort. Just inattention.

Before proceeding to our final category, I did promise to say a few words concerning the sections preceding §35. What makes Ridpath's interpretation of §35 even more inept is the fact that the section is preceded by (at least) two aphorisms that bear on the efficacy of feelings and hence whether we should trust them or our reason. §35 differentiates between moral feelings and moral concepts, the latter, according to Nietzsche are usually nothing more than rationalizations of actions performed on the basis of moral feelings, the latter being derived from apelike imitation of the "inclinations for and aversions to certain actions" which children have observed in adults. In reading the entire aphorism, it is clear that Nietzsche is critical of this method of picking up a morality. The section in full reads as follows:

Moral feelings and moral concepts. - It is clear that moral feelings are transmitted in this way: children observe in adults inclinations for and aversions to certain actions and, as born apes, *imitate* these inclinations and aversions; in later life they find themselves full of these acquired and well-exercised affects and consider it only decent to try to account for and justify them. This 'accounting', however, has nothing to do with either the origin or the degree of intensity of the feeling: all one is doing is complying with the rule that, as a rational being, one has to have reasons for one's For and Against, and that they have to be adducible and acceptable reasons. To this extent the history of moral feelings is quite different from the history of moral concepts. The former are powerful *before* the action, the latter especially after the action in face of the need to pronounce upon it. (Hollingdale trans.)

But §33 (too long to quote in full) is even more explicit on the point that one "has to be suspicious of *all higher feelings*, so greatly are they nourished by delusion and nonsense." These higher feelings derive from a fear of the supernatural as well as contempt for the law of causality. The whole aphorism deserves to be studied along with Rand's essay on "Causality Versus Duty."³⁴ In this aphorism, Nietzsche lambasts what he calls the morality of custom (cf. obeying one's grandparents etc. from the last sentence of §35) because, under its spell, "man despises first the causes, secondly the consequences, thirdly reality, and weaves all his higher feelings...into an *imaginary world*: the so-called higher world." In fact, the title of the aphorism is "Contempt for causes, for consequences and for reality." Nietzsche is trying to tell us that if we replace the contempt with respect for those three we will hardly need either a morality of custom nor the supernatural realm which provides it with "support." All of this casts a shadow of doubt on whether Ridpath ever read either §33 or 34, especially if one remembers that he found the quotation from §35 in a secondary source, Ginsburg, and never provided pagination in the original.

Obviously, one could step back even further from §§33-35 and consider, say, the entire first book of D. §6 is perhaps the most interesting from the point of view of our concerns because it contrasts the morality of custom with those "moralists...who, following in the footsteps of Socrates, offer the *individual* a morality of self-control and temperance as a means to his own *advantage*, as his personal key to happiness..."³⁵ This and other sections should have provided Ridpath with the background against which to read and interpret §35, and in the light of them I venture to say that Ridpath's reading is a misreading.

We have arrived at the final category of scholarship errors: context dropping. The reader is no doubt familiar with the ideas as it occurs within the canon of Objectivist thought. There are two principal usages of this term: One deals with one's desires and is principally a psychological device of evasion. The other usage is epistemological, and it is this sense of context-dropping that I will be using.³⁶ You are guilty of context-dropping whenever, "you tear an idea from its context and treat it as though it were a self-sufficient, independent item..."³⁷ As an example of this practice, consider Ridpath's handling of what he believes is Nietzsche's politics. Ridpath tells us that, for Nietzsche, "the preservation of the 'noble' comes before any concern with the rest of mankind."³⁸ And in a paragraph designed to sum up Nietzsche's politics Ridpath writes, "In a chilling phrase that captures all of this, Nietzsche writes: 'The beginnings of everything great on earth [are sic] soaked in blood thoroughly and for a long time.'" (11, 10)

In order to see this as an example of context-dropping, consider that the line is quoted from §6 of the second essay (titled "'Guilt', 'Bad Conscience,' and the Like") of the *Genealogy of Morals* (GM) where the origins of "guilt" and "bad conscience" are being discussed. The section, as well as those preceding and succeeding have nothing to do with the preservation of the noble or their slaughtering of slaves. Hear the opening sentence: "It was in this sphere then, the sphere of legal obligation, that the moral conceptual world of 'guilt,' 'conscience,' 'duty,' 'sacredness of duty' had its origin: its beginnings were, like the (not "The" as Ridpath writes) beginnings of everything great on earth, soaked..." etc., as in Ridpath. Nietzsche here is making an historical point,³⁹ not recommending this as something politically desirable.

The notion that Nietzsche is in favor of some caste-based elitist tyranny is laughable, especially in one who recommends that we "examine Nietzsche's ideas, not his art; confront him in *toto*, not selectively;"⁴⁰ (11, 10) and then goes on to ignore entire sections of books devoted to a pillorying of all forms of state-worship in proto-Randian terms. The interested reader should consult §4 of "Schopenhauer as Educator" from *Untimely Meditations*; "A Glance at the State" from Vol. 1 of *Human-all-too-Human*; "On the New Idol" from *Thus Spake Zarathustra* and "What the Germans Lack" from *Twilight of the Idols*. After reading these, one might come to agree with Kaufmann, who writes, "It is for this reason that the State becomes the Devil of Nietzsche's ethics: it intimidates man into conformity and thus tempts and coerces him to betray his proper destiny."⁴¹ Notice that Kaufmann writes about the State without qualification. And if one remembers all the nasty stuff Nietzsche had to say about religion and mysticism, one can appreciate that an appropriate subtitle for a study of Nietzsche might be "Faith and Force: the Destroyers of the Modern World."⁴²

Nor is this the only instance of context-dropping in Ridpath's study. It is the rule rather than the exception. He has a penchant for taking three or four word phrases from Nietzsche's works and stringing them together with his own words to make a paragraph; such a practice, while not in itself context dropping, can easily lead to it. So as not to belabor the point, let us consider only one last example. n23, which is flanked by an "*" tells us that "[t]he translation in the edition cited may differ slightly from that quoted herein." n23 reads "The general character (total nature) of the world is chaos to all eternity."⁴³ At this point, it will come as no surprise to the reader that this quotation is also a grammar switch. Again we must ask: What is Nietzsche's context? What is going on in the section from which this half sentence has been ripped? If Ridpath had merely continued the quotation he would have seen what was going on. "The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos - in the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms." Nietzsche is warning us against crude-all-too-crude anthropomorphisms. The entire section (§189) is written as a series of warnings - a set of three "let us beware of"s. The first sentence of the first paragraph reads, "Let us beware of thinking that the world is a living being." The second paragraph, from which Ridpath "quotes," is, in the main, a warning against imposing aesthetic judgements on the universe. "None of our aesthetic and moral judgements apply to it." The third and last paragraph warns us against the belief that creation is going on in the world. "Let us beware of thinking that the world eternally creates new things." And then Nietzsche asks, "When will all these shadows of God cease to darken our minds? When will we complete our de-deification of nature?"

After quoting Nietzsche, Ridpath then asserts that "[f]or man, life in this sort of mind-numbing world has to be terrifying" (1,12). But given our restored context, we must ask if Ridpath would really prefer the deification of nature? Do aesthetic anthropomorphisms provide metaphysical comfort necessary for man to survive? It seems appropriate to quote from the aphorism immediately before the one we have been examining, in which Nietzsche says "[g]od is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. - And we - we still have to vanquish his shadow, too."⁴⁴

I would like to conclude this study with a few brief remarks concerning the value of Nietzsche for Objectivist philosophers. First, and here I am simply elaborating on Heidegger's point alluded to in n5, that in order to know and appreciate the philosophical relationship between Rand and Nietzsche (and here I am speaking ahistorically) one must have an intimate knowledge of their ideas. Second, there is a question of historical influence. How much did Rand read and understand of Nietzsche's corpus? Since this question has a large historiographic component, it would undoubtedly require the services of someone with an equal competence (and interest) in history, biography and philosophy. Third, although Ridpath explicitly downplays Nietzsche's style (and surely the plural "styles" is warranted here) he remains, with Plato and Rand, as one of the greatest writers in the history of philosophy. There are aspects of his writings that, on the sense of life level are, quite simply, Objectivist.⁴⁵

I'll bring this short list to a close with a fourth reason for studying Nietzsche. Rand wanted to be known as "the greatest enemy of religion"⁴⁶ and this title she must surely wrest from the man who wrote *A: TOI*, (especially chapters five and seven); *TSZ*, when a religious type is used to speak religiously against all religion; "The Religious Life" section from *HAH*; the "What is Religious" section of *BGE*; almost all of *GM*; and finally, Book Two, section 1, "Critique of Religion" from *WTP*. I would lay these works on the bench before any honest judge and say, quoting Roark, "the defense rests."

Endnotes

NB: All abbreviations are as in Ridpath's original article. All translations from the German are by Walter Kaufmann unless otherwise indicated.

1. Richard Taylor, *Metaphysics*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1963, 1.
2. Ayn Rand, *An Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology*, New York, New American Library, 1979, 53. This monograph originally appeared in *The Objectivist* from July 1966-February 1967. The quoted material is from *Philosophy: Who Needs It*, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1982, 3.
3. Cf. Nietzsche's *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. M. Cowan, Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1962, 51. For additional reasons why Nietzsche eschewed a "systems" approach, see the chapter "Nietzsche's Method" in Walter Kaufmann's *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, New York, Meridian Books, 1956. Also cf. Danto's "When he uses the term 'metaphysics' he often has in mind only a philosophy that speaks of a reality which is higher and purer than the one we are seemingly acquainted with through the senses." (*Nietzsche as Philosopher*, 81)
4. This is a problem for those who see, say, Kant and Hegel as antipodes on crucial areas of metaphysics and epistemology. For example, if the existence of a noumenal world is distinctive of Kant, then Hegel was certainly seen by Ayn Rand as a member of the "major line of philosophers [who] rejected Kant's 'noumenal' world..." (*For the New Intellectual*, p.34). In this respect, if Nietzsche is a Kantian in his metaphysics, then he can't be an Hegelian. If the latter, then not the former. Ridpath can't have his Kant and eat his Hegel too. As for epistemology, see Kelley's pro-Hegelian n45 on p.39 of his *The Evidence of the Senses* where he refers to p.31 of the Baillie translation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* for the latter's criticism of Kant's view of mind as a distorting medium of knowledge which can nevertheless critique itself without distortion. Here Nietzsche is close to Hegel when he writes in §486 of WTP "...a critique of the faculty of knowledge is senseless; how should a tool be able to criticize itself when it can use only itself for the critique?" §473 is equally appropriate in its obvious anti-Kantian tone.
5. Kirk, G.S., and Raven, J.E., *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, 187. Alexander Nehamas makes the same error on p.43 of his book on Nietzsche and cites BOT, 8 here Nietzsche pours his new wine into Schopenhauerian bottles. If BOT 7 represents a break with, at least, the language of Schopenhauer, BOT 8 marks a temporary return to the idioms of the great pessimist. Cf. Kaufmann's n2 to BOT 8. I obviously have weighted heavily Nietzsche's comments *against* Schopenhauer in both §6 of the "Attempt at a self-criticism" section of BOT and §§1,2 of the EH-BOT to which the reader is gently referred. In defence of Ridpath, most commentators on Nietzsche see little in the influence of Heraclitus except the "flux" doctrine. One may add the names of Kaufmann and Danto to Nehamas' - Jaspers is the exception among this quartet. Cf. pp.209 and 350 of the paperback edition of his *Nietzsche: An introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity*, Chicago, Regnery, 1969. Finally a word about Heidegger on Heraclitus. He hardly mentions the "flux" doctrine and calls

Nietzsche's use of it "pseudo-Heraclitean" on p.91 in vol. 2 of the four volume English translation of his two volume *Nietzsche*. In two essays on Heraclitus included in *Early Greek Thinking*, Heidegger does not mention the "flux" doctrine at all and prefers to concentrate on λόγος and ἀληθεσία as found in fragments B15 and B16 respectively. Needless to say they are both intimately connected with the "Being of beings." An *en passant* reference to Heraclitus may be found on p.109 of *What is Called Thinking*, but there Heidegger abuses those who think by making such a connection (a connection between Nietzsche and Heraclitus) they are saying anything of importance. The point being that, according to Heidegger, since we hardly know what either of these two thinkers thought, connecting them is more akin to concealing chatter (*Gerede*) than revealing speech.

6. For more on Nietzsche's doctrine that "A thing is the sum of its effects" (WP, 551) cf. Alexander Nehamas' chapter of the same name from his *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*. For the Goethe that follows in the text, debts to the first volume of Kaufmann's trilogy, *Discovering the Mind*. The quote from Goethe is on p.23 of Cf. Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, trans. D. Green, Garden City, Anchor, 1967, 177 who agrees with Kaufmann and even goes on to say that Goethe is for Nietzsche what Christ is for Christians. On Ridpath side, Löwith does see Nietzsche as a pessimist ala Schopenhauer. For an antipode of Nietzsche in Objectivist literature, the interested reader might compare James Taggart (*Atlas Shrugged*, 883/820) who wanted to be loved, not for anything he did or said or thought - not for his body or mind or words or works or actions but just for himself. Only, if Cheryl Taggart and Nietzsche are right, there is nothing left after all of the above have been subtracted.

7. For details on the rejection of the two element view of entities, see Leonard Peikoff's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, *The Status of the Law of Contradiction in Classical Logical Ontologism*, 213ff. This does not mean, of course, that Objectivism embraces Nietzsche's view of entity.

8. Debts to W. Kaufmann's index for the count of the number of appearances that Heraclitus, Hegel and Schopenhauer make in BOT. It must be admitted of course, that the actual citing of any historical name proves little. Recall what Nietzsche says in EH- BOT 1 concerning the "hostile silence about Christianity throughout the book." That is, the book is profoundly anti-Christian without Christianity making an on-stage appearance. Cf. Toohey who also thought this a powerful technique when in reply to Dominique's accusation that he had done nothing against Roark, not even so much as to mention him in print said "That, my dear, is what I've done against Mr Roark." 299/281.

9. Also crucial for an understanding of Nietzsche's concept of metaphysics is the immediately preceding section, §6 of TOI, which tells us that any other kind of reality, besides this world, is "absolutely indemonstrable" and can only result in a "slander, detraction and suspicion against life" here on earth.

10. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, Princeton University Press, 1950, 109.

11. A note of caution. "Dionysius" is used multivocally by Nietzsche. When used in contrast with Apollo, he stands for a particular ensemble of qualities that give rise to the

various Dionysian art forms, e.g. harmonic music, dithyrambic poetry and ecstatic dance. When used in contrast to Socrates, Nietzsche means that "equally Dionysian and Apollinian form of art - Attic tragedy." (BOT, 1) For more on this see Kaufmann's *Nietzsche*, 1st ed. p.109. Even more interesting albeit less convincing is Kaufmann's notion on p.108 that although Nietzsche does not extol either god, he favors Apollo if he favors any!

12. What has to be guarded against (and this is especially true in cases where one is taking three or four words out of context) is accusing a thinker of subjectivism where he is attacking the intrinsic; or accusing a thinker of intrinsicism where he is attacking the subjective. At this point in the evolution of Objectivist theory, subjectivism appears to be the more villainous of the pair since our age is one of rampant subjectivism. Cf. *The Ayn Rand Lexicon* where only three small anti-intrinsic excerpts are cited versus four+ pages against subjectivism.

13. For additional discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism see Nehamas' "Untruth as a Condition of Life" chapter as well as Danto's "Perspectivism" chapter from his *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, especially pp.81-2. To quote just two sentences from each chapter to give the flavor of their commentaries, consider "What is seen is simply the world itself...from that perspective." (Nehamas, 50) "Depreciation of the body motivates depreciation of the senses, and the opposition between sense and reason has its origin in this distrust. Such theories of reason, not reason as such, are the target for Nietzsche's antirational attacks." (Danto, 81) These two quotations should not be taken to suggest overall agreement between these writers. In fact, one significant area of disagreement concerns the pragmatic theory of truth usually attributed to Nietzsche - Danto yes, Nehamas no. For more on Nietzsche defence of reason see the discussion of his ethics below.

14. I specify the 1936 edition because a careful reading of both editions suggests that the earlier is, in a sense approximating Ridpath's understanding as evinced in his article (and in that sense incorrect), more "Nietzschean" than the 1959 edition.

15. Cf. §40 of BGE, as well as Kaufmann's note 22 and the references contained therein to Jaspers on this very topic.

16. Walter Kaufmann, *The Portable Nietzsche*, New York, Viking, 1959, 102.

17. For an early work cf. D§6, for a middle work, TSZ, Second Part, "On Self-Overcoming," and for a late work, TOI, "On the 'Improvers' of Mankind" and from the notes see WTP, 382-388. All of these passages are commented on by Kaufmann in the chapter "Morality and Sublimation" from his *Nietzsche*, to which I am indebted and cannot improve.

18. Kaufmann, 199. Cf. TOI IX, 14. Ridpath's ignoring of the concept of self-overcoming probably goes a long way to explaining his misunderstanding of the overman. (He discusses the overman at 11, 6-9). For more on the relationship between self-overcoming and the overman, see Kaufmann's *Nietzsche*, ch. 11; Danto's *Nietzsche as Philosopher*, ch. 7 and Nehamas' *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, pp.158-9, to name only three.

19. Cf. the following passages: HAH, 96; D, 9, 132; BGE, 32, 201, 221, 226, 228, 259, 260; TOI, Chapter 7, Chapter 9, §32; EH, IV 2-4, IV 6; WTP, 116, 132, 235, 304, 361, 457. Of these, EH, IV, 4 is the most straightforward in its explanation of the term "immoralist" where we read that the "term *immoralist* involves two negations. For one, I negate a type of man that has so far been considered supreme: the good, the benevolent, the beneficent. And then I negate a type of morality that has become prevalent and predominant as morality itself - the morality of decadence or, more concretely, *Christian* morality." For a different interpretation of this "immorality" issue, cf. Jaspers' *Nietzsche*, p.160ff.

20. Cf. §126 of BGE.

21. Ridpath attacks the "blood" idea before and after citing WTP p.495-6. Cf. Kaufmann's Nietzsche p.264-5 for a less crude reading.

22. NB. Despite appearances, the last clause does not commit a self-referential fallacy. A color example may help. One can eschew thinking in simple minded black and white terms without denying the existence of black and white. There is an upside and a downside to this approach. On the one hand, one can find good in the worst of men and bad in the best of men. That's the down side. The up side is, and I think this is the case with Nietzsche, a willingness to look beyond good and evil in the crudest sense to what may be overlooked by superficial and hasty evaluations. This approach was used by Nietzsche, especially in the essay on David Strauss, HAH, in TOI. It is, I would suggest, a much better interpretation of the phrase "How one philosophizes with a Hammer" since nuances are more effectively revealed with a tuning fork than with a sledge hammer. Nevertheless, I am not entirely convinced by Kaufmann's argument, and one of the reasons is the analysis Nietzsche gives of the phrase "beyond good and evil" when he writes it does not mean "beyond good and bad", i.e. the antithetic of the nobles. (GM, 1, 17).

23. Something Dominique found impossible to endure. Nietzsche's realization of this fact should not be construed as an endorsement.

24. Consider §9 of the *Dawn* where Nietzsche, after discussing and disparaging the moralities of those who simply follow custom and traditions, goes on to discuss "Those moralists, on the other hand, who follow in the footsteps of Socrates, offer the *individual* a morality of self-control and temperance as a means to his own *advantage*, as his personal key to happiness..."

25. See my "μεγαλοψυχία : A Suggestion" *The Personalist*, Winter, 1975.

26. See §2 of his introduction to EH.

27. Biographical information on Vaihinger is from the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 8, 221f.

28. See nn.44 and 45.

29. WTP, p.97 n15.
30. Ibid. Especially notes 1063 and 1064.
31. See especially the punching episode in *The Early Ayn Rand*, p.376.
32. Ibid. The Ginsberg quotation is to be found on p.302 of the Solomon collection and the lines from Nietzsche are, of course, from §35 of the *Dawn*.
33. The research for this paper was done before I bought the Hollingdale translation. His translation and the original from Nietzsche is provided for comparison.

Feelings and their origination in judgements. - 'Trust your feeling!' - But feelings are nothing final or original; behind feelings there stand judgements and evaluations which we inherit in the form of feelings (inclinations, aversions). The inspiration born of a feeling is the grandchild of a judgement - and often a false judgement! - and in any event not a child of your own! To trust one's feelings - means to give more obedience to one's grandfather and grandmother and their grandparents than to the gods which are in *us*: our reason and our experience.

Gefühle und deren Abkunft von Urteilen - "Vertraue deinem Gefühle!" - Aber Gefühle sind nichts Letztes, Ursprüngliches, hinter den Gefühlen stehen Urteile und Wertschätzungen, welche in der Form von Gefühlen (Neigungen, Abneigungen) uns vererbt sind. Die Inspiration, die aus den Gefühle stammt, ist das Enkelkind eines Urteils - und oft eines falschen! - und jedenfalls nicht deines eigenen! Seinem Gefühle vertrauen - das heißt seinem Großvater und seiner Großmutter und deren Großeltern mehr gehorchen als den Göttern, die in *uns* sind: unserer Vernunft und unserer Erfahrung.

This is from *Werke in Drei Bänden*, edited by Karl Schlechta, vol. 1, 1037.

34. This essay was first published in *The Objectivist*, Vol. 9, #7, July 1970 and later reprinted in the collection *Philosophy: Who Needs It*.
35. The translation is by Hollingdale. The interested reader should also consult §10 for more on the antipodal relationship between custom and causality.
36. Debts to *The Ayn Rand Lexicon* of which see p.105 for complete quotations and additional references.
37. Ibid.
38. (II, 9) This quotation always reminds me of the discussion in which Keating tells Toohey that Roark is "a maniac on the subject of architecture. It seems to mean so damn much to him that he's lost all human perspective...He'd walk over corpses. Any and all of them. All of us. But he'd be an architect." p.254; pb.239.

39. Cf. esp. §§4 and 5 immediately preceding the section from which Ridpath's take his quotation. (A similar point is made by Roark in the first two paragraphs of his courtroom speech in *The Fountainhead*, pp.736/679).

48. Whether this is possible is, of course, another question. It may well be the case that critical analysis, like art, is a "selected recreation of reality" according to the critic's "metaphysical value judgements."

41. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, New York, Meridian Books, 1956, p.135.

42. This is, of course, the title of a lecture by Rand originally given in 1960 at Yale University and reprinted by the Nathaniel Branden Institute (no copyright date) and most recently in *Philosophy: Who Needs It*, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1982, pp.70-92. (The contents page of the hardcover edition has the article beginning on p.71, a typo no doubt).

43. The reference is to p.168 of the Kaufmann translation of 1974 published by Vintage. Don't be fooled by Ridpath's capitalization and punctuation - this is another grammar switch. But for Ridpath that is almost a *sine qua non* of his scholarship etiquette. Rule #1 (A paraphrase of Nietzsche strange to say) in Ridpath's scholar manual reads "One offends an author badly if one doesn't distort his grammar."

44. GS, §108.

45. Cf. Rand's comments on Nietzsche's analysis of the "noble soul" in her Introduction to the 25th anniversary edition of *The Fountainhead*. Of all the philosophers she could have chosen, she picked Nietzsche and that choice is significant. Why not some line from the great souled man section of Aristotle's ethics? Or consider her "Notes for 'The Fountainhead'" published in *The Objectivist Forum*, Vol. 5, #6 where on p.1 she uses the expression "herd-instinct" to describe the antipode of independence; and a quote from Nietzsche to describe the meaning of Howard Roark who lived a "whole life lived on a certain principle."

46. *The Objectivist Forum*, Vol. 4, #4, 3.