Review Essay: Mark D. Friedman, *Nozick’s Libertarian Project: An Elaboration and Defense*

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A recent trend in libertarian thought has been a move away from anarcho-capitalism or minarchy in favor of a more interventionist and redistributive state, whether in a left-libertarian “Georgist” vein or in a more Rawlsian “social justice” direction. In contrast, Mark Friedman’s purpose in *Nozick’s Libertarian Project* is to advance a minarchist natural-rights libertarianism in the light of Robert Nozick’s contribution and the critical literature it has spawned (p. 2). Friedman’s book has received only one review prior to this one. That review misrepresents Friedman and is flimsy, flippant, and distastefully hostile. I attempt to do better here.

In chapter 1, Friedman expounds and defends Nozick’s explanation of the ground of natural rights in features of persons that distinguish them from other beings. In Chapters 2 and 3, he explains and develops Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice and defends it against objections, mostly from egalitarian conceptions of “social justice.” Some of his arguments depend upon intuitions which are not shared by all, and to that extent seem circular; and he tends in places to emphasize desert instead of entitlement. However, he seems to say enough to dispose of objections raised by G. A. Cohen, Barbara Fried, Loren Lomasky, Thomas Nagel, Michael Otsuka, Hillel Steiner, Peter Vallentyne, Jonathan Wolff, and others. In Chapter 4, he offers a two-part argument for the legitimacy of the minimum state. In Chapter 5, he explains the libertarian thesis that liberty requires private property, which he illuminatingly illustrates with historical surveys of England, Germany, and Mexico. He also criticizes the extensive government interventions in American economic life since the New Deal. In the final chapter, he defends natural-rights libertarianism against the objections of David Friedman, Jonathan Wolff, Will Kymlicka, and Peter Railton, respectively, to the effect that

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• its conception of rights is implausibly stringent,
• it requires the state to stand by as needy people starve,
• it fails to ensure that all have the resources needed for the effective exercise of autonomy, and
• it cannot deal adequately with negative externalities.

He makes several proposals to permit minimal compulsory redistribution in some circumstances, invoking value pluralism and a right to self-preservation. There is much in Chapters 2, 3, 5, and 6 that is worthy of detailed discussion, but here I focus on Chapters 1 and 4, concerning natural rights and the state.

In *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, Nozick says that a “moral side-constraint” is not a goal or something to be maximized; rather, it restricts the goals we may pursue and the means by which we may pursue them. A side-constraint expresses the fact that people may not be used in the specific way that the side-constraint excludes. Nozick claims that side-constraints reflect the fact that people exist as different individuals with separate lives. He suggests that the best explanation of the fact that morality contains side-constraints will appeal to features of persons that entail this partial libertarian side-constraint:

(p) it is (normally) impermissible to use a person merely as a means for the benefit of other persons.

The parenthetical “normally” signifies that it might be permissible to use a person as a means for the benefit of others “to avoid catastrophic moral horror.” The full libertarian side-constraint, which also prohibits paternalistic aggression, needs an additional argument. Nozick says that anyone who rejects (p) must deny that morality contains side-constraints, propose a different explanation for them which does not entail (p), or show that Nozick’s explanation does not entail (p).³

We can illustrate the point with an example from natural science. We begin with the fact that the planets move around the sun. For more than two centuries, the best explanation of that fact was Isaac Newton’s theory. Newton’s theory entails not only that the planets move around the sun, but that they move around the sun in near-elliptical orbits. Anyone who rejects the proposition that the planets move around the sun in near-elliptical orbits must deny that the planets move around the sun (as did Aristotle, Ptolemy, and others), propose a different explanation which does not entail near elliptical orbits (as did Einstein, if we count rotating near-ellipses as not being near-

elliptical), or show that Newton’s theory does not entail near-elliptical orbits (which has not been done). The fact that Einstein’s explanation is better than Newton’s shows the weakness of Nozick’s type of argument: so-called “inference to the best explanation” is invalid. Still, if the features of persons to which Nozick appeals do explain the fact of side-constraints better than any other explanation that has been proposed so far, and if they entail (p), then it will be true that (p) follows from a theory which is currently the best explanation in its field. Unfortunately, Nozick’s explanation is sketchy.

Nozick dismisses some traditional explanations for side-constraints in terms of things like rationality, free will, and moral agency; however, he thinks that these may closely be related to the attribute of persons that explains side-constraints. Nozick’s discussion\(^4\) is obscure, but it seems that he takes that attribute to be this:

\[(M)\text{ the ability to regulate and guide one’s life in accordance with some overall conception one chooses to accept.}\]

How would it follow from the fact that a being has (M) that she ought not to be used as a means for the benefit of another? Nozick suggests that a being with (M) might be one which can have, or strive for, a meaningful life, and that the concept of meaning seems to straddle the “is-ought” divide. He admits, though, that this does not answer the question and he says that he hopes to grapple with these issues on another occasion.\(^5\) In short, his proposed explanation is so sketchy that it entails neither the partial libertarian side-constraint nor any other.

Friedman gives the label “rational agency” to the combination of (M) with the three attributes of rationality, free will, and moral agency, which it presupposes (p. 18). He reconstructs Nozick’s argument as follows (pp. 20-22).

\begin{enumerate}
  \item Persons enjoy a special moral status: their individual interests are entitled to great moral weight.
  \item The special moral status of persons renders them morally inviolable: there are side-constraints on how they may be treated.
  \item Persons are rational agents.
  \item Persons are inviolable because they are rational agents.
\end{enumerate}

\(^4\) Ibid., pp. 48-49.

\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 50-51.
(5) Persons have a right to exercise their rational agency without interference, subject only to the equal rights of other rational agents.

Therefore,

(6) the use of force or coercion against innocent persons (those not engaged in aggression or fraud against other persons) interferes with their rational agency and is therefore morally impermissible.

I have for simplicity’s sake suppressed qualifications about non-adults and persons with impaired cognitive capacity.

Friedman’s argument for (1)-(4) runs as follows. Our ordinary moral thinking recognizes that there are constraints on using persons merely as means for the benefit of others, even where the gain for the others is greater than the loss for those sacrificed. For example, we think it wrong to kill a man and harvest his organs to save five other people. In contrast, routine sacrifice of animals for the sake of other animals or persons, even to the extent of killing them for food, is permissible. The contrast must be explained in terms of an attribute of persons which is not possessed by those animals which are not persons. Friedman considers a number of possible attributes but rejects them for one reason or another. He says that the process of elimination leaves him with the attribute of rational agency, which he claims is the best explanation for the contrast, though, unlike Nozick, he sees moral agency, rather than (M), as the attribute that does the explanatory work (pp. 22-26).

It is worth clarifying this first part of Friedman’s argument, and what it shows, before proceeding to the second part. The side-constraints on persons recognized in our ordinary moral thinking are weaker than (p): they do not rule out all uses of some people merely as means for the benefit of others. For example, many people see nothing wrong with redistributive taxation and some see nothing wrong with a period of compulsory military service. Furthermore, our ordinary moral thinking recognizes side-constraints on animals, which prohibit those uses of them for our benefit which are cruel. So the contrast between persons and other animals to which Friedman appeals in his argument for (1)-(4) concerns those “middling side-constraints,” weaker than (p), but stronger than those which people generally think apply to animals. We can note that our ordinary moral thinking allows these middling side-constraints to be overridden in some circumstances, for instance, if we have to kill a person to save one million. If we accept Friedman’s process of elimination (which I do not discuss), we are left with rational agency as a property that distinguishes persons from animals. However, it does not follow from this that rational agency is the best explanation for the overridable middling side-constraints on persons. It follows only that the two are correlated: whenever we have one, we have the other. As the statisticians put it, “correlation does not prove causation.” The only way to show that it is
rational agency that explains overridable middling side-constraints is to produce the explanation. That requires an intelligible connection, ideally a relation of entailment, between the two properties, or failing that, a theory which affirms rational agency to be the ground of overridable middling side-constraints which also entails consequences that are in some way independently testable and which survive the tests (e.g., the theory may enable the solution or an illuminating re-statement of problems other than those it was designed to solve).

Friedman’s argument for (5) and (6) is intended to supply the explanation. For, if the rational agency of persons entails (p), it will explain why persons are protected by overridable middling side-constraints (in the same sort of way that, if Newton’s theory entails that the planets move around the sun in near ellipses, it explains why the planets move around the sun). Friedman makes several attempts to derive (p) from rational agency. In the first he argues for premise (5), that it seems obvious that the application of force or the threat of force against innocent persons (those not engaged in aggression or fraud) will interfere with the exercise of their capacity for rational agency, from which we would like to conclude that all other persons are morally required to refrain from such interference (p. 26). However, this restates his conclusion, (6), which is supposed to be derived from (2)-(5); it cannot, therefore, without circularity, be used to argue for (5). Perhaps this should be interpreted as a parenthetical remark rather than as part of the argument.

He next presents a quotation from Nozick’s Philosophical Explanations. I have numbered the sentences for ease of reference.

[1] If your basic moral characteristic of being a value-seeking individual includes weighting values in free choice . . . then [2] being responsive to this characteristic and to the originative value you possess will involve respecting your autonomy. [3] Within this domain it will be impermissible for others even to force you away from the bad or less good toward the best; [4] doing so would be anti-responsive to your capacity as a weighter of values. [5] Thereby is a right to personal liberty delineated.6

Friedman rightly complains that proposition [2] does not seem to follow from proposition [1]: “even granting that it is our rational agency that confers value upon us, why are other persons required to respect our autonomy?” (p. 27) He makes two attempts to plug the gap, neither of which appears satisfactory. The first invokes Kant’s dictum never to use a person merely as a means. However, Kant’s dictum is (p), so to appeal to it in an argument for (p) is entirely circular. Friedman elaborates as follows:

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The special moral status of rational agents is rooted in their autonomy (this is a variation on Friedman’s premise [4]); therefore,

appropriate deference requires that they be permitted to live the life they choose, so long as they do not infringe the equal rights of others (this is a variation on Friedman’s premise [5]); therefore,

the use of force or coercion against persons in order to accomplish some extraneous goal is a morally inappropriate response to the value of autonomy, and is therefore impermissible (this is a variation on Friedman’s [6]).

However, the transition from (i) to (ii) just mirrors Nozick’s transition from [1] to [2], which Friedman has acknowledged to be deficient. We still have no explanation for why a person’s rational agency or autonomy imposes restrictions on the behavior of others. Friedman adds that this little argument assumes the truth of premise (4), that persons are inviolable because they are rational agents. However, we recently saw that Friedman’s argument for (4) showed only that rational agency and overridable middling side-constraints are correlated. We are looking to this second part of his argument to provide the because.

Friedman’s second attempt (pp. 27-28) to plug the gap between Nozick’s [1] and [2], or his own (i) and (ii), appeals to impartiality (or Kantian universalizability). He says that people who accept (4)—that persons are protected by overridable middling side-constraints because they are rational agents—may not demand respect for their own autonomy while denying equal respect to other persons (because to do so would not be impartial). But what about people who do not accept (4)? Friedman is supposed to be explaining why rational agency grounds side-constraints; he must address his argument to those who doubt or deny (4), not only to those who already accept it. Furthermore, he concedes that many people who do accept (4) will be egalitarians of one kind or another who construe “autonomy” so that it is consistent with some redistributive measures. So, even by addressing his argument to people who accept (4), he will still not get them to (p). He says that such egalitarians will need to articulate a principled distinction between acceptable and unacceptable forms of redistribution, and that he will argue in Chapters 2 and 3 that it is impossible convincingly to draw such lines. However, he draws such lines himself in his Chapter 6. So, this argument falls apart: Friedman has still not explained how rational agency grounds (p) or other side-constraints on persons.
A second problem with Friedman’s and Nozick’s type of argument is that, even if it could be made to work, it would yield the wrong side-constraint. Friedman’s (5) claims that we have a right to exercise our rational agency without interference, and his (6) says that what is wrong with the use of force or coercion is that it interferes with another’s rational agency. Nozick’s argument is concerned to show that we are required to respect a person’s autonomy or free choice. However, a constraint on interfering with persons’ exercises of rational agency, autonomy, or free choice, does not amount to (p). Consider the following examples.

(e1) Joe has just bought a beer for himself, which he intends to drink. I pick it up and drink it. Joe does not notice what I have done until he sees me put down the empty glass.

(e2) I see that Joe intends to ask Annie for the next dance. Before he does, I ask Annie to dance and she accepts.

(e3) A runaway train threatens to kill five workers on the track. Joe and I are on a bridge over the track, between the train and the workers. Joe is a very heavy man. I push him off the bridge into the path of the train, thereby stopping the train and saving the five workers.\(^7\)

In each example I interfere with Joe’s exercise of his rational agency, his free choice, and his autonomy, preventing the execution of his plans for his immediate or long-term future. However, only in (e1) and (e3) do I use Joe merely as a means for the benefit of others. In (e1) I use him for my benefit (though without using force or threat). In (e3) I use him for the benefit of the five workers (and I also use force against him). In (e2), in contrast, I do not use Joe as a means at all. Some interferences with rational agency, autonomy, or free choice do not use a person merely as a means. Furthermore, while (e1) and (e3) are normally regarded as morally impermissible, (e2) is not. Some interferences with rational agency, autonomy, or free choice are morally permissible. In short, it seems that focusing simply on exercises of rational agency, autonomy, or free choice will not get us to (p) or to side-constraints that mark the bounds of permissibility. Examples similar to (e2) are familiar both to Nozick\(^8\) and to Friedman (pp. 44-46), but each fails to see that something additional to, or perhaps instead of, a person’s capacity for autonomy/free choice/rational agency is required to explain libertarian side-constraints.

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\(^8\) Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, pp. 262-64.
It should be noted that, while Nozick sometimes formulates the partial libertarian side-constraint as (p), he often formulates it as: it is impermissible to sacrifice one person to benefit others. He seems to treat the two formulations as interchangeable. However, they are not. If sacrificing someone means killing him, the two formulations are plainly different; but Nozick does not use “sacrifice” in that sense. If “sacrifice” is not used in that sense, it seems too vague or metaphorical. For example, in (e2) I clearly do not use Joe merely as a means, but I do (in some sense) sacrifice him for my benefit. He had an interest, perhaps a keen one, in having that dance with Annie, yet I denied him that for the sake of my own interest in having that dance with Annie. I therefore suggest that (p) is the better formulation of the partial libertarian side-constraint.

How can we improve upon Nozick’s and Friedman’s arguments from rational agency to (p)? I can only sketch an answer here. First, Nozick’s (M) suggests the dogmatic rationalist, or “self-authorship,” idea that persons somehow discover by pure reason who they are and then live their lives accordingly. We replace (M) with the critical rationalist, or “self-discovery,” conception of the distinguishing attribute of persons. In the case of an animal which is not a person, the best life that it can lead is determined by its biology. The animal normally tries to live a life of that kind by acting in accord with its biological instincts and the culture, if any, that it acquires from its local conspecifics. In contrast, a person is a creature who has language and self-consciousness, who can therefore formulate in words her inherited beliefs, theories, attitudes, practices and such like, and subject them to critical scrutiny. This critical rationality enables her to ask herself: What sort of life will fulfill me? The only way she has of discovering the answer to that question is by conjecture and refutation: she must form a hypothesis about what kind of life will fulfill her and then test that hypothesis by trying to live that life. She may learn, possibly quite quickly, that her conjecture is mistaken: it becomes clear to her that she cannot live, or cannot live well, in the kind of life she has chosen, either because she is not good at it or because it does not satisfy her. In such circumstances, her conjecture is refuted and she has to learn some lessons from the mistake and then make another guess about who she is and then set off to test it empirically. Second, we hypothesize that

9 For example, ibid., pp. 30-31 and 46.

10 For example, ibid., pp. 31, 34, and 45-46.


12 Compare Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 312-17, on experimental communities.
the point of human morality is the flourishing of the human community, which is a function of the fulfillment of individual human persons. Third, we infer that morality requires that persons have extensive freedom to experiment with types of life so that they can seek to discover what will fulfill them. Fourth, we note that people will be free to experiment with types of life effectively only if they are permitted to acquire private property and are reasonably safe from being used merely as a means for the benefit of others. Fifth, we conclude that morality requires (p). Which exceptions to (p) are allowed by the “normally” qualification it includes, is a matter for further argument, but the work of free-market economists suggests that far fewer exceptions are permissible than are allowed by the overridable middling side-constraints generally recognized in contemporary Western societies.

In Chapter 4, Friedman discusses and rejects a number of attempts, including Nozick’s, to show that the state is legitimate. He offers a new argument in two parts. The first part, concerning the state’s provision of national defense, draws on George Klosko. It can be summarized as follows. A community that is unable to defend itself against external aggression risks a moral catastrophe. However, a defense service provided commercially would founder on the free-rider problem: people who do not pay for the service would still get its benefits, so all would have an incentive not to pay and the service would be under-provided, if provided at all. In consequence, a community can avoid the risk of moral catastrophe only if there is an agency providing for its defense which is able to compel those citizens who are unwilling to pay for it. Now, the point of side-constraints is to protect rational agency, but they will not do that without national defense and there will not be national defense without compulsion to pay for it. Therefore, such compulsion is necessary if side-constraints are to fulfill their function, in which case, the side-constraints must allow an exception for that purpose. The argument will generalize to other forms of compulsion that are necessary to secure our rational agency. However, any such compulsion is subject to a fairness condition. Thus, Friedman formulates the libertarian principle of fairness: “if the benefits and burdens of cooperating with the state in a programme necessary to secure our rational agency are fairly distributed, then all rational agents are morally obligated to participate.” This argument, unlike Klosko’s, is not suited to legitimize state provision of such public goods as cleaner air or basic scientific research; for, while such goods may improve our standard of living or extend our life expectancy, they are not required to protect us from violations of our rational agency (pp. 86-95).14


14 For an approach that is in some ways similar, see Eric Mack, “Nozickean Arguments for the More Than Minimal State,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, ed. Ralf Bader and John Meadowcroft (Cambridge: Cambridge
Friedman’s argument can be viewed as a Kantian argument against the anarchist. The full libertarian side-constraint that prohibits using a person merely as a means to benefit another or as a means to benefit himself is “practically inconsistent” or impossible to realize, because it precludes the state, thereby precluding national defense, thereby practically ensuring that there will be violations of the full libertarian side-constraint. The only way to make the full libertarian side-constraint practically consistent is to include an exception for national defense and other services necessary to secure our rational agency, subject to the fairness condition. The argument might recall the doctrine that Nozick labeled a “utilitarianism of rights,” according to which we are to violate side-constraints where, but only where, doing so reduces the number or severity of violations of side-constraints overall. There is an important difference, however. Friedman’s argument does not legitimate scapegoating or killing one to save five, because the benefits and burdens would not be shared fairly: in the libertarian principle of fairness, the “our” in “secure our rational agency” should be taken to refer to all of us.

The second part of Friedman’s argument for the minimal state concerns its provision of internal security. He says that the argument for the legitimacy of a minimal state’s providing tax-funded national defense does not carry over to a minimal state’s monopolizing the domestic security services (law-enforcement, adjudication, and punishment), because the problem of free riders in the latter case is not acute (people can to a large extent be excluded from receiving the service if they do not pay) (p. 96). The main problem is, instead, to explain the legitimacy of outlawing rival protective associations and independents who enforce their own rights. Friedman’s explanation is that “the citizenry of a state governed by the rule of law have collectively foregone the opportunity to employ their individually preferred legal procedures” (p. 99). This might sound as if the citizens have made a compact to give up their rights to defend themselves in their own way. Friedman avoids that falsehood by construing “collective foregoing” in terms of a culturally fostered adherence to the rule of law. Drawing on Friedrich Hayek, Friedman says that the requisite collective foregoing obtains if and only if there is a moral tradition subscribed to by the majority of the community according to which laws must be abstract (or impartial), must not affect particular people or groups disproportionately without their consent, and must apply equally to the legislators. In addition, state compulsion should satisfy the libertarian principle of fairness (pp. 96-98).


15 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 28-29.

It is difficult to see how such a community tradition of the rule of law amounts to a collective foregoing of the opportunity to employ individually preferred legal procedures. It requires only that a majority of the community subscribe to the tradition. How do the remainder partake of the collective foregoing if they do not even agree with the tradition? Even if everyone agrees with the tradition now, what is to stop some people from changing their minds about it? Furthermore, even those who do adhere to the tradition as specified, need not agree that the laws should be enforced by a single agency. The existence of a tradition of the rule of law does not amount to the required “collective foregoing.” Friedman says: “unlike in Nozick’s invisible hand narrative, those living in a society substantially governed by Hayek’s rule of law are justified in rejecting legal procedures and punishments employed by outsiders, even if they are formally the ‘same’ procedures” (p. 98). But the alternative legal procedures are not employed by outsiders. Some may be employed by members of the society who are critical of the rule-of-law tradition. Others may be employed by members of the society who endorse that tradition but who disagree with the majority about which procedures should be employed to enforce, adjudicate, and punish. Friedman’s argument for the legitimacy of a minimal state’s monopolizing domestic security services seems a failure.

It is curious that Friedman goes through this unsuccessful detour concerning “collective foregoing,” because it seems that the libertarian principle of fairness can get him to his conclusion directly. It is not, as with national defense, that the free-rider problem makes taxation necessary; it is rather that having competing agencies for internal security is likely to lead to internecine feuding, or that permitting independents to operate their own justice procedures would generate too great a risk of violations of side-constraints. If side-constraints do not permit an exception for state monopoly provision of internal security, they will not fulfill their function of securing our rational agency. This type of argument legitimizes all types of state compulsion which are necessary to reduce the overall number or severity of incursions into side-constraints, provided the fairness condition is satisfied; and it will involve a balancing of the incursions due to compulsory protective services against the (likely) incursions they protect against. It should be clear that Friedman’s argument, thus modified, for the legitimacy of the minimal state’s providing national defense and internal security, is consistent with the critical-rationalist defense of broadly libertarian side-constraints sketched above.

Friedman’s book is a serious attempt to defend and develop Nozick’s work. It is ambitious, well-informed, packed full of arguments, and attacks problems from different angles and with varied solutions. His solutions and his arguments are not always successful, especially where they depend upon appeal to contested intuitions, but when they fail, they are usually instructive. The book is clearly written and remarkably compact. It is an enjoyable and enlightening read.